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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
This dissertation studies the determinants of firms’ financial reporting decisions. It
presents three empirical studies. The study in chapter 2 describes the determinants and
consequences of the choice to voluntarily adopt non-local accounting standards.
Chapters 3 and 4 contain studies of the effects of firm-specific and country-specific
factors on firms’ financial reporting choices.
 Firms face reporting choices at different levels. For example, before the
European Commission decided to mandate usage of International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) across the European Union, firms in many countries were allowed to
use U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (U.S. GAAP) or IFRS instead of
their local GAAP for consolidated financial reporting. But also within a  set  of
accounting standards, managers can make measurement and disclosure choices, such
as the choice of depreciation scheme, the capitalization or expensing of development
costs, the classification of a lease as finance or operating lease, or whether to recognize
a provision or a contingent liability. These reporting choices are made by managers
with certain reporting objectives in mind.
The determinants of firms’ reporting objectives and reporting choices are the
central theme of this dissertation. I make a distinction between country-specific
(institutional) and firm-specific influences on financial reporting. The role that is
attributed to accounting information differs internationally (Ali and Hwang 2000; Ball
et al. 2000, Leuz et al. 2003). In countries where the rights of minority investors are
well protected, capital markets are well-developed, and shareholders are at arm’s
length from the firms they invest in, financial reporting has an important information
function for shareholders. Shareholders demand information about the performance of
the firm in contracting with management and in making their investment decisions. On
the other hand, in countries where debt financing is more prevalent and large
shareholders are actively involved in management of the company or closely monitor
management, accounting serves a different role. Information provision to shareholders
is not the main objective of financial reporting in these countries. Instead, accounting
is used to determine payouts to the various stakeholders of the firm. The main
objective of financial reporting in this stakeholder-orientated view is avoiding
unwarranted payouts to any stakeholder group, e.g., dividends to shareholders or
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bonuses to managers, in order to ensure the financial health and stability of the firm,
which is considered to be in the interest of all stakeholders. The international
differences in the role of accounting are also reflected in other institutional
characteristics, such as the extent of political influence on the accounting standard
setting process, the nature of accounting regulation, the link between financial and tax
accounting, and the development of the auditing profession (Ali and Hwang 2000).
Firms’ reporting decisions are not solely driven by the institutional environment
they operate in, but also differ across firms within countries. Examples of firm-specific
influences on reporting choices include firms’ ownership structures (Fan and Wong
2002), managerial ownership (Warfield et al. 1995), managerial incentive
compensation (Cheng and Warfield 2005), board composition (Vafeas 2000), debt
financing, and foreign exchange listings (Meek et al. 1995). For example, shareholders
of closely held firms will typically have opportunities and incentives to more directly
monitor management than shareholders of widely held firms, which translates into a
relatively more important information role of financial reporting for shareholders in
widely held firms. Also, the strength of the market for corporate control can influence
firms’ reporting decisions. Managers of firms that are not protected by takeover
defense mechanisms often face pressure from shareholders to reach short-term profit
goals, which may encourage earnings management by these firms. Likewise, incentive
pay (Cheng and Warfield 2005) and the threat of debt covenant violations (DeFond
and Jiambalvo 1994) may influence managers’ financial reporting choices.
1.2 Outline
The body of this dissertation consists of three empirical studies. Chapter 2 describes a
study about the determinants and consequences of voluntary non-local GAAP adoption
by listed EU firms. The non-local accounting standards I study are IAS/IFRS1 and U.S.
GAAP. I choose a research period before the European Commission announced its
plans to mandate IAS/IFRS usage in the EU to prevent the effect of the anticipation of
mandated usage in firms’ decision to switch to non-local standards. Firms can be
expected to voluntarily adopt non-local standards when the net benefits of switching
from their local GAAP are positive. By studying the characteristics of voluntary
adopters, the determinants of adoption can be studied, which sheds light on the
distribution of net benefits of non-local GAAP usage across the population of listed
EU firms. Furthermore, firms that did not voluntarily switch to non-local standards can
be expected to be less likely to fully comply with IAS/IFRS when usage becomes
mandatory. Knowing the determinants of adoption can therefore help enforcement
institutions direct their efforts.
INTRODUCTION
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The second part of chapter 2 studies the consequences of voluntary non-local
GAAP adoption. I empirically investigate the presumption that usage of IAS/IFRS or
U.S. GAAP lowers information asymmetries between a firm and its shareholders and
consequently leads to a reduction in the cost of equity capital. Although it should be
emphasized that the consequences of voluntary adoption of non-local standards could
very well be different from the consequences of mandatory adoption, the analyses
presented provide information to regulators and capital market participants on the
effects of adoption. Furthermore, in an additional analysis, the consequences are
analyzed separately for ‘early’ and ‘late’ voluntary adopters to examine possible
effects over time.
Chapter 3 provides an analysis of the effects of the reporting incentives
generated by firms’ corporate governance structures in The Netherlands. The
shareholder-oriented nature of Dutch accounting regulation coupled with the relatively
weak enforcement environment leaves firms considerable discretion in drawing up
their financial statements. Furthermore, the governance mechanisms of Dutch publicly
listed firms differ widely, which provides them with very diverse reporting incentives.
Therefore, this setting provides an interesting opportunity to study the influence of
firms’ governance structures on their financial reporting in an environment that is
characterized by shareholder-oriented accounting regulation. A significant portion of
listed firms has concentrated ownership structures and/or takeover defense
mechanisms in place, which isolates these firms from the pressure of capital markets
and allows them to take the interests of all stakeholders into account in their financial
reporting, instead of the interest of shareholders only. Widely held firms without
takeover protection face demand from shareholders for informative public reporting
and are therefore expected to report shareholder-oriented. I measure a firm’s reporting
orientation by examining properties of its accounting. Specifically, I expect firms with
a stakeholder orientation to report more (unconditionally) conservatively, to more
actively smooth earnings, and to engage in less myopic reporting, measured by the
tendency to meet or just beat analyst earnings forecasts.
In chapter 4, the effects of the institutional environment on firms’ financial
reporting objectives conditional on firms’ ownership concentration is studied using a
sample of Western European firms. I classify countries’ institutions as stakeholder- or
shareholder-orientated and measure the orientation by constructing a factor score of
various country-level influences on accounting. Widely held firms in both stakeholder-
and shareholder-oriented countries have incentives to report informatively to
overcome information asymmetries between the firm and shareholders who are at
arm’s length. They can do so in stakeholder-oriented environments by choosing
options in local accounting standards or by providing additional disclosures. Closely
held firms’ reporting objectives are congruent with the country’s reporting orientation
CHAPTER 1
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in stakeholder-oriented countries. However, in shareholder-oriented countries, firms
with concentrated ownership structures face relatively high costs of not complying
with the country’s institutional orientation. Investor protection rules in these countries
protect the interest of minority investors, who demand informative financial reporting.
Furthermore, enforcement in these countries tends to be relatively strict. In summary, I
hypothesize the influence of institutions on reporting to be more pronounced for
closely held than for widely held firms. As in chapter 3, I measure firms’ reporting
objectives by studying properties of their accounting information and consider
(unconditionally) conservative reporting and earnings smoothing as indicative of
stakeholder-oriented reporting objectives.2
Knowing how firm-specific and institutional factors influence firms’ reporting
objectives and reporting choices is important to regulators and various stakeholders.
Financial statement users have to understand a firm’s reporting objectives to assess the
information they use for valuing their investments or in contracts with the firm. Also,
regulators trying to influence financial reporting practices by changing aspects of the
institutional environments faced by firms, have to consider the influence of other
institutional and firm-specific factors and their interplay on financial reporting choices.
1.3 Contribution
This dissertation contributes to the literature in a number of ways. The study in chapter
2 provides an analysis of voluntary adoption of non-local GAAP across the European
Union. The study documents firm-specific and country-specific determinants of
voluntary usage of non-local accounting standards in a period before the European
Commission announced its plans to mandate usage of IAS/IFRS. As such, it provides
insight into the factors that contribute to firms experiencing net benefits from adoption
of non-local accounting standards. Furthermore, it provides some evidence regarding
the consequences of adoption.
The studies in chapters 3 and 4 study the influence of firm-specific and
institutional factors on firms’ reporting behavior. The study in chapter 3 uses the
unique setting in The Netherlands to examine the influence of the reporting incentives
generated by firms’ governance structures in a situation where accounting regulation is
shareholder-oriented and highly comparable to IAS/IFRS. In chapter 4, I study the
influence of country-specific institutional factors on reporting behavior for firms with
different levels of ownership concentration. Most prior literature does not consider the
moderating role of firm-specific reporting incentives. However, I find evidence to
suggest that the effect of institutions on financial reporting choices is conditional on a
firm’s ownership structure.
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1.4 Structure of the dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes an
empirical study on the determinants and consequences of non-local GAAP adoption in
the European Union. In chapter 3, the influence of firms’ corporate governance
structures on properties of accounting information is analyzed. Chapter 4 deals with
the effects of institutional and firm-specific incentives on accounting properties. The
final chapter presents a summary and conclusion of this dissertation.
CHAPTER 1
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Notes
1  The terms International Accounting Standards (IAS) and International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) are used interchangeably throughout this dissertation. IAS standards were issued
by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), whereas IFRS standards are issued
by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB, the successor body to the IASC).
International Financial Reporting Standards is now the official name that the IASB uses for all IAS
and IFRS standards issued. For more information, see http://www.iasb.org.
2  In chapter 4, I do not study the tendency to meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts, one of the
accounting properties I investigate in chapter 3, because I do not have data available for all
countries included in the sample.
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Voluntary Adoption of Non-Local GAAP in the
European Union: A Study of Determinants and
Consequences*
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, economic and regulatory changes may have provided firms with
incentives to voluntarily prepare their financial statements according to different
accounting standards than those of their home country. Within the European Union
(EU) important developments in this respect are the merger of several stock
exchanges, initiatives at the International Organisation of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and the efforts of
the European Commission (EC) to harmonize financial reporting.
This study examines both the determinants and consequences of voluntary
adoption of non-local generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) by
non-financial firms domiciled and listed in the EU. I focus on voluntary adoption of
International Accounting Standards (IAS) and United States (U.S.) GAAP, the two
predominant internationally accepted sets of standards. The maintained hypothesis in
this chapter is that firms choose to report according to non-local GAAP if the benefits
outweigh the costs associated with the switch from their local GAAP. By documenting
the determinants of non-local GAAP adoption, I am providing indirect evidence of
benefits and costs of adoption. I also directly examine the consequences of non-local
GAAP adoption by testing whether firms using IAS or U.S. GAAP experience lower
levels of information asymmetry, a much cited benefit of increased financial reporting
transparency, than firms using local GAAP.
Unlike previous studies on voluntary adoption of IAS and/or U.S. GAAP (e.g.,
Dumontier and Raffournier 1998; El-Gazzar et al. 1999; Murphy 1999; Joos and
Weets 2000; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Ashbaugh 2001; Leuz 2003), that focus on a
very narrow (single country or stock exchange) or very heterogeneous group of firms,
I study a fairly large homogeneous group of firms, by focusing on listed EU firms.
* This chapter is published as: Cuijpers, R. and W. Buijink (2005). Voluntary Adoption of Non-Local
GAAP in the European Union: A Study of Determinants and Consequences. European Accounting
Review 14, 487-524. The literature in this chapter has not been updated to include more recent studies
on (voluntary) IAS/IFRS adoption.
CHAPTER 2
8
Furthermore, I contribute to the scarce evidence (Auer 1996 1998; Leuz and
Verrecchia 2000; Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001) on the consequences of non-local
GAAP adoption.
A central problem for a study such as this is to establish which firms fully adopt
non-local GAAP. I use information from the IASB web site, financial statement
databases, and some other sources to identify listed EU firms using non-local GAAP in
their 1999 fiscal year. I then inspect the notes and audit reports in the consolidated
annual reports of all these firms to verify that they are stating compliance with IAS or
U.S. GAAP. This represents a major difference with some earlier studies. Ashbaugh
(2001), for example, also includes firms that only provide footnote reconciliations to
IAS or U.S. GAAP. The firms that I study are making a much stronger commitment to
report according to non-local GAAP by drawing up their entire financial statements in
accordance with IAS or U.S. GAAP.
I find that 133 non-financial firms domiciled and listed in the EU report
according to non-local GAAP. This finding itself strongly suggests that by 1999/2000
most listed EU firms do not expect to benefit from switching to non-local accounting
standards. Furthermore, I find that firms adopting non-local GAAP are more likely to
be listed on a U.S. exchange, the EASDAQ exchange in Brussels, and have more
geographically dispersed operations. Also, these firms are more likely to be domiciled
in a country with lower quality financial reporting and where IAS is explicitly allowed
as an alternative to local GAAP.
I find mixed evidence on the consequences of non-local GAAP adoption. The
findings do not show a lower cost of equity capital for adopters, but I do find that
non-local GAAP users are followed more heavily by financial analysts. This latter
finding applies specifically to firms that have been using IAS or U.S. GAAP for a
longer period of time (‘early’ adopters). Consistent with prior literature (Leuz and
Verrecchia 2000), I do not find any significant differences in stock return volatility
between local and non-local GAAP users, but I document a higher dispersion of
analyst earnings forecasts for non-local GAAP adopters. When comparing ‘early’ and
‘late’ non-local GAAP adopters, I find that only ‘late’ adopters have higher forecast
dispersion. This finding suggests that analysts need time to learn to interpret a firm’s
financial statements drawn up under IAS or U.S. GAAP or that firms that recently
switched are not yet perfectly complying with non-local GAAP.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section I
provide a short background for this study, followed by a description of the data
collection. The analysis of the determinants of non-local GAAP adoption is reported in
section 3. In section 4 I study the consequences of adoption, by testing whether IAS or
U.S. GAAP adoption reduces information asymmetry. The final section of this chapter
contains a discussion of the findings and some concluding remarks.
VOLUNTARY ADOPTION OF NON-LOCAL GAAP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
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2.2 Voluntary non-local GAAP adoption
2.2.1 Background
Several developments may have motivated firms to prepare financial statements in
accordance with non-local GAAP. Potentially the most important development is the
rapid worldwide economic integration and the associated increase in cross-border
capital flows. In the EU one recent manifestation of this phenomenon was the merger
of three stock exchanges (Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam). Also, the IOSCO has
recommended its members to allow multinationals that are planning cross-border
exchange listings to prepare their financial statements according to IAS (IOSCO
2000). Already many stock market regulators allow (foreign) registrants to prepare
their consolidated financial statements using non-local GAAP, sometimes with a
requirement to provide a reconciliation to local GAAP.1 In the EU this is the case in
most member states.
There were also some relevant developments on the regulatory side. In 1995 the
EC recognized the need for further harmonization of financial reporting in the EU
going beyond the level achieved by the European Accounting Directives (Commission
of the European Communities 1995). The EC expressed its support for IAS, the
standards issued by the IASC (the International Accounting Standards Committee, the
predecessor body to the IASB). In February 2001 the EC proposed a requirement for
all EU domiciled firms listed on stock exchanges within the EU to prepare their
financial statements in accordance with IAS by 2005 (Commission of the European
Communities 2001b). The European Parliament and the Council adopted the
regulation prepared by the EC in May 2002 (European Parliament and Council 2002).
At the time of the study, there is no EU regulator mandating firms to use
non-local accounting standards, except for the Deutsche Börse, which required firms
traded on the Neuer Markt (‘New Market’) segment to use either IAS or U.S. GAAP.
The EASDAQ (NASDAQ Europe) exchange in Brussels requires firms to fully adopt
or prepare a reconciliation to either IAS or U.S. GAAP. Most firms can therefore
voluntarily adopt IAS or U.S. GAAP for financial reporting.
EU firms can use non-local GAAP for financial reporting in a number of ways.
An extreme option is to provide two separate sets of financial statements: one using
local GAAP (to satisfy regulatory requirements) and another one using non-local
GAAP. A second possibility is to report according to non-local GAAP and provide a
reconciliation to local GAAP. Third, some firms have the option to comply with two
sets of accounting standards by choosing certain accounting measurement options in
local GAAP that are in accordance with non-local GAAP and provide additional
disclosures that may be required under non-local GAAP. Finally, if allowed by the
national (stock exchange) regulators, firms can provide financial statements that
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comply only with non-local GAAP. I classify firms that choose one of the four options
described above, as complying with non-local GAAP. For the purposes of this chapter,
I do not consider preparing financial statements in accordance with local GAAP and
providing a reconciliation to IAS or U.S. GAAP as complying with non-local
accounting standards.
2.2.2 Data collection
I attempt to identify an as large as possible number of firms from the EU member
states using non-local GAAP in the preparation of their financial statements. The
selection procedure is as follows. Based on a number of sources (described below)
initial groups of listed EU firms possibly using IAS and U.S. GAAP are formed. To be
included in this initial group the firms have to appear on the Worldscope database
(December 2000 version). For the firms in the initial group I subsequently verify that
they are actually stating compliance with non-local GAAP by inspecting the notes and
the audit report contained in the annual reports. For each firm the annual report of the
first fiscal year starting on or after July 1, 1998 (the 1999 annual report) is inspected,
because IAS 1 stipulates that from this date on:
“An enterprise whose financial statements comply with International
Accounting Standards should disclose that fact. Financial statements
should not be described as complying with International Accounting
Standards unless they comply with all the requirements of each
applicable Standard and each applicable Interpretation of the Standing
Interpretations Committee.” (IAS 1, Emphasis added.)
Therefore, if a firm refers to the use of IAS in its annual report, it is effectively stating
compliance with all applicable standards and interpretations. I inspect the annual
reports of possible U.S. GAAP adopters for the same period. I do not examine a later
period, because with the proposal by the EC in February 2001 it became clear that IAS
usage would be mandated from 2005 on.
I leave Italian firms out of the initial group of firms possibly using IAS, because
they are known to frequently refer to IAS in the absence of local standards, without
fully complying with IAS (Zambon 1998: 572).2 However, for three Italian firms
previously identified as complying with IAS, of which only two are on the Worldscope
database, IAS compliance is verified. Several data sources were combined in an
attempt to identify the initial group of firms in the EU possibly using IAS. First, I
obtained a list of ‘Companies referring to their use of IAS’, dated May 2000, from the
IASC.3 This list identifies 239 firms domiciled in one of the EU member states
(excluding Italy). I downloaded a similar, but updated list from the IASC web site in
February 2001 (IASC 2001). This list contains 80 EU firms that published annual
VOLUNTARY ADOPTION OF NON-LOCAL GAAP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
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reports in 1999/2000 that fully comply with IAS.4 In addition I searched two financial
statement databases for listed firms using IAS. I searched the Worldscope database
(December 2000 version) for EU firms using ‘international standards’ or ‘local
standards with some IASC guidelines’5 as their accounting standards. This search
returned 172 (non-Italian) firms. I also used COMPUSTAT’s Global Vantage database
(May 2001 version) to search for EU firms (again excluding Italy) using accounting
standards6 ‘generally in accordance with IASC guidelines’ and ‘generally in
accordance with IASC and OECD guidelines’. Global Vantage returned 224 firms.
Furthermore, I checked the 165 firms referring to IAS in their 1999 financial
statements that are included in the sample of a survey by Cairns (2001). Of these firms
79 are domiciled in one of the EU member states (excluding Italy). Combining these
sources and screening for presence of these firms on the Worldscope database resulted
in an initial group of 360 possible IAS users (see Table 2.1, Panel A).7
I undertook a similar procedure to form an initial group of firms possibly using
U.S. GAAP. The two financial statement databases described earlier (Worldscope and
Global Vantage) were used to identify EU firms that use U.S. GAAP in their 1999
financial statements. Worldscope included 71 firms using ‘U.S. GAAP’ or ‘U.S.
GAAP reclassified from other standards’. Global Vantage listed 139 firms using either
‘United States’ standards’, ‘domestic standards generally in accordance with United
States GAAP’, or ‘domestic standards generally in accordance with principles
generally accepted in the United States’. Combining these two lists of firms, again by
checking for presence on the Worldscope database, leaves an initial group of 163 firms
(see Table 2.1, Panel B).
I contacted all firms in the initial group of possible IAS (U.S. GAAP) users to
obtain their 1999 annual reports. I could not obtain the annual reports of 26 (38) firms
because they were taken over, merged with another firm, became inactive, were no
longer or not yet listed on an exchange in 1999, or did not reply to the information
requests. I examined the annual reports of the remaining firms to verify their use of
IAS (U.S. GAAP), by inspecting (1) the notes to the financial statements and (2) the
audit report. A firm was kept in the group of IAS (U.S. GAAP) adopters if the notes or
the audit report stated full compliance with IAS (U.S. GAAP). As can be seen from
Table 2.1, I found no disclosure of compliance with IAS (U.S. GAAP) for 139 (31) of
firms in the initial group, leaving 195 (96) firms. Because of differing financial
reporting regulations in most countries, firms in the financial industries (SIC code 6)
were deleted.8 I also deleted firms without a listing in the EU and firms listed on the
Neuer Markt segment of the Deutsche Börse. This leaves 133 listed non-financial EU
firms voluntarily using non-local GAAP (92 IAS and 41 U.S. GAAP users).
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When analyzing the distribution of firms across countries (see Table 2.2) it
becomes clear that firms using non-local GAAP are concentrated in specific countries.
Most firms using IAS are domiciled in Germany, Austria, or France. Concentrations of
Table 2.1
Identification of firms using non-local GAAP
Panel A Firms using IAS
Source
Number of
firms
Firms on
Worldscope
IASC list May 2000 239 216
IASC list February 2001 80 74
Worldscope (WS) database 172 172
Global Vantage (GV) database 224 212
Cairns 79 78
358
Italian firms possibly using IAS 3 2
Group of firms to be verified 360
Not verified (taken over, merged, became inactive, no longer or not yet
listed on an exchange in 1999, or no reply to information requests) (26)
No disclosure of compliance with IAS (139)
Financial firms (SIC code 6, or unknown) (22)
Listed on the Neuer Markt segment of the Deutsche Börse (79)
Not listed on an EU exchange (or unknown) (2)
Non-financial firms voluntarily disclosing compliance with IAS 92
Insufficient data availabilitya (12)
IAS adopters used in analyses 80
Panel B Firms using U.S. GAAP
Source
Number of
firms
Firms on
Worldscope
Worldscope (WS) database 71 71
Global Vantage (GV) database 139 133
Group of firms to be verified 163
Not verified (taken over, merged, became inactive, no longer or not yet
listed on an exchange in 1999, or no reply to information requests) (38)
No disclosure of compliance with U.S. GAAP  (31)
U.S. GAAP adopters identified using other sources 2
Financial firms (SIC code 6, or unknown) (4)
Listed on the Neuer Markt segment of the Deutsche Börse (46)
Not listed on an EU exchange (or unknown) (5)
Non-financial firms voluntarily disclosing compliance with U.S. GAAP 41
Insufficient data availabilitya (7)
U.S. GAAP adopters used in analyses 34
a  Includes Luxembourgian firms, because of unavailability of data on one of the independent
regression variables (Q_ACC).
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U.S. GAAP adopters are found in Germany, France, and The Netherlands. No firms
from the United Kingdom, Ireland, Portugal, or Sweden were identified as adopters of
non-local GAAP. For the UK and Ireland, the most likely reasons for this finding are
the similarity between IAS, U.S. GAAP, and UK GAAP and the relatively high quality
of UK accounting standards (Haller 2002). Firms domiciled in these two countries are
therefore not included in the subsequent analyses.9 I also have to exclude firms
domiciled in Luxembourg, because of unavailability of data on one of the independent
variables (quality of accounting standards, discussed later). Deleting firms with
insufficient data available on the Worldscope database leaves 114 non-local GAAP
adopters (80 IAS and 34 U.S. GAAP) for further analysis. Table 2.2 shows how the
net benefits of non-local GAAP adoption are distributed across the society of EU
countries.
To investigate the determinants of non-local GAAP adoption, all 1679
non-financial firms listed and domiciled in the EU (excluding firms domiciled in the
UK, Ireland, and Luxembourg and firms that are listed on the Neuer Markt) that do not
Table 2.2
Distribution of firms by accounting standards used and country of domicilea (n = 1,793)
IAS  U.S. GAAP
Non-local
GAAP
(IAS and U.S.
GAAP)  Local GAAP
Country n % n % n % n %
Austria 16 20.0 1 2.9 17 14.9 35 2.1
Belgium 4 5.0 1 2.9 5 4.4 83 4.9
Denmark 7 8.8 1 2.9 8 7.0 98 5.85
Finland 2 2.5 0 0.0 2 1.8 105 6.3
France 11 13.8 12 35.3 23 20.2 460 27.4
Germany 35 43.8 8 23.5 43 36.0 245 14.6
Greece 2 2.5 0 0.0 2 1.8 119 7.1
Italy 1 1.3 0 0.0 1 0.9 120 7.1
The Netherlands 1 1.3 11 32.4 12 10.5 140 8.3
Portugal 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 23 1.4
Spain 1 1.3 0 0.0 1 0.9 67 4.0
Sweden 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 184 11.0
Total 80 100.0 34 100.0 114 100.0 1,679 100.0
Adoption % 4.5 1.9 6.4 93.6
a Only cases with full data available for the analyses are tabulated. Firms from the UK and Ireland
are excluded because of the comparable high quality of UK GAAP and the non-local GAAPs
studied (IAS and U.S. GAAP). Luxembourgian firms are excluded from further analyses, because
of unavailability of data on one of the independent variables (Q_ACC).
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use IAS or U.S. GAAP and have sufficient data available on the WS database are used
as a control group. I use such a large control group to keep the fraction of non-local
GAAP adopters close to the ‘real’ rate of adoption.10 The rate of adoption of non-local
GAAP in my group of firms is only 6.4% (4.5% use IAS and 1.9% use U.S. GAAP,
see Table 2.2). This percentage is higher than the true percentage of non-local GAAP
adopters, because relatively more firms using local GAAP are deleted due to data
unavailability and because I exclude firms from the UK and Ireland. It should be noted
that the number of firms listed in Table 2.2 represent the observations used in the
analysis of determinants in section 3. When testing the consequences of non-local
GAAP adoption in section 4 I lose more observations because the analyses, among
others, require I/B/E/S earnings forecast data.
2.3 Determinants of non-local GAAP adoption
Using IAS or U.S. GAAP typically implies using stricter measurement rules and
making more disclosures in financial statements than would be required under a firm’s
local GAAP. If a firm therefore chooses to report according to IAS or U.S. GAAP it is
voluntarily making a commitment to providing more, and more standardized
information to capital markets (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Ashbaugh 2001). The
maintained hypothesis is that firms will switch from local to non-local GAAP if the
benefits of adoption outweigh the costs. The expected determinants of voluntary
non-local GAAP adoption described below are mainly based on earlier studies on the
adoption of non-local GAAP and on voluntary disclosure literature in general.
2.3.1 Stock exchange listings
Firms with international stock exchange listings face additional capital market
pressures (Meek et al. 1995) and stock exchange requirements (Cooke 1992) that may
lead them to increase their level of disclosure. Investors demand information about the
domestic operating environment and domestic accounting regulations of foreign listed
firms (Nobes and Parker 1998). Also, firms will incur costs to comply with the
regulations of the different stock exchanges that they decide to list on (Biddle and
Saudagaran 1991), and as Saudagaran and Biddle (1995) point out: ‘these costs can be
significant’. In order to meet foreign investors’ demand and comply with foreign
exchange regulations, firms may be motivated to report according to an internationally
accepted set of accounting principles. In fact, many stock exchanges around the world
allow foreign registrants to prepare their financial statements according to IAS or U.S.
GAAP. Prior studies show that the level of disclosure (Cooke 1992; Meek et al. 1995)
and the probability of using non-local GAAP (El-Gazzar et al.; 1999; Murphy 1999;
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Ashbaugh 2001) are positively associated with the number of foreign stock exchange
listings of a firm.
I expect the net benefits of non-local GAAP adoption to be higher for firms
listed on more exchanges. Because within the EU there is a mutual recognition11 of
each member states’ accounting standards (Fédération des Experts Comptables
Européens 1993), this mainly applies to firms listed on exchanges outside the EU.
However, I even expect firms without listings outside the EU to have an incentive to
adopt non-local GAAP, because they can provide more standardized information to
foreign investors by using IAS or U.S. GAAP.
The Neuer Markt (NM), the ‘new market’ segment of the Deutsche Börse,
obliges firms to use either IAS or U.S. GAAP. Because firms traded on the NM are
constrained in their choice of GAAP (they do not voluntarily choose to report
according to non-local GAAP), they will be excluded from the analyses. Firms listed
on one or more U.S. exchanges either have to fully adopt or reconcile to U.S. GAAP.
Likewise, the EASDAQ exchange obliges firms to fully adopt IAS or U.S. GAAP, or
to provide a reconciliation to either set of GAAP. Like firms with a U.S. listing, firms
listed on the EASDAQ exchange will bear the cost of providing a reconciliation if they
decide to report according to their local GAAP. Firms may be reluctant to provide a
reconciliation, because this requires them to report two (diverging) earnings figures.
This could cause confusion among investors and reduce their trust in the financial
reporting of a firm, because they are unable to identify true economic performance. I
therefore expect firms listed in the U.S. or traded on the EASDAQ exchange to be
more likely to report according to non-local GAAP.
I realize that the trade-off for these firms (reporting according to non-local
GAAP or preparing a reconciliation to non-local GAAP) is likely to be fundamentally
different than for other firms. Therefore, I perform a sensitivity analysis, where I
repeat the main analysis of determinants, excluding firms listed in the U.S. or on the
EASDAQ exchange.
2.3.2 International operations
Typically, firms operating internationally have a much more heterogeneous group of
stakeholders than firms that mainly operate nationally. Even without foreign stock
exchange listings, I expect demand for more standardized information from these
different interest groups. Dumontier and Raffournier (1998), El-Gazzar et al. (1999),
and Murphy (1999) find that firms using IAS have more foreign operations. I therefore
expect firms operating on an international scale to be more likely to adopt non-local
GAAP.
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2.3.3 Country-specific determinants
I expect the net benefits of non-local GAAP adoption to depend on the
country-specific institutional environment of a firm. Firms domiciled in countries with
accounting standards of lower quality that want to provide high quality accounting
information, can use IAS or U.S. GAAP as a strong signal of their commitment to
higher quality financial reporting. The net benefits to firms from countries with high
quality financial reporting are much lower, because by reporting according to their
local GAAP they are already providing high quality accounting information. For firms
in these countries, the costs of adopting IAS or U.S. GAAP could very well outweigh
the benefits.
For each country represented in her sample, Ashbaugh (2001) develops a
measure of the differences between IAS or U.S. GAAP and local GAAP, based on a
number of disclosure and measurement issues. She finds that firms domiciled in
countries where local accounting standards differ more from IAS or U.S. GAAP are
more likely to adopt non-local GAAP. However, the measure only focuses on the
major differences between local and non-local GAAP. I decide to use a more general
measure of the quality of a country’s financial reporting.12 I measure reporting quality
by a score published by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research
(CIFAR). The CIFAR score is constructed by investigating the disclosure of 90 items
in the annual reports of firms (La Porta et al. 1998).13 I expect the net benefits of
non-local GAAP adoption to be higher for firms from countries with low quality
domestic financial reporting.
The general quality of financial reporting in a country also depends on the
enforcement of accounting standards. However, this does not have a direct effect on
the choice between local and non-local GAAP, because the enforcement environment
of a firm will not change by merely adopting IAS or U.S. GAAP for financial
reporting. Indirectly, firms may try to overcome the weaknesses of their domestic
enforcement mechanisms by committing themselves to higher quality financial
reporting. I address the role of enforcement in an additional analysis.
In some EU members states usage of IAS is explicitly allowed as an alternative
to using local accounting standards for consolidated financial reporting. This is the
case in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg
(Commission of the European Communities 2001a). The costs of adopting non-local
will be lower for firms domiciled in one of these countries, because they will surely
not face any reconciliation requirements to local GAAP if they switch to IAS. I
therefore expect adoption of non-local GAAP to be higher in these countries.
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2.3.4 Corporate governance
Public disclosures of firms can be expected to reflect their governance structure. Firms
with many ‘inside’ stakeholders have fewer incentives to disclose high quality
financial information than firms that rely primarily on ‘outsiders’ to provide the
necessary capital. This is because ‘insiders’ to the firm are not dependent on public
disclosures, whereas for firms with many outside stakeholders, public disclosures are
the only economically feasible way to resolve possible information asymmetry
problems. I therefore expect the use of high-quality accounting standards for financial
reporting, targeted at the interests of equity investors, like IAS or U.S. GAAP, to be
higher for firms with many outside stakeholders. This study measures the ‘inside’ or
‘outside’ orientation of a firm in two ways: (1) the percentage of debt in a firm’s
capital structure and (2) a measure of stock ownership concentration.
Previous studies on voluntary disclosure have often used a firm’s capital
structure as a proxy for their governance structure (Chow and Wong-Boren 1987;
Meek et al. 1995; Zarzeski 1996; Jaggi and Low 2000). Different authors however,
hypothesize different relationships between capital structure and disclosure. Meek et
al. (1995) argue that voluntary disclosures can be expected to increase with leverage,
because in firms with proportionally more debt, the potential wealth transfers from
debt holders to stockholders and managers (agency costs) are larger. Zarzeski (1996)
expects to find a negative relationship between disclosure and leverage, assuming that
firms with high debt ratios are located in countries with strong banking relationships
and many interlocking corporate ownerships (a bank-oriented financial system). In
these countries there is less need for high quality financial reporting, as many
stakeholders are ‘insiders’ to the firm and rely on private rather than public
information to make decisions. These two different lines of reasoning illustrate the
inability of leverage alone to be a good proxy for the governance structure of a firm.
I use leverage as a proxy for the level of ‘inside’ orientation of a firm, because
providers of debt finance, such as banks, are typically less dependent on public
disclosures of firms than shareholders. However, this argument does not apply to
public debt. Unfortunately, I cannot control for this, because I am unable to make a
distinction between public and private debt based on the data.
Equity investors are usually ‘outsiders’ to a firm. However, if a shareholder
owns a large stake in a firm, the dependence on public disclosure is likely to be
smaller, because he can directly monitor management. Therefore, in addition to
leverage, I use concentration of stock ownership as a proxy for a firm’s ‘inside’
governance.
I expect the two proxies for a firm’s governance structure (leverage and stock
ownership concentration) to be negatively related to non-local GAAP adoption
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because they both measure the ‘inside’ governance orientation of a firm. The net
benefits of non-local GAAP adoption will likely be less for firms with stakeholders
that are ‘insiders’ to the firm. These expectations are supported by El-Gazzar et al.
(1999), who find a negative relation between the debt to equity ratio and the
probability of IAS adoption, and Dumontier and Raffournier (1998), who find that
Swiss IAS adopters have more diffuse ownership than firms using local GAAP.
2.3.5 Size
Voluntary disclosure research has consistently found that larger firms provide
stakeholders with more disclosures (Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Cooke 1992; Lang
and Lundholm 1993; Meek et al. 1995; Zarzeski 1996; Ashbaugh 2001; Jaggi and Low
2000). It is however unclear what factors the size variable is actually representing.
Costs of disclosure appear to be decreasing in firm size. One component of disclosure
costs is information production costs, for which the fixed component can be spread
over more ‘units of size’ in large organizations. Also, because larger firms generally
have higher levels of analyst following, information dissemination, transaction, and
competitive disadvantage costs (Foster 1986; Lang and Lundholm 1993) are reduced.
Higher political costs, caused by higher public exposure, and agency costs, caused by
more widely dispersed ownership, may also drive larger firms to voluntarily make
more disclosures (Foster 1986; Meek et al. 1995). Because the choice to adopt
non-local GAAP represents a commitment to making more disclosures than would
typically be required under local GAAP, I expect the documented positive relation to
hold in my setting as well.
2.3.6 Univariate results
Descriptive statistics and univariate results for the firms included in the analysis can be
found in Table 2.3. Wilcoxon two-sample tests indicate that firms using non-local
GAAP to draw up their financial statements are more likely to be (1) listed on more
EU (EU_EX) and non-EU (NONEU_EX) exchanges (2), listed in the U.S. (US_EX),
(3) listed on the EASDAQ exchange (EASDAQ), (4) operating in a larger number of
geographic segments (GEO_SEGM), (5) domiciled in countries with lower quality
accounting standards (Q_ACC), (6) domiciled in countries where IAS is explicitly
allowed as an alternative to local GAAP (IAS_ALLOW), and (7) larger in terms of
market capitalization (MRKT_CAP). Contrary to expectations, firms using non-local
GAAP have a higher ownership concentration (OWN_CONC) and do not differ
significantly in terms of their long-term debt to assets ratio (DEBT).
I also test for industry effects in the choice between local and non-local GAAP.
The level of voluntary disclosure may differ between industries because of industry
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specific accounting regulation, competitive pressures (Cooke 1992), or proprietary
costs (Meek et al. 1995). These factors may also cause industry differences in the costs
and benefits of adopting non-local GAAP. The industry analysis reveals that
manufacturing firms (SIC codes 2 and 3) are more likely to use non-local GAAP,
whereas firms in agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, and construction (SIC codes 0
and 1) and retail and wholesale trade (SIC code 5) are less likely to adopt IAS or U.S.
GAAP.There are no significant differences for firms in transportation,
communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services (SIC code 4) and services (SIC
code 7 and 8).
The Pearson and Spearman correlations between the independent variables
(determinants) are shown in Table 2.4. The correlation between some of these
variables is rather high. High correlation between independent variables can cause
problems of multicollinearity in the regression analyses. I will address this issue
below.
2.3.7 Logistic regression results
The method used to study the determinants of non-local GAAP adoption is similar to
that used in other papers on the subject (e.g., Ashbaugh 2001). In a logistic regression
a binary variable indicating whether a firm is using local or non-local GAAP is
regressed on a number of explanatory variables representing firm- and country-specific
characteristics expected to influence non-local GAAP adoption. Specifically, I
estimate the following logistic regression model:
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where GAAP is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm uses non-local
GAAP and 0 otherwise, EU_EX (NONEU_EX) is the number of EU (non-EU) stock
exchange listings of a firm, US_EX (EASDAQ) is an indicator variable taking the value
1 if a firm is listed on a U.S. exchange (the EASDAQ exchange) and 0 otherwise,
GEO_SEGM is the number of geographic segments reported by a firm, Q_ACC is  a
measure of the quality of a country’s accounting standards published by CIFAR (La
Porta et al. 1998, Table 2.5), IAS_ALLOW is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if
a firm is domiciled in one of the seven EU member states (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg) that explicitly allow usage of IAS
(Commission of the European Communities 2001a), OWN_CONC is a Herfindahl
concentration index based on the ownership percentages of the ten largest shareholders
of a firm (only shareholdings of 5% or more are available), DEBT is a firm’s long-term
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Table 2.5
Logistic regression analysis of determinants of non-local GAAP adoption
Model (a) Model (b) Model (c)
Full sample
Excluding firms
listed in the U.S.
and on the
EASDAQ
exchange
Excluding firms
from countries
where IAS is not
allowed as an
alternative to
local GAAP
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(Wald ?2)
Coefficient
(Wald ?2)
Coefficient
(Wald ?2)
Intercept -0.7768
(0.61)
-0.4887
(0.19)
3.6036
(4.57)++
EU_EX + 0.0895
(0.29)
0.1154
(0.35)
0.1001
(0.29)
NONEU_EX + -0.2138
(0.45)
-0.0905
(0.07)
-0.1598
(0.22)
US_EX + 0.9461
(6.70)***
- 0.5448
(1.32)
EASDAQ + 3.3459
(33.56)***
- 3.0156
(22.65)***
GEO_SEGM + 0.1925
(15.79)***
0.1976
(12.90)***
0.1905
(10.38)***
Q_ACC – -0.0793
(26.07)***
-0.0945
(26.08)***
-0.1321
(24.73)***
IAS_ALLOW + 1.0277
(13.82)***
1.4257
(15.54)***
-
OWN_CONC – -0.1405
(0.09)
-0.1089
(0.05)
-0.1097
(0.05)
DEBT – -0.1925
(0.04)
-0.2846
(0.08)
-0.6687
(0.36)
MRKT_CAP + 0.2831
(18.74)***
0.3194
(18.89)***
0.2994
(15.15)***
Industry dummiesa N/A
4.93
N/A
5.26
N/A
4.23
Likelihood ratio ?2 174.78+++ 123.43+++ 130.43+++
Number of
observations:
Non-local GAAP
Local GAAP
114
1,679
85
1,615
91
1,048
1,793 1,700 1,139
a  Industry effects are tested by testing the joint significance of four industry dummies compared to
the base group.
***, **, * Significantly different from zero (one-sided) at significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
respectively.
+++, ++, + Significantly different from zero (two-sided) at significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
respectively.
(Continued on next page)
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debt to total assets ratio, MRKT_CAP is the natural logarithm of a firm’s market
capitalization, industry membership is represented by a series of indicator variables
(INDUSTRY), with the largest group (manufacturing) used as the base group.
The results of estimating equation (2.1), displayed in Table 2.5 (model a), show
that the choice to adopt non-local instead of local GAAP is significantly positively
related to (1) having a listing in the U.S., (2) being listed on the EASDAQ exchange,
(3) operating in more geographic segments, (4) being domiciled in a country that has
accounting standards of lower quality, (5) being domiciled in a country that explicitly
allows IAS as an alternative to local GAAP, and (6) being larger as measured by
market capitalization. It is remarkable that a firm’s number of (EU and non-EU)
exchange listings is not significantly positively related to non-local GAAP adoption, a
finding contrary to the univariate analysis. Also, the combined effect of the industry
dummies is insignificant.
The high correlations between some of the independent variables could cause a
multicollinearity problem in the regression analyses. To determine the extent of
multicollinearity in the regression analysis, I compute the variance inflation factor
(VIF) for each variable in equation (2.1). Because these values (not reported) do not
Table 2.5 (Continued)
The variables are defined as follows (data source):
GAAP = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm uses non-local GAAP (IAS
or U.S. GAAP) and 0 otherwise (see section 2 and Table 1 for
identification procedure);
EU_EX = Number of stock exchange listings of a firm within the EU (Worldscope);
NONEU_EX = Number of stock exchange listings of a firm outside the EU (Worldscope);
US_EX = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if a firm is listed on a U.S. exchange
and 0 otherwise (Worldscope and NYSE (www.nyse.com) and NASDAQ
exchanges (www.nasdaq.com));
EASDAQ = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if a firm is listed on the EASDAQ
exchange and 0 otherwise (EASDAQ exchange (www.easdaq.com));
GEO_SEGM = Number of geographic segments reported by a firm (Worldscope);
Q_ACC = Measure of the quality of a country’s accounting standards published by
CIFAR (La Porta et al. 1998, Table 5);
IAS_ALLOW = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if a firm is domiciled in one of the
seven EU member states (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, and Luxembourg) that explicitly allow usage of IAS for consolidated
financial reporting (Commission of the European Communities 2001a);
OWN_CONC
= Herfindahl concentration index based on the ownership percentages of the
ten largest shareholders of a firm (Worldscope, only shareholdings of 5%
or more are reported);
DEBT = Firm’s long-term debt to total assets ratio (Worldscope);
MRKT_CAP = Natural logarithm of a firm’s market capitalisation (Worldscope);
Industry dummies = Series of indicator variables, with the largest group (manufacturing, SIC
codes 2 and 3) used as the base group (see lower part of Table 2.3 for
definitions of the 5 industry groupings).
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exceed 2 for any independent variable, I conclude that multicollinearity does not
present a severe problem in my analysis. In addition, in an attempt to solve the
problem of high correlation between EU_EX and NONEU_EX, I sum these variables
and re-estimate equation (2.1). The conclusions reported earlier are not affected,
because I find an insignificant negative coefficient on the summation variable. I also
tried using the natural logarithm of sales as an alternative for the size measure
(MRKT_CAP). This variable has similarly high correlations with the other independent
variables and substitution of this variable in equation (2.1) does not materially change
the results reported earlier.
As explained in section 2, firms listed on the EASDAQ exchange or a U.S.
exchange have strong incentives to report according to non-local GAAP. To examine
whether inclusion of these firms is driving the results, I re-estimate equation (2.1)
without firms listed on the EASDAQ exchange or a U.S. exchange. Dropping these
firms from the analysis does not materially change any of the other results, as can be
seen from Table 2.5 (model b). To control for possible impediments to non-local
GAAP adoption, I drop all firms domiciled in countries where IAS is not explicitly
allowed as an alternative to local GAAP from the analysis. Again, the results do not
change materially (see Table 2.5, model c), only the positive effect of having a listing
in the U.S. disappears. To control for unknown barriers to non-local GAAP adoption, I
re-estimate equation (2.1) on a restricted sample including only firms from countries
where I observe a relatively large number of firms (more than 10) adopting non-local
GAAP (Austria, France, Germany, and The Netherlands). Besides turning the joint
effect of the industry controls significant, the logistic regression outcome (not
reported) leaves the results reported earlier qualitatively unchanged.
Earlier I argued that financial statement enforcement quality in a country might
influence a firm’s decision to adopt non-local GAAP. Firms may try to overcome
weaknesses in their domestic enforcement system by adopting IAS or U.S. GAAP,
thereby committing to high quality financial reporting. The Fédération des Experts
Comptables Européens (2001) concludes that the enforcement of financial reporting
standards for listed firms is largely comparable across Europe. The main differences
between European countries relate to institutional oversight systems. A number of EU
countries do not have a specific institutional oversight system for financial reporting
standards in place.14 To test whether the absence of an institutional oversight system
increases the likelihood that firms choose non-local GAAP for financial reporting, I
add an indicator variable to regression equation (2.1), which takes the value of 1 if an
institutional oversight system for financial reporting is in place and 0 otherwise. The
results (not tabulated) from estimating equation (2.1) with the indicator variable
included, confirm that the absence of an institutional oversight system leads to a higher
probability of non-local GAAP adoption.15 This could suggest that EU firms adopt
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non-local GAAP to overcome low quality domestic enforcement of financial reporting.
An alternative explanation is that the costs of adopting of non-local GAAP are lower
in countries with weak enforcement of financial reporting. This would mean that
adoption in these countries does not represent such a strong commitment to increased
financial reporting quality as in countries where enforcement is of higher quality.
Because listed EU firms are required to use IAS from 2005 on, it is especially
interesting to see what factors determine the adoption of IAS versus local GAAP. By
identifying firms that experience net benefits from IAS adoption, I am essentially
identifying the firms that the EC is benefiting by the new regulation. After the new
regulation enters into effect, these firms are more likely to comply with the regulation.
Enforcement can therefore be targeted at firms for whom IAS adoption is not expected
to be beneficial. Unreported results indicate that the determinants of IAS adoption are
similar to the determinants of non-local GAAP adoption in general.16
2.4 Consequences of non-local GAAP adoption
In section 3, I study the net benefits of non-local GAAP adoption by documenting firm
characteristics that are related to non-local GAAP adoption. The underlying economic
assumption is that firms switch to IAS or U.S. GAAP because the benefits outweigh
the costs. Therefore, by identifying the characteristics of firms that use non-local
GAAP, I am providing indirect evidence of the net benefits of adoption. In this section
I attempt to measure benefits of adoption directly.
Prior literature finds some evidence indicating that firms experience capital
market benefits from adopting non-local GAAP. Auer (1996) finds that earnings
announcements of Swiss firms using IAS convey more information to the market than
announcements of firms using Swiss GAAP, but that there is no significant difference
with financial statements based on EC-Directives. Furthermore, Swiss firms switching
to IAS experience a significant change in stock return volatility (Auer 1998).
However, the evidence is mixed, because for some firms volatility decreases, whereas
for others it decreases. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) find evidence suggesting that the
information asymmetry component of the cost of capital for German firms adopting
IAS or U.S. GAAP decreases, by documenting a reduction in the bid-ask spread and
an increase in trading volume. However, they do not find any impact on volatility.
Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) find that analyst forecast errors decrease after firms adopt
IAS. I build on these studies by examining cost of capital effects directly as well as
providing results on some other information asymmetry proxies for listed EU firms.17
As stated earlier, I view non-local GAAP adoption as a voluntary commitment
to increased disclosure. If this makes financial statements more informative to capital
market participants, I expect information asymmetry in the market to decrease (Bartov
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and Bodnar 1996; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000).  Lower information asymmetry is
expected to lead to a lower cost of equity capital (Botosan 1997) and increased
information intermediation by financial analysts (Healy and Palepu 2001). Other
studies (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 1999; Leuz 2003) have used dispersion in
analyst earnings forecasts and stock return volatility as proxies for information
asymmetry, because they indicate uncertainty about the financial position of a firm. If
firms are providing more standardized financial information by using non-local
GAAP, I expect capital market participants’ beliefs to be more homogeneous, causing
lower forecast dispersion and stock return volatility.
2.4.1 Cost of capital
I hypothesize that adoption of non-local GAAP reduces a firm’s cost of equity capital,
because the increased disclosure and stricter measurement rules of non-local GAAP
(Ashbaugh 2001; Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001) are expected to reduce information
asymmetry, which leads to lower transaction costs and increased market liquidity.
Also, non-diversifiable estimation risk associated with making investment decisions is
reduced, which reduces the cost of capital (Botosan 1997; Botosan and Plumlee 2002).
Estimates of the cost of capital are calculated for the groups of non-local GAAP
adopters and non-adopters separately, using the method by Easton et al. (2002). This
method can be used to simultaneously determine cost of capital and growth rate
estimates for groups of firms. Guay et al. (2003) show that cost of capital estimates
from implied cost of capital approaches are highly dependent on terminal value
assumptions (i.e., forecast period and assumed abnormal earnings growth rate). An
important advantage of the Easton et al. (2002) method is that I do not need to
explicitly define a growth rate of abnormal earnings beyond the forecast horizon. I
obtain cost of capital and growth rate estimates, by fitting the following regression
equation for the local and non-local GAAP group separately:
egg ++= BMBX // 10 (2.2)
where M/B is the firm’s market-to-book ratio at fiscal yearend (from Worldscope) and
X/B is cumulative forecasted cum-dividend earnings (earnings forecasts are provided
by I/B/E/S) for the next four fiscal years divided by book value per share at fiscal
yearend.18 The coefficient estimates from equation (2.2) allow me to calculate the cost
of capital (r) and the growth rate of abnormal earnings (g) for local and non-local
GAAP adopters (Easton et al. 2002).
1)1( 40 -+= gg (2.3)
44 )1()1(1 gr +-+=g (2.4)
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From equations (2.3) and (2.4), estimates of r and g can be derived as follows:
1)1(4 0 -+= gg (2.5)
1)1(4 10 -++= ggr (2.6)
Because I require I/B/E/S analyst earnings forecasts, among others, for estimating
equation (2.2), the number of observations with sufficient data available drops
considerably, compared to the earlier analyses. I employ a matched sample design,
because I cannot readily include any control variables in equation (2.2) and I want to
control for known determinants of the cost of capital. This means that for each
non-local GAAP user with sufficient data available for the analysis (77 firms, 55 IAS
and 22 U.S. GAAP users), I find a matching non-local GAAP user. I control for a
firm’s country of domicile, because the risk free rate of return differs internationally,
which could lead to country effects in the cost of capital estimates. To rule out any
risk-based explanations for differences in cost of capital, I also control for beta and
size (Botosan 1997). Furthermore, I control for the likelihood of non-local GAAP
adoption, because I expect firms with a low likelihood of adoption that use non-local
GAAP to benefit less from adoption than firms with a high likelihood, i.e., I expect the
net benefits to non-local GAAP adoption to be higher for firms with a higher
likelihood of adoption. I measure the likelihood of adoption by the fitted values from
the adoption choice regression (equation (2.1)). Specifically the sampling procedure is
as follows: for each non-local GAAP user I find a local GAAP match from the same
country of domicile with the smallest combined difference in terms of beta19, size
(measured by the natural logarithm of market capitalization) and likelihood of
adoption.20 This means that the same local GAAP user can be the best match for more
than one non-local GAAP firm. In this case I include this firm more than once in the
local GAAP sample.
As shown in Table 2.6 (Panel A) I find no evidence of any direct benefits of
non-local GAAP adoption in terms of lower cost of capital. The cost of capital for the
non-local GAAP adopters is even (insignificantly) higher than for the group of local
GAAP users. Potential explanations for this finding are that firms need time to learn to
comply with all requirements of IAS or U.S. GAAP in their financial statements or
that investors and analysts need to time to learn to interpret these financial
statements.21 To examine these explanations, I divide the group of non-local GAAP
adopters into firms that have been using IAS or U.S. GAAP for two or more years
(‘early’ adopters, with adoption before fiscal year 1998) and firms that only recently
started using non-local GAAP (‘late’ adopters, with adoption in fiscal year 1998 or
1999).22 Because I do not have adoption dates for all firms, the sample of non-local
GAAP adopters is reduced to 27 ‘early’ and 36 ‘late’ adopters. The results, displayed
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in Table 2.6, Panels B and C, show that both ‘early’ and ‘late’ non-local GAAP
adopters have an insignificantly higher cost of capital than their local GAAP control
group. However, the difference between the group of non-local and local GAAP users
is smaller for firms that have been using non-local GAAP longer. This finding
provides weak support for the idea that information asymmetry only gradually
decreases after non-local GAAP adoption.
Table 2.6
Analysis of cost of capital differences between non-local and local GAAP users
Panel A Full sample
Non-local GAAP Local GAAP
Independent variable
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Intercept 0.5479
(5.80)+++
0.3966
(3.25)+++
M/B 0.0890
(3.51)+++
0.1394
(2.91)+++
Adjusted R2 20.48% 35.33%
Number of observations 77 77
Cost of equity capital (r) a 13.11% 11.32%
Growth rate of abnormal earnings (g) a 11.54% 8.71%
Panel B Sample of ‘early’ non-local GAAP adopters
Non-local GAAP Local GAAP
Independent variable
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Intercept 0.4796
(3.82)+++
0.3338
(2.06)+
M/B 0.1044
(2.19)++
0.1754
(2.37)++
Adjusted R2 27.93% 39.11%
Number of observations 27 27
Cost of equity capital (r) a 12.18% 10.84%
Growth rate of abnormal earnings (g) a 10.29% 7.47%
(Continued on next page)
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2.4.2 Analyst following
If financial analysts are primarily information intermediaries, an increase in disclosure
is expected to lead to an increase in investor base, and consequently an increase in a
firm’s analysts following, because of increased demand for analyst services by
investors.23 The supply of analyst services is also likely to increase, because
information acquisition costs are lower if a firm voluntarily provides additional
information. However, if analyst services are competing with firm-provided
disclosures, an increase in disclosure may actually lead to a decrease in analyst
following (Lang and Lundholm 1996). Evidence by Lang and Lundholm (1996), who
find that analyst following increases with disclosure, supports the view that analysts
are information intermediaries. Because I view usage of non-local GAAP as a
Table 2.6 (Continued)
Panel C Sample of ‘late’ non-local GAAP adopters
Non-local GAAP Local GAAP
Independent variable
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Intercept 0.4329
(6.32)+++
0.2603
(1.44)
M/B 0.0941
(4.80)+++
0.1680
(2.42)++
Adjusted R2 47.64% 49.26%
Number of observations 36 36
Cost of equity capital (r) a 11.16% 9.32%
Growth rate of abnormal earnings (g) a 9.41% 5.95%
a  Estimates of the cost of equity capital (r) and the growth rate of abnormal earnings (g) are
calculated from the coefficient estimates as follows (Easton et al. 2002): g = (1 + ?0)1/4 – 1;
r = (1 + ?0 + ?1)1/4 – 1. t-statistics are calculated using White (1980) adjusted standard errors,
because the error term is heteroskedastic (see Easton et al. 2002, footnote 11). The differences in
cost of capital between non-local and local GAAP users are not statistically significant in panels A,
B, and C. Furthermore, the difference in cost of capital between non-local and local GAAP users
for ‘early’ adopters (panel B) is not significantly different from this difference for ‘late’ adopters
(panel C).
+++, ++, + Significantly different from zero (two-sided) at significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
respectively.
The variables are defined as follows (data source):
X = Cumulative forecasted cum-dividend earnings per share for the next four
fiscal years measured six months after fiscal yearend (I/B/E/S);
B = Firm’s book value per share at fiscal yearend (Worldscope);
M/B = Firm’s market-to-book ratio at fiscal yearend (Worldscope).
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voluntary increase in disclosure, I expect a positive association between non-local
GAAP adoption and analyst following. Moreover, because of the enhanced
international comparability of IAS or U.S. GAAP financial statements, I also expect
IAS and U.S. GAAP adopters to attract an increasing number of international analysts.
Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) document an increase in analyst following after firms
adopt IAS. At the country level, Chang et al. (2000) find that analyst activity depends
on international institutional factors. They find that analyst following is significantly
higher in countries with higher stock market development and higher quality
accounting standards. Lang et al. (2003, 2004) find that non-U.S. firms traded in the
U.S. attract a higher number of analysts. Furthermore, I expect firms listed on more
exchanges and larger firms to attract higher levels of analyst following, because of
their greater public exposure. Firms with high stock return volatility are expected to be
followed less, because of the higher uncertainty involved in forecasting future
performance (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Lang et al. 2003, 2004). To control for these
known determinants of analyst following, I include controls for stock market
development, quality of accounting standards, exchange listings, size, and stock return
volatility in the analysis. I also include the industry controls introduced in equation
(2.1). I examine the impact of non-local GAAP usage on analyst following by
estimating the following regression equation:
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where FOLLOWING is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts
issuing forecasts for next year’s earnings outstanding six months after fiscal yearend
(from I/B/E/S), GAAP is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm uses non-local
GAAP and 0 otherwise, EU_EX, NONEU_EX, US_EX, Q_ACC, MRKT_CAP, and the
industry dummies are as defined in section 3, stock market development
(STMRKT_DEV) is the ratio of a country’s stock market capitalization to GDP24 in
1999, and return volatility (VOLATILITY) is the standard deviation of abnormal daily
stock returns (from Datastream) over a firm’s current fiscal year.25 Because I require
data on analyst following and return volatility, the number of observations with
sufficient data available drops compared to the analysis in Table 2.5. I have sufficient
data on 94 non-local GAAP (66 IAS and 28 U.S. GAAP) users and 1321 local GAAP
users.
An univariate analysis of differences (Wilcoxon two-sample test, not tabulated)
between the groups of non-local and local GAAP users reveals that analyst following
is significantly higher for firms using IAS or U.S. GAAP (z-statistic 6.92, significant
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Table 2.7
Analysis of differences in analyst following between non-local and local GAAP users
Full sample
Sample including only
non-local GAAP adopters
with known adoption dates
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Intercept -1.2112
(-5.40)+++
-1.1701
(-5.22)+++
GAAP + 0.3580
(3.83)***
0.1947
(1.53)
EARLY × GAAPa - 0.2519
(1.26)
EU_EX + 0.0036
(0.07)
0.0058
(0.11)
NONEU_EX + 0.0419
(0.42)
0.0473
(0.47)
US_EX + 0.0063
(0.05)
-0.0315
(-0.25)
Q_ACC + 0.0154
(4.76)***
0.0148
(4.58)***
STMRKT_DEV + 0.1342
(3.02)***
0.1380
(3.10)***
VOLATILTY – -8.0485
(-4.94)***
-8.6392
(-5.28)***
MRKT_CAP + 0.4276
(31.52)***
0.4284
(31.47)***
Industry dummiesb N/A
(2.34)+
N/A
(1.95)
Adjusted R2 52.84% 52.87%
Number of
observations:
Non-local GAAP
Local GAAP
94
1,321
76
1,321
1,415 1,397
a  In the second model, the effect for early adopters, represented by the sum of the coefficients on
GAAP and EARLY × GAAP, is significantly different from zero at the 0.01 significance level.
b  Industry effects are tested by testing the joint significance of four industry dummies compared to
the base group.
***, **, * Significantly different from zero (one-sided) at significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
respectively.
+++, ++, + Significantly different from zero (two-sided) at significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
respectively.
(Continued on next page)
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at the 1% level, two-sided).26 Firms using non-local GAAP are followed by an average
of 27.27 analysts, whereas this figure is 13.37 for firms using local GAAP.27 As can be
seen from the regression analysis in Table 2.7, I find that non-local GAAP usage has a
significantly positive effect on analyst following. Except for the listing variables, the
control variables have the expected signs and are statistically significant. To test
whether there is a difference in analyst following between ‘early’ and ‘late’ non-local
GAAP adopters, I add an interaction term, EARLY × GAAP, to equation (2.7), where
EARLY is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a firm adopted IAS or U.S.
GAAP before fiscal year 1998, and 0 otherwise. For estimating this modified version
of equation (2.7), I have enough data on 29 ‘early’ adopters and 47 ‘late’ adopters. The
results, also shown Table 2.7, indicate that the positive effect of non-local GAAP
adoption on analyst following is mainly due to ‘early’ adopters, because the effect for
‘late’ adopters (given by the coefficient on GAAP) is insignificantly positive and the
effect for ‘early’ adopters (given by sum of the coefficients on GAAP and EARLY ×
GAAP) is significantly positive. This provides further support for the idea that the
benefits of non-local GAAP adoption take some time to fully materialize.
Table 2.7 (Continued)
The variables are defined as follows (data source):
FOLLOWING = Natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts issuing one year
ahead earnings forecasts measured six months after fiscal yearend
(I/B/E/S);
GAAP = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm uses non-local GAAP (IAS
or U.S. GAAP) and 0 otherwise (see section 2 and Table 1 for identification
procedure);
EARLY = Indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a firm adopted non-local GAAP
before fiscal year 1998 and 0 otherwise;
EU_EX = Number of stock exchange listings of a firm within the EU (Worldscope);
NONEU_EX = Number of stock exchange listings of a firm outside the EU (Worldscope);
US_EX = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if a firm is listed on a U.S. exchange
and 0 otherwise (Worldscope and NYSE (www.nyse.com) and NASDAQ
exchanges (www.nasdaq.com));
Q_ACC = Measure of the quality of a country’s accounting standards published by
CIFAR (La Porta et al. 1998, Table 5);
STMRKT_DEV = Country’s stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP
(http://www.world-exchanges.org);
VOLATILITY = Standard deviation of a firm’s daily abnormal stock returns over the fiscal
year (Datastream);
MRKT_CAP = Natural logarithm of a firm’s market capitalisation (Worldscope);
Industry dummies = Series of indicator variables, with the largest group (manufacturing, SIC
codes 2 and 3) used as the base group (see lower part of Table 2.3 for
definitions of the 5 industry groupings).
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2.4.3 Uncertainty
Adoption of IAS or U.S. GAAP typically reduces the choice of accounting
measurement rules that can be used compared to local GAAP (Ashbaugh 2001;
Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001). I expect adoption of non-local GAAP to lead to more
homogeneous beliefs about a firm, because differences in interpretation of accounting
information by analysts and investors are reduced. However, the relative inexperience
of some analysts and investors with IAS or U.S. GAAP may initially make financial
statement information harder to interpret and cause forecast dispersion and stock
return volatility to increase. Moreover, if adoption of non-local GAAP reduces firms’
opportunities for income smoothing, earnings may become more volatile and less
predictable (Chang et al. 2000), leading to more heterogeneous beliefs. I measure the
effect on analyst and investor beliefs by examining differences in abnormal stock
return volatility and dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts between non-local and
local GAAP users, using the following regression equations:
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where DISPERSION is defined as the standard deviation deflated by the absolute value
of the mean one-year ahead analyst earnings forecast outstanding six months after
fiscal yearend (from I/B/E/S) and all other variables are as defined earlier. In equation
(2.8) I control for the number of analysts following a firm (FOLLOWING), because
analysts’ information processing and disclosure may be an input to decisions by
investors and other analysts, leading to more homogeneous beliefs and a reduction in
forecast dispersion. I also control for abnormal stock return volatility (VOLATILITY),
because I expect analysts’ earnings forecasts to be more homogeneous for less volatile
stocks. In both equations (2.8) and (2.9) I control for quality of accounting standards at
the country level (Q_ACC) and firm size (MRKT_CAP). I expect the quality of
financial reporting to influence uncertainty about a firm among analysts and investors.
On the one hand, high quality financial reporting is expected to reduce uncertainty
because better information about the firm is available. On the other hand, because
higher quality accounting standards are typically stricter and allow less measurement
alternatives, opportunities for income smoothing are reduced, which could make
forecasting of future performance more difficult. I expect uncertainty regarding large
firms to be lower, because large firms have higher public exposure, resulting in more
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Table 2.8
Analysis of differences in uncertainty between non-local and local GAAP users
Panel A Analyst forecast dispersion (DISPERSION) as dependent variable
Full sample
Sample including only
non-local GAAP adopters
with known adoption dates
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Intercept 0.1290
(0.53)
0.0866
(0.35)
GAAPa 0.2893
(2.80)+++
0.5251
(3.67)+++
EARLY × GAAPa - -0.4642
(-2.09)++
FOLLOWING – 0.0251
(0.55)
0.0302
(0.65)
Q_ACC 0.0032
(0.98)
0.0038
(1.15)
VOLATILITY + 8.6391
(4.38)***
8.5323
(4.27)***
MRKT_CAP – -0.0449
(-2.02)**
-0.0460
(-2.04)**
Industry dummiesb N/A
(3.82)+++
N/A
(3.65)++
Adjusted R2 3.31% 3.55%
Number of
observations
Non-local GAAP
Local GAAP
87
1,034
70
1,034
1,121 1,104
Panel B Stock return volatility (VOLATILITY) as dependent variable
Full sample
Sample including only
non-local GAAP adopters
with known adoption dates
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Intercept 0.0313
(8.51)+++
0.0313
(9.64)+++
GAAPa 0.0014
(0.94)
0.0000
(0.01)
EARLY × GAAPa - 0.0019
(0.58)
(Continued on next page)
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Table 2.8 (Continued)
Full sample
Sample including only
non-local GAAP adopters
with known adoption dates
Independent variable
Expected
sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Q_ACC 0.0000
(0.48)
0.0000
(0.45)
MRKT_CAP – -0.0013
(-6.66)***
-0.0013
(-6.47)***
Industry dummiesb N/A
(12.99)+++
N/A
(13.53)+++
Adjusted R2 6.61% 6.56%
Number of
observations:
Non-local GAAP
Local GAAP
94
1,321
76
1,321
1,415 1,397
a  The effect for early adopters, represented by the sum of the coefficients on GAAP and
EARLY × GAAP, is not significantly different from zero.
b  Industry effects are tested by testing the joint significance of four industry dummies compared to
the base group.
***, **, * Significantly different from zero (one-sided) at significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
respectively.
+++, ++, + Significantly different from zero (two-sided) at significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
respectively.
The variables are defined as follows (data source):
DISPERSION = Standard deviation deflated by the absolute value of the mean of one year
ahead analyst earnings forecasts measured six months after fiscal yearend
(I/B/E/S);
VOLATILITY = Standard deviation of a firm’s daily abnormal stock returns over the fiscal
year (Datastream);
GAAP = Indicator variable taking the value 1 if the firm uses non-local GAAP (IAS
or U.S. GAAP) and 0 otherwise (see section 2 and Table 1 for identification
procedure);
EARLY = Indicator variable taking the value of 1 if a firm adopted non-local GAAP
before fiscal year 1998 and 0 otherwise;
FOLLOWING = Natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts issuing one year
ahead earnings forecasts measured six months after fiscal yearend
(I/B/E/S);
Q_ACC = Measure of the quality of a country’s accounting standards published by
CIFAR (La Porta et al. 1998, Table 5);
MRKT_CAP = Natural logarithm of a firm’s market capitalisation (Worldscope);
Industry dummies = Series of indicator variables, with the largest group (manufacturing, SIC
codes 2 and 3) used as the base group (see lower part of Table 2.3 for
definitions of the 5 industry groupings).
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information being publicly available. I also control for possible differences in
uncertainty across industries, by including the same set of industry dummies as in
earlier analyses. For estimating regression equation (2.8) (equation (2.9)), I have
enough data on 87 (94) non-local GAAP users (59 (66) IAS and 28 (28) U.S. GAAP)
and 1036 (1321) local GAAP users.
The results of a Wilcoxon two-sample test (not tabulated) indicate that there is
no significant difference in forecast dispersion (z-statistic 0.71) or abnormal stock
return volatility (z-statistic -0.53) between the group of non-local and local GAAP
users.28,29 The results from estimating regression equations (2.8) and (2.9), displayed in
Panels A and B of Table 2.8, suggest that uncertainty is larger for firms using
non-local GAAP, because forecast dispersion (abnormal stock return volatility) is
significantly (insignificantly) positively associated with non-local GAAP usage. I also
find that forecast dispersion increases with abnormal stock return volatility.
Furthermore, I find the expected negative effect of firm size in both regressions.
Industry membership also appears to influence uncertainty. The finding that
uncertainty is higher for firms using non-local GAAP than for firms using local GAAP
is consistent with non-local GAAP offering fewer opportunities for income smoothing
or unfamiliarity of capital market participants with IAS or U.S. GAAP. If the results
are due to unfamiliarity with non-local GAAP, I expect to observe the positive effect
of non-local GAAP usage on uncertainty to be more pronounced for firms that have
only recently started using IAS or U.S. GAAP (‘late’ adopters). To explicitly examine
this explanation, I add an interaction term, EARLY × GAAP, to regression equations
(2.8) and (2.9). For estimating this modified version of equation (2.8) (equation (2.9)),
I have enough data for 27 (29) ‘early’ adopters and 43 (47) ‘late’ adopters. The results,
also displayed in Panels A and B of Table 2.8, show that only ‘late’ non-local GAAP
adopters have significantly higher forecast dispersion than local GAAP users; ‘early’
adopters do not differ significantly from local GAAP users. My earlier (insignificant)
findings regarding abnormal return volatility remain unaffected.
2.4.4 Selection bias
Because firms choose their reporting standards conditional on the expected net
benefits in terms of reduced information asymmetry, the analysis could be influenced
by self-selection bias (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Leuz 2003). This could mean that
the coefficient on GAAP in equations (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9) is overstated.30 I examine
the impact of possible self-selection bias using the approach by Leuz and Verrecchia
(2000), i.e., I estimate a two-stage model to measure ‘treatment effects’. First, I
estimate a probit model to predict the choice to adopt non-local GAAP (using the same
variables to explain adoption as in equation (2.1)).31 Subsequently, I estimate the effect
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of adoption on information asymmetry controlling for possible self-selection bias. The
results (not tabulated) indicate that the inferences obtained earlier remain qualitatively
unchanged. However, I no longer find that forecast dispersion is higher for firms using
non-local GAAP, i.e., the coefficient on GAAP in equation (2.8) is no longer
significant.32
2.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
I study the determinants and consequences of voluntary non-local GAAP adoption. I
find that the rate of adoption of non-local GAAP by non-financial firms domiciled and
listed in the EU in 1999 is relatively low. Apparently, voluntary adoption of IAS or
U.S. GAAP brings no net economic benefits for a large majority of firms. However, I
find that adopters of non-local GAAP have some common characteristics that
discriminate them from non-adopters. Firms that use non-local GAAP are more likely
to be listed on a U.S. exchange or the EASDAQ exchange, have more geographically
dispersed operations, and are larger on average than firms using local GAAP. I also
find that firms adopting non-local GAAP are more likely to be domiciled in countries
with lower quality financial reporting and in countries where IAS is explicitly allowed
as an alternative to local GAAP.
Besides documenting the characteristics of firms that decide to adopt non-local
GAAP, I also study the consequences of adoption. Specifically, I test whether firms
using IAS or U.S. GAAP experience a lower level of information asymmetry, by
examining several proxies for information asymmetry. I fail to find evidence of a
lower cost of capital for adopters. However, firms adopting IAS or U.S. GAAP, and
especially ‘early’ adopters, attract more financial analysts. I also find that forecast
dispersion is higher for firms that recently started using non-local GAAP (‘late’
adopters). I do not find a difference in forecast dispersion between ‘early’ non-local
GAAP adopters and firms using local GAAP. Furthermore, there is no significant
difference in stock return volatility between non-local and local GAAP users.
These findings suggest that non-local GAAP adopters share common
characteristics and that, although they are experiencing benefits by increased public
exposure in capital markets, the reductions in information asymmetry they experience
appear to be small. One reason may be that investors and analysts need time to learn to
understand the changes in a firm’s financial reporting brought about by the switch to
non-local GAAP or that firms need time to learn to fully comply with the new set of
accounting standards. Another explanation for the lack of compelling evidence of
lower information asymmetry for non-local GAAP users could be that accounting
quality is not primarily determined by accounting standards, but that firms’ reporting
incentives play a more important role (Ball et al. 2003). In my setting this would mean
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that the choice of accounting standards, non-local versus local GAAP, is not
determining the quality of financial statements and the resulting level of information
asymmetry, but that firms’ incentives to report informatively are more important.
The finding that net benefits of voluntary non-local GAAP adoption seem to be
positive for only a small fraction of listed EU firms, coupled with the apparent lack of
any quantifiable benefits is surprising, and certainly informative, considering the
obligation for listed EU firms to use IAS (or International Financial Reporting
Standards, IFRS, as future standards by the IASB are called) from 2005 on. Because I
examine a time period before the European Commission formally announced this
regulation, firms using IAS can be seen as voluntary adopters of this regulation who
expect IAS usage to be beneficial. The firms that voluntarily use IAS are therefore
representative of the types of firms that the EC is benefiting by the new regulation.
From this perspective this research sheds some light on the decision function of the
EC. The study also provides some insights into the social aspects of IAS adoption in
the EU, by showing how the net benefits of IAS adoption are distributed across EU
countries (Table 2.2). Furthermore, it seems reasonable to believe that firms not
experiencing net benefits from adoption will have an incentive to not fully comply
with the regulation, once in place. Therefore, the results can also help the EC and other
regulators in deciding where to put emphasis in their enforcement efforts, once the IAS
regulation will be effective.
The EC motivates the regulation by referring to the enhanced international
comparability and transparency of financial statements and improved access to
international capital markets resulting from IAS usage. I fail to find strong evidence of
lower information asymmetry, a much cited benefit of more transparent financial
reporting, for non-local GAAP adopters. If this finding is due to the second-order
effect of accounting standards in determining accounting quality (i.e., firms’ reporting
incentives are more important), this would mean that the mandatory usage of IAS from
2005 on would not automatically lead to the anticipated benefits in terms of more
transparency and lower information asymmetry, without a simultaneous change in
firms’ reporting incentives. However, the findings do suggest that benefits of adoption
are larger for ‘early’ adopters than for ‘late’ adopters, which provides some support for
the view of the EC that standardization of financial reporting would be needlessly
lengthy if left up to financial markets and that in the meantime competition between
different standards would not lead to improvements in terms of transparency and
comparability. On the whole, it remains an open question whether mandatory, as
opposed to voluntary adoption of IAS by all listed EU firms from 2005 on will bring
the desired benefits and lead to a quantifiable reduction in information asymmetry for
all firms.
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Notes
1  For an overview of listing requirements of EU stock exchanges, see Haller (2002).
2  Private communication with Stefano Zambon confirmed this. His research shows that only three
Italian firms comply fully with IAS.
3  I would like to thank Paul Pacter of the IASC for providing the list that was no longer available
from the IASC web site.
4  To be included, the auditor’s report and summary of accounting policies, or footnotes must state
that the financial statements comply with IAS without qualification (IASC 2001).
5  Not necessarily IAS, however no more specific data was available.
6  Item number GF66: Accounting standard – Note (ASTD). Again, no more specific data was
available.
7  There was considerable overlap between the different data sources.
8  I also excluded a small number of firms classified as SIC code 9.
9  The inclusion of firms domiciled in the United Kingdom in my regression analyses (I do not have
data on the quality of Irish accounting standards) does not materially influence the results.
10  See Maddala (2001, section 8.3) or, for a discussion of methodological issues in using in an
accounting context, see Zmijewski (1984), Palepu (1986), and Maddala (1991).
11  Mutual recognition in this context means that EU firms listing on a stock exchange in the EU can
use their local GAAP to draw up their financial statements.
12  The measure developed by Ashbaugh (2001) is not available for Austria, Greece, and Italy,
whereas the CIFAR score is only unavailable for Luxembourg.
13  Although this score was constructed based on 1990 annual reports, I still expect the measure to
reflect differences in accounting disclosures across countries, because regulation and practice only
change gradually.
14  EU countries without any institutional oversight systems for financial reporting standards are:
Austria, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (Ireland and Luxembourg
are not included in the analyses). The report does not analyze the enforcement mechanisms in
Greece, which forces me to exclude Greek firms from this sensitivity analysis.
15  The coefficient on the indicator variable is statistically significant (1% level, one-sided). Inclusion
of this variable leaves the results reported earlier qualitatively unchanged.
16  I estimate the logistic regression equation (1) including only firms using IAS or local GAAP (i.e.,
excluding U.S. GAAP users), with IAS as the dependent variable (an indicator variable that takes
the value 1 if a firm uses IAS and 0 otherwise) and without the dummy variable indicating a U.S.
listing (US_EX).
17  In contrast to Auer (1998) and Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) I employ a cross-sectional design to
study the consequences of non-local GAAP adoption, mainly because of data availability
constraints. After contacting the 114 firms using non-local GAAP examined in section 3, I was able
to obtain the date of first usage for 92 firms. However, many of these firms did not switch to non-
local GAAP but were using (or started using) IAS or U.S. GAAP at the time of the IPO.
Consequently, for many firms I do not have pre-adoption data available. Furthermore, Leuz and
Verrecchia (2000) point out that, based on an event study (around the switch to non-local GAAP),
it is hard to separate the effect on information asymmetry from the news effect (the revision in
capital market participants’ expectations about future firm performance). Therefore, Leuz and
CHAPTER 2
42
Verrecchia perform time-series analysis only as a consistency check for their cross-sectional
findings.
18  I use earnings forecasts outstanding 6 months after fiscal yearend to allow the publication of
(possible first-time) non-local GAAP annual reports to affect my information asymmetry proxies.
When forecasts for the next four years are not available, I use the forecasted earnings growth rate
from I/B/E/S or the growth rate implicit in forecasts that are available to calculate the missing
forecasts. I exclude observations that have negative cumulative four year earnings forecasts.
19  I estimate beta by using daily return observations (from Datastream, at least 150 observations
required) over the firm’s fiscal year for which I analyze the accounting standard choice.
20  Specifically, I minimize the Euclidean distance between local and non-local GAAP users per
country based on standardized measures of beta, market capitalization, and probability of adoption
(the fitted value per firm from regression equation (1)).
21  I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this possibility.
22  I contacted the 114 firms using non-local GAAP included in the determinants analysis and asked
when they started using IAS or U.S. GAAP. In this way I was able to obtain the date of first usage
of non-local GAAP for 92 firms. Data availability constraints reduce the number of observations in
the various consequences analyses even further.
23  An alternative would be to directly examine changes in a firm’s investor base. I did not perform
this analysis because, based on my data, it is hard to come up with a proxy for investor base.
24  Data is available at the statistics section of the web site of the World Federation of Exchanges
(http://www.world-exchanges.org).
25  At least 150 daily return observations are required.
26  Wilcoxon two-sample tests for differences between the groups of non-local and local GAAP users
for the independent variables appearing in equation (7) reveal differences comparable to those in
Table 2.3, suggesting that the reduction in observations has not changed the composition of the
sample significantly. The level of stock market development (STMRKTDEV) is significantly lower
(1% level, two-sided) for non-local GAAP than for local GAAP users. Furthermore, there is no
significant difference in abnormal stock return volatility (VOLATILITY) between the groups of non-
local and local GAAP users.
27  The mean natural logarithm of one plus analyst following (FOLLOWING) for the group of non-
local (local) GAAP users is 2.92 (2.02), the standard deviation is 1.09 (1.21), and the median is
3.11 (2.08). For the full sample (non-local and local GAAP users), the mean is 2.08, the standard
deviation is 1.22, and the median is 2.08.
28  Wilcoxon two-sample tests for differences between the groups of non-local and local GAAP users
for the independent variables appearing in equations (8) and (9) confirm earlier findings (also see
Table 2.3 and note 26).
29  The mean forecast dispersion (DISPERSION) for the group of non-local (local) GAAP users is 0.63
(0.39), the standard deviation is 1.87 (0.78), and the median is 0.26 (0.25). For the full sample
(non-local and local GAAP users), the mean is 0.41, the standard deviation is 0.91, and the median
is 0.25.  The mean stock return volatility (VOLATILITY) for the group of non-local (local) GAAP
users is 0.03 (0.03), the standard deviation is 0.01 (0.01), and the median is 0.02 (0.02). For the full
sample (non-local and local GAAP users), the mean is 0.03, the standard deviation is 0.01, and the
median is 0.02.
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30  In the analysis of cost of capital differences between non-local and local GAAP users, self-
selection bias is less of an issue, because I match local GAAP users to non-local GAAP users on
the estimated benefit of adoption, i.e., the fitted values from equation (1), among others (also see
note 20).
31  The results (not tabulated) from estimating the probit model are comparable to the results from the
logistic regression model (see Table 2.5, model a).
32  Specifically, I find that the coefficient on GAAP remains positive and statistically significant in
equation (7). In equation (8), the effect of non-local GAAP adoption on forecast dispersion is no
longer statistically significant. Controlling for possible self-selection bias does not influence the
results obtained from estimating equation (9), i.e., I do not find an effect of non-local GAAP usage
on stock return volatility. Furthermore, the coefficients on the control variables included in
equations (7), (8), and (9) remain qualitatively similar. In addition to the two-stage model described
in the text, I also use an instrumental variables approach (as described in Leuz and Verrecchia
2003, footnote 23), with similar results. Note that I do not control for possible self-selection in the
equations where I separately measure the effect of early and late adoption of non-local GAAP on
my information asymmetry proxies (see Tables 2.7 and 2.8), because this would require explicit
modeling of the early versus late adoption choice to avoid self-selection bias. I consider this to be
outside of the scope of the paper.
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Chapter 3
Firm-Level Reporting Incentives and Accounting
Properties: Stakeholder- versus
Shareholder-Oriented Governance Structures*
3.1 Introduction
Around the world, accounting is going through substantial changes. One of the most
apparent current worldwide developments is that accounting regulators mandate firms
to report their financial statements in accordance with International Accounting
Standards (IAS). Regulators’ overriding objective for taking such actions is to improve
the usefulness of accounting information for shareholders, as illustrated by the
European Union’s motivation of its decision to prescribe IAS in the EU:
“This Regulation aims at contributing to the efficient and cost-effective
functioning of the capital market. The protection of investors and the
maintenance of confidence in the financial markets is also an important
aspect of the completion of the internal market in this area.” (Regulation
(EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council.)
Because prior research suggests that changes in accounting regulation do not
necessarily imply changes in accounting practices (Ball 2001; Ball et al. 2003), the
worldwide move towards shareholder-oriented accounting regulation yields an
important research question. Do firm-specific reporting incentives moderate the effect
of shareholder-oriented accounting regulation on accounting practices?
In this chapter, I investigate the impact of various corporate governance
mechanisms on the properties of firms’ accounting information in a country with
shareholder-oriented accounting rules that exhibit much resemblance with IAS. The
setting of my study, i.e., The Netherlands, is interesting from a corporate governance
perspective for several reasons. First, public firms’ ownership structures are very
diverse and range from majority-owned by one large shareholder to the classic
example of a widely-held firm (De Jong et al. 2001). Within the same institutional
context, I am therefore able to study firms with diffuse ownership structures, which
* This chapter is based on a working paper co-authored with Frank Moers and Erik Peek. I gratefully
acknowledge the contribution of Thomson Financial for providing earnings per share forecast data,
available through the I/B/E/S - Institutional Brokers Estimate System.
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resemble typical U.S. firms, and firms with concentrated ownership, which are
common in large parts of the world. Second, unlike many Anglo-Saxon countries, the
Dutch corporate law allows public firms to adopt a rich variety of protectionist
measures that severely reduce shareholders’ intervention power and impair the market
for corporate control, such as the issuance of non-voting depository receipts and the
use of voting caps. In addition, many firms, but not all, are subject to the so-called
structure regime, which grants the Supervisory Board significantly greater power than
in non-structure firms, at the expense of shareholders’ power. Dutch regulators’ main
objective for allowing such anti-shareholder, protectionist measures and corporate
structures is to reduce the influence of minority shareholders with the intention to
isolate firm management from myopic influences and to impose a stakeholder
orientation on firm management (SER 1969; Voogd 1989).1
The main research question that I address is whether firms’ orientation, in terms
of shareholder versus stakeholder orientation, affects the properties of their financial
reporting. Because Dutch firms can choose to adopt protectionist measures and
because the structure regime does not apply to all firms, the governance structures in
my sample exhibit sufficient variation to examine the impact of shareholder versus
stakeholder orientation on financial reporting, holding other institutional influences
constant. In this study, I examine the influence of a firm’s corporate governance
structure, stakeholder- versus shareholder-oriented, on three characteristics of financial
reporting: earnings smoothing, conservatism, and the likelihood of meeting or beating
analyst earnings forecasts. I expect that firms with more concentrated ownership, more
takeover defense mechanisms in place, and firms subject to the structure regime, i.e., a
stakeholder-oriented governance structure, smooth earnings more actively, report more
(unconditionally) conservatively, and are less likely to meet or beat analyst
expectations than shareholder-oriented firms. My findings are consistent with these
expectations.
My study distinguishes itself from prior studies in three important ways. First,
to date, single-country studies on the effect of corporate governance on financial
reporting have mainly focused on two extreme corporate governance models. That is,
most prior studies examine either the U.S. or the U.K. (e.g., Warfield et al. 1995;
Vafeas 2000; Beekes et al. 2003), where shareholder rights are well-protected,
ownership is widespread, and the market for corporate control is strong, or East Asia
(e.g., Ball et al. 2003; Fan and Wong 2002; Yeo et al. 2002), where shareholders are
poorly protected and most firms have concentrated ownership structures. A distinctive
feature of my research setting is that Dutch firms exhibit clear differences in
governance and reporting incentives. In addition, accounting institutions in The
Netherlands tend to leave much discretion to the firm because enforcement is weak
and tax accounting is formally separate from financial accounting (Alford et al. 1993;
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Ali and Hwang 2000), which ensures that firms do have a choice whether or not to
report informatively to shareholders. In this respect, The Netherlands reflects many
characteristics of the Continental European and Asian countries that currently
introduce or have recently introduced IAS. Many of these countries still have weak
enforcement mechanisms and large varieties of governance structures.
Second, the orientation of accounting regulation and firms’ governance
structures tend to be related across countries, which has led prior researchers to study
the influence of orientation on financial reporting by focusing on cross-country
differences in reporting systems. For instance, Ali and Hwang (2000), Ball et al.
(2000), and Leuz et al. (2003) find that earnings in countries with shareholder-oriented
reporting systems are more informative, more conditionally conservative, and less
managed, respectively, than in countries with stakeholder-oriented reporting systems.
A disadvantage of cross-country research designs is that these are influenced by many
confounding factors. For example, countries with stakeholder-oriented reporting
systems are often characterized by weak outside investor protection, alignment of
financial and tax accounting rules, and low quality accounting regulation and
enforcement (Leuz et al. 2003). My focus on one country in which substantial
variation in financial reporting orientation exists contrasts with the approaches of Ali
and Hwang (2000), Ball et al. (2000), and Leuz et al. (2003) and allows me to isolate
the influence of governance on financial reporting from the influence of institutional
factors such as accounting regulation.
Third, some prior studies have examined the influence of ownership
concentration on financial reporting under shareholder-oriented institutions by
comparing public firms and private firms in the U.K. or the U.S. For example, Beatty
and Harris (1998) and Beatty et al. (2002) find that managers of public firms use
discretion in financial reporting to manage earnings more than managers of private
firms, which suggests that managers’ reporting decisions are a response to the weight
placed on this information by investors. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) directly test the
quality of financial reporting across private and public U.K. firms, and find that public
firms recognize economic losses on a timelier basis than private firms. The
Netherlands provide an interesting setting for studying whether ownership structure
influences firms’ reporting decisions. Specifically, in contrast with the U.K. or U.S.
studies of Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Beatty and Harris (1998), and Beatty et al.
(2002), I do not need to rely on data from private firms to study closely held firms,
because many Dutch listed companies can be seen as closely held. An advantage of
using public firms’ data only is that it makes capital market tests of earnings properties
possible. I also avoid that possible effects of listing on an exchange, like additional
disclosure requirements, intensified public scrutiny, or any other unobservable
differences between public and private firms influence my results.
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Finally, my study adds to the findings of Ball et al. (2003), who study financial
reporting in four East Asian countries where IAS has been introduced but other
reporting incentives, including enforcement, have remained largely unchanged. The
authors find that financial reporting has not become comparable to other countries with
shareholder-oriented accounting (like e.g. the U.K. or the U.S.). They attribute this
finding to the importance of other institutional factors and firm-specific incentives in
shaping accounting practice, but cannot explicitly test this. The setting of my study
allows powerful tests of the effect of firm’s reporting incentives on accounting
properties under shareholder-oriented accounting rules.
When extrapolating my results to settings where IAS is introduced, the
following caveat of my study should be borne in mind. Although Dutch accounting
regulation has the same objective as IAS, Dutch rules do differ from IAS in some
areas, such as post-retirement benefits and financial instruments. Despite these
differences, I do believe that my results provide relevant insights into the potential
impact of IAS introductions on worldwide accounting practices.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section two describes the
Dutch accounting system, the Dutch corporate governance system, prior literature, and
my hypotheses. Section three describes my sample, data, and research design. Section
four discusses the empirical tests and the results. Section five concludes with some
additional remarks.
3.2 Background and hypotheses development
3.2.1 Dutch accounting regulation
Dutch financial accounting and tax accounting rules are distinct and the influence of
the government on Dutch accounting regulation is limited. Although broad rules
concerning the format of financial statements, disclosure, and the valuation of assets,
which conform to the EU 4th and 7th Company Law Directive, are incorporated into
Dutch Law, detailed accounting rules are set by a private body, i.e., the ‘Council for
Annual Reporting’ (Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving). The Dutch Council for Annual
Reporting issues ‘Guidelines for Annual Financial Statements’, which are followed by
many Dutch publicly listed firms, even though they are not legally binding. The
Council’s objective in setting Guidelines is similar to the objective of the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB, formerly IASC), i.e., to ensure that publicly listed
firms’ financial statements provide useful information to shareholders. The idea that
the Dutch Guidelines have a shareholder-orientation similar to the IAS is clearly
illustrated by the fact that the Dutch Council’s Conceptual Framework is a literal
translation of the IASB Conceptual Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of
Financial Statements, which states that:
FIRM-LEVEL REPORTING INCENTIVES AND ACCOUNTING PROPERTIES
49
“As investors are providers of risk capital to the enterprise, the provision
of financial statements that meet their needs will also meet most of the
needs of other users that financial statements can satisfy.” (IASB
Conceptual Framework, paragraph 10.)
Since the early 1980s, the Council has explicitly integrated the International
Accounting Standards into its Guidelines (Buijink and Eken 1999). However, in its
effort to seek consensus between the various members of the Council, who are
representatives of preparers, users, and auditors of financial statements, the Council
has sometimes deviated from the requirements of IAS. Important examples of areas
where Dutch Guidelines deviate from IAS at the end of my sample period are that
Dutch firms are allowed to write off purchased goodwill against equity immediately on
acquisition, Dutch firms have more discretion in setting up provisions, and that IAS 19
(post-retirement benefits) and IAS 39 (financial instruments) are not yet incorporated
into the Dutch Guidelines (see e.g., Buijink and Eken 1999; Council for Annual
Reporting 1999; Nobes 2000). Because most of the Dutch exceptions to IAS broaden
the scope of options, Dutch listed firms are largely able to draw up their financial
statement in accordance with IAS, if they desire.
The Dutch Enterprise Chamber, which is a separate section of the Amsterdam
Court of Justice, is the only mechanism that passively enforces Dutch accounting
rules. Any party with an interest in the financial statements of a firm can file a
complaint with the Enterprise Chamber. During my sample period, active enforcement
of publicly listed firms’ compliance with Dutch accounting rules was absent (Buijink
and Eken 1999). The passive character of enforcement in combination with the fact
that the Council’s Guidelines are not officially backed by the law or endorsed by the
stock exchange (Flower 2004, p.80) makes that the enforcement of accounting
regulation in The Netherlands is weak. In sum, like IAS, Dutch accounting regulation
is not influenced by taxation and has a shareholder-orientation (see also Ali and
Hwang 2000; Hung 2001 but Dutch institutions tend to allow much discretion. As a
result, the Dutch institutional environment leaves firms the option whether or not to
provide informative public financial reporting.
3.2.2 Dutch corporate governance
From an international perspective, the corporate governance system in The
Netherlands has some unique characteristics. Like some other Continental European
countries, the corporate structure of Dutch (public) firms is based on the two-tier board
structure, formally separating the decision management and decision control functions.
The structure law governs the corporate structure of firms with more than 100
employees and common equity in excess of 13 million Euros. Firms fulfilling these
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criteria are referred to as structure firms.2 In structure firms, important rights of
common shareholders, namely (1) the authority to appoint and dismiss management
and (2) the right to make amendments to the financial statements, are delegated to the
Supervisory Board. Furthermore, the Supervisory Board has the right to veto strategic
decisions made by the executive board. Members of the Supervisory Board are
appointed by co-optation, which means that supervisors appoint their own successors.
Furthermore, because Dutch law states that supervisors can only be dismissed by those
who appointed them, the Supervisory Board in structure firms is a powerful
autonomous body beyond common shareholders’ control.
In addition to the firms that do not meet the above size criteria, other firms may
be exempt from the structure regime if they are the corporate headquarters of a
multinational corporation and employ more than 50 percent of their employees outside
The Netherlands. In non-structure firms, the authority of the Supervisory Board is
limited to suspending management and disapproving of the financial statements. The
authority to appoint and dismiss management and supervisors and the right to amend
the financial statements remain with the common shareholders. Approximately 32
percent of my observations come from non-structure firms.
Another characteristic of Dutch corporate governance is the extensive use of
various anti-takeover mechanisms (Kabir et al. 1997; De Jong et al. 2001; De Jong
2002).3 Mechanisms to limit the power of shareholders are issuing priority shares to a
friendly foundation, which retains control over important decisions (adopted by
approximately 35 percent of my observations), or limiting the number of votes per
shareholder (voting cap, adopted by 3 percent). Another widely used method to limit
the voting power of common shareholders is the issuance of depository receipts by an
administrative office controlled by the firm (adopted by 30 percent). Holders of
depository receipts have all the cash flow rights attached to common shares, but no
voting rights. Because the administrative office retains the voting rights attached to the
shares, the use of depository receipts significantly reduces the power of common
shareholders. The most widely adopted anti-takeover mechanism is the use of
preferred defense shares with the same voting rights as common shares (adopted by 60
percent). Once authorized by common shareholders, firm management has the right to
issue the preferred shares to a friendly party to avoid a takeover, causing a substantial
dilution of common shareholders’ voting rights. Kabir et al. (1997) argue that the
structure regime, although typically not a choice variable, can also be considered an
anti-takeover mechanism, because it limits the power of common shareholders in favor
of the Supervisory Board.
A third characteristic of the governance structure in The Netherlands is that in
many firms, management or large shareholders hold large parts, or even the majority,
of outstanding shares. Whereas such concentrated ownership structures mirror the
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structures that are common in large parts of the world, the ownership structures of
several other Dutch listed firms mirror the structures of widely-held firms that are
common in the U.S. or the U.K. This gives rise to a great within-country variation in
ownership structures (Becht and Röell 1999; Becht and Mayer 2001; De Jong et al.
2001). Institutional ownership is common in The Netherlands, but institutions typically
hold only small stakes in Dutch firms (De Jong 2002).
3.2.3 Hypotheses development
Financial reporting can have various objectives, such as providing timely information
to outside stakeholders, payout determination, or tax determination. In this study, I
distinguish two financial reporting systems with different objectives, i.e., stakeholder-
oriented systems versus shareholder-oriented systems. Following previous studies such
as Ali and Hwang (2000) and Ball et al. (2000), I define shareholder-oriented reporting
systems as systems whose main objective is to provide a timely and reliable
accounting performance measure to shareholders. In contrast, I define stakeholder-
oriented reporting systems as systems whose main objective is payout determination,
i.e., to determine the maximum amount of earnings that can be used for payments to
stakeholders such as shareholders and executives, without jeopardizing the firms’
financial stability.
The accounting literature identifies several determinants of firms’ reporting
objectives. One determinant is accounting regulation and enforcement. Ball et al.
(2000) argue that the degree of political interference in standard setting differs across
countries, yielding cross-country differences in standards’ objectives. Specifically,
accounting regulation in countries with a high degree of political influence, such as
many Continental European countries, tends to focus on payout determination and
promote the concept of prudence, which can prohibit firms from providing timely,
informative reporting. As argued, the political interference in Dutch standard setting is
virtually absent and Dutch accounting regulation has a shareholder-orientation,
although the Dutch enforcement environment leaves much discretion to the firm.
Hence, Dutch accounting institutions leave firms the option whether or not to provide
informative public reporting.
Another determinant of firms’ reporting objectives are their governance
structures, which create different financial reporting incentives, depending on
shareholders’ demand for public financial reporting (e.g., Beatty and Harris 1998; Ke
et al. 1999; Ball and Shivakumar 2005). In firms with concentrated ownership,
characterized by large shareholdings and low share turnover, the importance of
financial reporting as a means to resolve information asymmetry is much lower than in
widely held firms. Because of their sizeable ownership stakes, large shareholders have
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both the incentives and the means to effectively monitor management (Shleifer and
Vishny 1986). Furthermore, in The Netherlands, many large shareholders are directly
involved in the monitoring of management through their presence on Supervisory
Boards, which reduces their reliance on public financial reporting (Ball and
Shivakumar 2005). In contrast, dispersed shareholders in widely-held firms face the
problem that other shareholders free ride on their monitoring activities and,
consequently, information asymmetry between shareholders and managers is most
efficiently resolved by timely public disclosure. Also, shareholders of widely-held
firms turn over their shares relatively often compared to closely-held firms’
shareholders, which leads to a greater demand for an accurate firm valuation on a
continuous basis, translating into greater demand for timely financial reporting.
In The Netherlands, other governance characteristics than ownership
concentration can also be associated with firms’ reporting objectives. As argued,
Dutch firms may use several mechanisms to reduce the intervention power of common
shareholders, such as the structure regime or takeover defense measures. The main
objective of Dutch regulators to allow the use of such mechanisms is to shield firm
management from the influence of minority shareholders and from the threat of hostile
takeovers. As such, the structure regime imposes a stakeholder orientation on firms.
One example of how this is achieved is that the members of the Supervisory Board of
structure firms are appointed by co-optation (i.e., not by the shareholders) and that
Dutch law requires those supervisors to act in the interests of all stakeholders. Another
example is that in structure firms the Supervisory Board has the right to make
amendments to the financial statements and, consequently, has the ultimate authority
to determine the amount of profit that is available for dividend payouts, whereas in
non-structure firms such authorities devolve to the common shareholders. In addition,
because takeover defense measures reduce shareholders’ power in the interest of
financial stability, firms using such measures implicitly signal their stakeholder
orientation.
Based on the above descriptions of Dutch governance structures, I hypothesize
that Dutch firms’ stakeholder orientation is a positive function of (i) ownership
concentration, (ii) being a structure firm and (iii) the number of takeover defense
measures in place. I expect that shareholder-oriented and stakeholder-oriented
reporting systems produce earnings with different properties. Specifically, I expect that
firms having stakeholder-oriented objectives such as payout determination prefer to
reduce earnings variability, i.e., smooth earnings, and report (unconditionally)
conservatively, i.e., present the worst-case scenario (e.g., Ball et al. 2000; Ball and
Shivakumar 2005). The main reason for these reporting preferences is that stable
earnings patterns (due to earnings smoothing) and conservative reporting reduce the
probability that a firm makes unwarranted payouts to shareholders (dividends) and
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managers (bonuses), which could harm the firm’s financial position. To examine the
effect of corporate governance on earnings smoothing and conservatism, I therefore
test the following hypotheses:
H1:  Firms with stakeholder-oriented governance structures smooth earnings to a
greater extent than firms with shareholder-oriented governance structures.
H2:  Firms with stakeholder-oriented governance structures report more
(unconditionally) conservatively than firms with shareholder-oriented
governance structures.
I emphasize that my definition of conservatism differs from the definition used by Ball
et al. (2000) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005). While these studies examine conditional
conservatism, i.e., the timely incorporation of economic losses into accounting
income, I focus on unconditional conservatism, i.e., the understatement of assets and
revenues and overstatement of liabilities and expenses, unconditional on the presence
of economic losses.
In addition to the above reporting strategies, I also expect stakeholder-oriented
firms to be less concerned about short-term earnings targets than shareholder-oriented
firms. Stein (1988) argues that takeover pressure causes managers to behave
myopically because takeover threats provide incentives to managers to increase current
earnings in order to avoid being taken over at an (temporarily) undervalued price. The
use of anti-takeover mechanisms mitigates these incentives and leads managers to
focus more on the long-term viability of the firm than on current profitability. Stein
(1988) further argues that one of the factors that cause shares to be (temporarily)
undervalued in the first place is the beliefs of shareholders. He distinguishes “patient”
from “impatient” shareholders, where impatient (patient) shareholders are defined as
those shareholders who are (not) discouraged by low earnings reports and therefore
(not) dump their shares as soon as such a report is issued. Impatient shareholders are
less likely to be dominant when firms are closely-held than when they are widely-held,
which suggests that ownership concentration decreases the probability of (temporary)
undervaluation and thus the incentives for myopic behavior.
An important myopic earnings target is meeting or beating analyst earnings
forecasts. Degeorge et al. (1999), Matsumoto (2002), and Cheng and Warfield (2005)
show that meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts is an important earnings
management threshold. Bartov et al. (2002) document a significant positive stock price
reaction to meeting or beating these thresholds. I expect managers of firms with
stakeholder-oriented governance structures to be less likely to respond to capital
market pressure and less likely to try to meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts.
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H3:  Firms with stakeholder-oriented governance structures are less likely to meet or
beat analyst earnings forecasts than firms with shareholder-oriented
governance structures.
3.3 Research design
3.3.1 Data and sample selection
The firms included in my sample are Dutch non-financial firms listed on the
Amsterdam stock exchange. Using data for the years 1991 to 2000, I obtain 1,176 firm
year observations from 173 firms with sufficient data available for the main analyses.
Ownership data comes from the WMZ (Disclosure of Major Holdings in Listed
Companies Act) register, which is administered by the AFM (The Netherlands
Authority for the Financial Markets), the Dutch stock exchange regulatory authority.
This register identifies for all listed firms the actual fraction of cash flow rights, as
well as voting rights, owned by each shareholder who holds at least 5 percent of the
firm’s shares (or depository receipts). I manually collected the data on various anti-
takeover mechanisms and data on whether a firm is subject to the structure regime
from the annual reports. Financial statement data come from the REACH database.
Stock prices are from Datastream and analyst earnings forecasts are from I/B/E/S.
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the sample. The great diversity in
ownership structures is apparent, as well as the extensive use of takeover defenses.
Preferred shares are the most popular takeover defense (adopted by 60.4 percent of my
observations), followed by depository receipts (adopted by 29.7 percent) and priority
shares (adopted by 34.6 percent). Statutory limitations on voting rights are relatively
uncommon (adopted by 3.3 percent). Furthermore, 68.1 percent of my observations
come from firms subject to the structure regime. Firm size, in terms of both total assets
and sales, varies substantially across observations. I therefore control for the influence
of differences in firm size in my empirical tests.
Table 3.2 shows that ownership concentration is negatively correlated with
being subject to the structure regime and the presence of anti-takeover mechanisms,
which suggests that these corporate governance mechanisms act as substitutes. Being
subject to the structure regime is positively correlated with the number of takeover
defense mechanisms in place. Furthermore, the aspects of firms’ corporate governance
structures that I study are not highly correlated with other firm characteristics, with the
exception that structure firms are smaller as measured by total assets and sales.
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Table 3.1
Descriptive statistics (n = 1,176)
Variable Mean Standard deviation Q1  Median Q3
Governance variables
CONCENTRATION 0.152 0.188 0.019 0.066 0.250
Largest shareholder 0.284 0.231 0.095 0.205 0.480
STRUCTURE 0.681 - - - -
ANTI_TAKEOVER 1.280 0.466 1.000 1.000 2.000
- Priority shares 0.346 - - - -
- Preferred shares 0.604 - - - -
- Depository receipts 0.297 - - - -
- Voting rights limitation 0.033 - - - -
Financial variables
ASSETS 1,897 6,906 61 237 816
SALES 2,276 7,559 110 390 1,247
?SALES -0.011 0.336 -0.099 0.004 0.104
ACCR -0.003 0.067 -0.036 -0.002 0.035
OCF 0.056 0.082 0.008 0.054 0.102
ROA 0.057 0.063 0.032 0.058 0.082
BTM 0.691 0.529 0.348 0.592 0.907
LEVERAGE 0.617 0.142 0.528 0.633 0.716
The variables are defined as follows:
CONCENTRATION = Herfindahl concentration index of share ownership;
STRUCTURE = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is a structure firm;
ANTI_TAKEOVER = Number of anti-takeover defense mechanisms in place;
Priority shares = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has priority shares outstanding;
Preferred shares = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has the possibility to issue preferred
(defense) shares;
Depository receipts = Indicator variable equal to 1 if 50 percent or more of a firm’s ordinary share
capital consists of depository receipts;
Voting rights
limitation
= Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has a statutory limitation on the
number of votes that can be cast by any single shareholder;
ASSETS = End-of-year total assets (in millions of Euros);
SALES = Sales (in millions of Euros);
?SALES = Change in sales in year t, defined as sales in year t, scaled by end-of-year
total assets, minus sales in year t-1, scaled by beginning-of-year total assets;
ACCR = Working capital accruals in year t, defined as non-cash working capital
minus provisions in year t, scaled by end-of-year total assets, minus non-
cash working capital minus provisions in year t-1, scaled by beginning-of-
year total assets;
OCF = Operating cash flow in year t, defined as net income in year t, scaled by
end-of-year total assets, minus ACCRt;
ROA = Return on assets in year t, defined as the ratio of net income before
extraordinary items in year t to end-of-year total assets;
BTM = Book to market ratio in year t, defined as the ratio of end-of-year book
value of equity to end-of-year market value of equity;
LEVERAGE = The ratio of end-of-year liabilities to end-of-year total assets.
I report descriptive statistics for ACCR, OCF, ROA, and ?SALES after removing the top and bottom
one percent of the corresponding distributions.
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3.3.2 Smoothing
In this study, I define earnings smoothing as the negative relation between working
capital accruals and current operating cash flows. To some extent, a natural property of
accrual accounting is that cash flows and accruals are negatively correlated, because
one of the objectives of accrual accounting is to resolve the timing and matching
problems of cash flows. However, following Leuz et al. (2003), I interpret a more
negative association as evidence that firms use financial reporting discretion to smooth
earnings. To test the influence of a firm’s governance structure on the tendency to
smooth earnings, I therefore estimate the following regression equation:
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where:
ACCRt = Working capital accruals in year t, defined as non-cash
working capital minus provisions in year t, scaled by end-
of-year total assets, minus non-cash working capital minus
provisions in year t-1, scaled by beginning-of-year total
assets;4
OCFt = Operating cash flow in year t, defined as net income in year
t, scaled by end-of-year total assets, minus ACCRt;
CONCENTRATIONt = Herfindahl concentration index of share ownership in year t;
STRUCTUREt = Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is a structure firm
in year t;
ANTI_TAKEOVERt = Number of anti-takeover mechanisms in place in year t;
?SALESt = Change in sales in year t, defined as sales in year t, scaled
by end-of-year total assets, minus sales in year t-1, scaled
by beginning-of-year total assets;
SALESGROWTHt+1 = Percentage change in sales from year t to year t+1;
SIZEt = Natural logarithm of end-of-year total assets;
INDUSTRYt = Industry dummies based on the industry classification of
Barth et al. (1998);
YEARt = Year dummies.
Based on my hypothesis that stakeholder-oriented firms smooth earnings more
than shareholder-oriented firms, I expect the interaction coefficients on my proxies for
the stakeholder orientation of a firm, i.e., CONCENTRATION, STRUCTURE, and
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ANTI_TAKEOVER to be negative. Following the argument that the structure regime
could be considered as a takeover defense mechanism (Kabir et al. 1997), I include the
summation of STRUCTURE and ANTI_TAKEOVER (labeled PROTECTION) in the
first regression. In a second regression, I replace the composite variable with the two
separate variables STRUCTURE and ANTI_TAKEOVER.
I include provisions (such as provisions for maintenance or warranty costs) in
my accruals measure because prior research finds that Dutch firms use such
discretionary provisions in managing earnings (Peek 2004). I include the current year
change in sales to control for the non-discretionary component of working capital
accruals. Following Dechow et al. (2003), I include next year’s percentage change in
sales as a control for investments in working capital to facilitate future growth. I
further include a proxy for size as an interaction term to control for possible size
effects in the accruals-cash flow relation. Finally, I include interactions of OCF with
industry and year dummies to control for differences in smoothing behavior across
industries or years. My industry classification is similar to the classification used by
Barth et al. (1998) and yields 9 different industry classes.5 Because OLS residuals of
equation (1) could be positively correlated across years, I calculate all t-statistics using
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (Newey and West
1987).
3.3.3 Conservatism
Following Ahmed et al. (2002), I define conservatism as a persistent difference
between market value and book value of equity. To study the impact of governance
mechanisms on conservatism, I estimate the following regression equation:
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where:
BTMt = Book to market ratio in year t, defined as the ratio of end-
of-year book value of equity to end-of-year market value of
equity;
SALESGROWTHt = Percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t;
ROAt = Return on assets in year t, defined as the ratio of net income
before extraordinary items in year t to end-of-year total
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assets;
LEVERAGEt = The ratio of end-of-year ratio of liabilities to end-of-year
total assets;
DIVIDENDSt = Dividends declared out of year t net income, scaled by end-
of-year total assets;
STD_ROAt = The standard deviation of ROAt, ROAt-1, and ROAt-2 (if
available);
RETt = Stock return over the twelve month period ending at year t
fiscal year-end;
and other variables are as defined before.
Based on the hypothesis that stakeholder-oriented firms report more
conservatively than shareholder-oriented firms, I expect the coefficients on my proxies
for stakeholder governance structures, CONCENTRATION, STRUCTURE, and
ANTI_TAKEOVER to be negative, corresponding to a lower book value of equity
relative to market value. Again, I start with a model that includes the summation of
STRUCTURE and ANTI_TAKEOVER (labeled PROTECTION) and estimate a second
model where I replace the composite variable with the two separate variables
STRUCTURE and ANTI_TAKEOVER.
I include the control variables SIZE, ROA, LEVERAGE, DIVIDENDS, and
STD_ROA because they represent additional explanations for conservatism (Ahmed et
al. 2002). Following Beaver and Ryan (2000) and Ahmed et al. (2002), I control for
temporary differences between book and market values, caused by lagged accounting
recognition, by including current and past returns as proxies for past performance. I
again include industry and year dummies to control for industry and year effects.
Because OLS residuals of equation (2) could be positively correlated across years, I
calculate all t-statistics using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard
errors (Newey and West 1987).
Basu (1997) describes an alternative test of conservatism in which earnings are
regressed on positive and negative contemporaneous stock returns. In this test, which
has been widely applied during the past years, earnings are considered to be more
conservative if the coefficient on negative stock returns exceeds the coefficient on
positive stock returns, i.e., earnings incorporate economic losses sooner and less
gradually than economic profits. I choose not to use this measure of accounting
conservatism for two reasons. First, my theory is that stakeholder-oriented firms
exhibit more unconditional accounting conservatism than shareholder-oriented firms,
whereas Basu’s (1997) measure of conservatism focuses on conditional conservatism,
i.e., accounting conservatism conditional on the presence of an economic loss. Second,
Dietrich et al. (2004) indicate that Basu’s (1997) regression is econometrically biased
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and may produce unreliable estimates of conservatism. Dietrich et al. (2004) propose
the use of the above market-value method as an alternative for Basu’s (1997) method.
3.3.4 Meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts
To examine whether firms with stakeholder-oriented governance structures are less
likely to meet or just beat analyst earnings forecasts, I estimate the following
regression:
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where:
BEATt = Indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm’s EPS meets or
exceeds the median analyst earnings forecast outstanding at
the firm’s year t earnings announcement date;
EPSt = Earnings per share in year t, scaled by the end-of-year share
price;
?EPSt = The change in earnings per share from year t-1 to year t,
scaled by the end-of-year share price;
%OLD_FORECASTt = The percentage of forecasts used in calculating the median
analyst forecast that has been outstanding for more than
ninety days at the year t earnings announcement date;
and other variables are as defined before.
Following my hypothesis that firms with stakeholder-oriented governance
structures are less likely to be excessively focused on meeting or beating analyst
expectations, I expect the coefficients on my proxies for the stakeholder orientation of
a firm (CONCENTRATION, STRUCTURE, and ANTI_TAKEOVER) to be significantly
negative. As before, I first estimate a model that includes PROTECTION (the
summation of STRUCTURE and ANTI_TAKEOVER). In a second regression, I
decompose this variable and include STRUCTURE and ANTI_TAKEOVER separately.
To avoid the possibility that the dependent variable BEAT measures analyst
forecast optimism versus pessimism instead of beating the analyst forecast, I take the
following precautions. First, in my main analysis I choose a small forecast error
interval (0.01% of share price at the earnings announcement date) in which I measure
BEAT, because I expect that a small interval is more likely to measure forecast beating
behavior than a large interval, where meeting or beating forecasts could be due to
analyst forecast bias. Second, I control for several drivers of analyst forecast bias.
Specifically, I control for firm size, because larger firms tend to have less optimistic
analyst forecasts (e.g., Matsumoto 2002). I control for unexpected shocks to firms’
FIRM-LEVEL REPORTING INCENTIVES AND ACCOUNTING PROPERTIES
61
earnings that tend to cause forecast errors by including several measures of current
(changes in) performance, i.e., EPS, ?EPS, and SALESGROWTH (e.g., Eames et al.
2002).6 Finally, I control for the percentage of relatively ‘old’ forecasts used in
calculating BEAT by including %OLD_FORECAST, because older forecasts tend to be
more optimistic (e.g., Richardson et al. 2004).
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Smoothing test
Table 3.3 shows the OLS results of equation (1). The first model in Table 3.3 shows
that ownership concentration (CONCENTRATION) negatively affects the relationship
between working-capital accruals and contemporaneous cash flows (p<0.05 one-
tailed). This implies that firms with more concentrated ownership smooth earnings
more actively, which is consistent with more stakeholder-oriented financial reporting.
The coefficient on the interaction between OCF and PROTECTION, measuring the
number of protectionist measures in place (including structure regime), is also
significantly negative (p<0.01 one-tailed), which is consistent with the idea that firms
that are isolated from intervention by shareholders engage in earnings smoothing to a
larger extent.
In a second regression analysis, I decompose the PROTECTION measure into
an indicator variable measuring whether a firm is subject to the structure regime
Table 3.3
OLS regression analysis of the influence of stakeholder orientation on the relationship between cash
flows and working capital accruals
Independent variable Expected sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Intercept ? 0.029
(10.723)+++
0.029
(10.680)+++
OCFt – -0.175
(-0.842)
-0.150
(-0.726)
Governance variables
OCFt ´ CONCENTRATIONt – -0.270
(-2.059)**
-0.267
(-2.047)**
OCFt ´ PROTECTIONt – -0.059
(-2.710)***
-
OCFt ´ STRUCTUREt – - -0.117
(-2.388)***
OCFt ´ ANTI_TAKEOVERt – - -0.035
(-1.399)*
(Continued on next page)
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(STRUCTURE) and a discrete measure of the number of takeover defenses in place
(ANTI_TAKEOVER). Table 3.3 also presents the results from estimating model (1)
after I replace PROTECTION with STRUCTURE and ANTI_TAKEOVER. The results
show that both variables, interacted with operating cash flows, are significantly
negative (p<0.01 and p<0.10 one-tailed, respectively).
The coefficients on the controls for current (?SALES) and future changes in
working capital needs (SALESGROWTH) are both in the expected direction, although
the coefficient on SALESGROWTH is insignificant. Firm size does not appear to
Table 3.3 (Continued)
Independent variable Expected sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Control variables
?SALESt + 0.018
(3.009)***
0.0179
(2.996)***
SALESGROWTHt+1 + 0.012
(1.268)
0.013*
(1.317)
OCFt ´ SIZEt ? -0.009
(-0.681)
-0.011
(-0.835)
Number of observations 1,081 1,081
F-value 42.676+++ 41.088+++
Adjusted R2 47.0% 47.1%
The variables are defined as follows:
ACCRt = Working capital accruals in year t, defined as non-cash working capital
minus provisions in year t, scaled by end-of-year total assets, minus non-
cash working capital minus provisions in year t-1, scaled by beginning-of-
year total assets;
OCFt = Operating cash flow in year t, defined as net income in year t, scaled by
end-of-year total assets, minus ACCRt;
CONCENTRATIONt = Herfindahl concentration index of share ownership in year t;
PROTECTIONt = Number of protective measures in place in year t, i.e., the sum of
STRUCTUREt and ANTI_TAKEOVERt;
STRUCTUREt = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is a structure firm in year t;
ANTI_TAKEOVERt = Number of anti-takeover defense mechanisms in place in year t;
?SALESt = Change in sales in year t, defined as sales in year t, scaled by end-of-year
total assets, minus sales in year t-1, scaled by beginning-of-year total
assets;
SALESGROWTHt+1 = Percentage change in sales from year t to year t+1;
SIZEt = Natural logarithm of end-of-year total assets.
Coefficients on interactions between OCF and industry and year dummies are included in the
regression but not separately reported. I estimate the regression after removing the top and bottom one
percent of the distribution of ACCRt and OCFt. Reported t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (Newey and West 1987).
***, **, and * (+++, ++, and +) denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent one-tailed (two-
tailed) alpha level, respectively.
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influence the accruals-cash flow relation. Overall, the results are consistent with the
hypothesis that firms with stakeholder-oriented governance structures smooth earnings
to a greater extent than firms with shareholder-oriented governance structures.
3.4.2 Conservatism test
Table 3.4 presents the OLS results of equation (2). The first model specification shows
that the coefficients on CONCENTRATION and PROTECTION are significantly
negative (p<0.05 and p<0.10 one-tailed, respectively), which is consistent with the
expectation that a stakeholder-oriented governance model is associated with more
conservative financial reporting. Decomposing the PROTECTION measure into
STRUCTURE and ANTI_TAKEOVER shows that the effect of PROTECTION on
conservatism is driven by the number of takeover defense mechanisms in place. As
can be seen from the second model specification in Table 3.4, the coefficient on
ANTI_TAKEOVER is significantly negative (p<0.05 one-tailed), whereas the
coefficient on STRUCTURE is not significant.
The coefficients on the control variables that capture other possible drivers of
conservative reporting are in the expected direction and statistically significant, with
the exception of SALESGROWTH. The coefficients on current year’s stock return and
three lagged returns, which control for temporary differences between book and
market value, are all significantly negative. In sum, the results are consistent with the
hypothesis that firms with stakeholder-oriented governance structures report more
conservatively than firms with shareholder-oriented governance structures.
Table 3.4
OLS regression analysis of the influence of stakeholder orientation on a market-based measure
accounting conservatism
Independent variable Expected sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Intercept ? 1.762
(8.689)+++
1.734
(8.456)+++
Governance variables
CONCENTRATIONt – -0.222
(-1.845)**
-0.225
(-1.868)**
PROTECTIONt – -0.030
(-1.524)*
-
STRUCTUREt – - 0.017
(0.399)
ANTI_TAKEOVERt – - -0.048
(-1.987)**
(Continued on next page)
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3.4.3 Meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts test
Table 3.5 reports the results of estimating equation (3) by logistic regression. Because
I am interested in cases where management actively attempts to beat (or meet) analyst
expectations by a small margin, I examine a subset of my observations for which the
Table 3.4 (Continued)
Independent variable Expected sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Control variables
SIZEt ? -0.007
(-0.568)
-0.004
(-0.360)
SALESGROWTHt – 0.070
(0.861)
0.071
(0.845)
ROAt – -3.451
(-5.783)***
-3.427
(-5.744)***
LEVERAGEt – -0.863
(-5.579)***
-0.884
(-5.749)***
DIVIDENDSt – -1.700
(-2.233)**
-1.718
(-2.292)**
STD_ROAt – -2.638
(-2.339)***
-2.564
(-2.292)**
Number of observations 1,066 1,066
F-value 129.909+++ 125.917+++
Adjusted R2 38.4% 38.5%
The variables are defined as follows:
BTMt = Book to market ratio in year t, defined as the ratio of end-of-year book
value of equity to end-of-year market value of equity;
CONCENTRATIONt = Herfindahl concentration index of share ownership in year t;
PROTECTIONt = Number of protective measures in place in year t, i.e., the sum of
STRUCTUREt and ANTI_TAKEOVERt;
STRUCTUREt = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is a structure firm in year t;
ANTI_TAKEOVERt = Number of anti-takeover defense mechanisms in place in year t;
SIZEt = Natural logarithm of end-of-year total assets;
SALESGROWTHt = Percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t;
ROAt = Return on assets in year t, defined as the ratio of net income before
extraordinary items in year t to end-of-year total assets;
LEVERAGEt = The ratio of end-of-year liabilities to end-of-year total assets;
DIVIDENDSt = Dividends declared out of year t net income, scaled by end-of-year total
assets;
STD_ROAt = The standard deviation of ROAt, ROAt-1, and ROAt-2 (if available);
RETt = Stock return over the twelve month period ending at year t fiscal year-end.
Coefficients on industry dummies, year dummies, RETt, RETt-1, RETt-2, and RETt-3 are included in the
regression but not separately reported. Reported t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors (Newey and West 1987).
***, **, and * (+++, ++, and +) denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent one-tailed (two-
tailed) alpha level, respectively.
FIRM-LEVEL REPORTING INCENTIVES AND ACCOUNTING PROPERTIES
65
forecast error is just above, equal to, or just below 0. Specifically, I limit my sample to
cases where the absolute forecast error (defined as the median analyst earnings per
share forecast minus reported earnings per share) before the earnings announcement
date is equal to or below 0.1 percent of the share price at the announcement date. In
the first model specification in Table 3.5, the coefficients on CONCENTRATION and
PROTECTION are significantly negative (p<0.05 and p<0.01 one-tailed, respectively),
which confirms my hypothesis that firms with a stakeholder-oriented governance
structure are less likely to meet or beat analyst forecasts. In the second specification, I
include STRUCTURE and ANTI_TAKEOVER separately. Again, the coefficients on
my proxies for stakeholder orientation (i.e., CONCENTRATION, STRUCTURE, and
ANTI_TAKEOVER) are all significantly negative (p<0.05, p<0.01, and p<0.05 one-
tailed, respectively). The coefficients on SALESGROWTH and %OLD_FORECASTS
are significant and in the expected direction. ?EPS is only significant and in the
expected direction in the second model specification. SIZE and EPS are not
significantly related to the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst forecasts.
To examine the sensitivity of my results to the definition of ‘small’ absolute
forecasts errors I estimate the second specification of my model again, but expand the
interval of absolute forecast errors to include errors of 0.5 percent or less. Untabulated
results show that the significance of the coefficients on STRUCTURE (p<0.10 one-
tailed) and ANTI_TAKEOVER (p=0.16 one-tailed) decrease. Expanding the interval to
include errors of 1 percent or less lowers the significance of my proxies even further.
Specifically, only CONCENTRATION and STRUCTURE remain significant (p<0.10
Table 3.5
Logistic regression analysis of the influence of stakeholder orientation on meeting or beating analyst
earnings forecasts
Independent variable Expected sign
Coefficient
(Wald ?2)
Coefficient
(Wald ?2)
Intercept ? 2.576
(2.942)+
3.022
(3.762)+
Governance variables
CONCENTRATIONt – -1.777
(2.972)**
-1.884
(3.233)**
PROTECTIONt – -0.465
(8.250)***
-
STRUCTUREt – - -0.895
(6.317)***
ANTI_TAKEOVERt – - -0.356
(3.886)**
(Continued on next page)
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one-tailed) at conventional levels. This decline in statistical significance of my proxies
as a result of broadening the interval is not unexpected, because a broad interval is
more likely to measure forecast optimism versus pessimism instead of beating
expectations. As such, I interpret the decline in significance as confirmation that the
dependent variable in my original specification measures firms’ beating behavior, as
opposed to analysts’ forecast bias.7
Table 3.5 (Continued)
Independent variable Expected sign
Coefficient
(Wald ?2)
Coefficient
(Wald ?2)
Control variables
SIZEt + -0.082
(0.787)
-0.105
(1.222)
EPSt + -0.839
(0.090)
-0.490
(0.031)
?EPSt + 3.360
(1.387)
3.666
(1.645)*
SALESGROWTHt + 1.372
(2.416)*
1.499
(2.814)**
%OLD_FORECASTt + 1.723
(2.065)*
1.739
(2.068)*
Number of observations 240 240
n | BEATt = 1 159 159
n | BEATt = 0 81 81
Likelihood ratio 15.386++ 17.327++
Pseudo R2 5.0% 5.6%
The variables are defined as follows:
BEATt = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm’s EPS meets or exceeds the median
analyst earnings forecast outstanding at the firm’s year t earnings
announcement date;
CONCENTRATIONt = Herfindahl concentration index of share ownership in year t;
PROTECTIONt = Number of protective measures in place in year t, i.e., the sum of
STRUCTUREt and ANTI_TAKEOVERt;
STRUCTUREt = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is a structure firm in year t;
ANTI_TAKEOVERt = Number of anti-takeover defense mechanisms in place in year t;
SIZEt = Natural logarithm of end-of-year total assets;
EPSt = Earnings per share in year t, scaled by the end-of-year share price;
?EPSt = The change in earnings per share from year t-1 to year t, scaled by the end-
of-year share price;
SALESGROWTHt = The percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t;
%OLD_FORECASTt = The percentage of forecasts used in calculating the median analyst forecast
that has been outstanding for more than ninety days at the year t earnings
announcement date.
***, **, and * (+++, ++, and +) denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent one-tailed (two-
tailed) alpha level, respectively.
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3.4.4 Sensitivity analyses
In order to test the robustness of my results, I perform the following sensitivity tests:
1. Board monitoring: In one-tier board structures, the board of directors is considered
to be the most important internal control mechanism (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen
1983). In the Dutch setting, the monitoring role is performed by the Supervisory
Board. To examine the impact of the effectiveness of Supervisory Boards on
financial reporting, I add measures for board effectiveness to equations (1), (2), and
(3). I control for board size because large boards are considered to be less effective
than small boards. As boards become larger, coalition costs increase and free-
riding by board members increases (Jensen 1993; Yermack 1996). In addition,
Beasley (1996) and Vafeas (2000) find that financial reporting quality decreases
with board size. Furthermore, I include the average number of additional
directorships held by Supervisory Board members. This variable can be considered
as a signal of a director’s reputation (Kaplan and Reishus 1990) or, alternatively as
an indicator for the extent to which a director is ‘busy’ and can devote less time to
each directorship (Core et al. 1999). Beasley (1996) finds support for the latter
argument by documenting a positive relation between the number of directorships
and the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Finally, I control for the average
age of board members. Older board members can be considered to be either less
effective monitors (Core et al. 1999) or less susceptible to group pressure and
therefore more effective monitors (Beasley 1996). I add three variables, measuring
the size of the Supervisory Board, the average number of additional directorships,
and the average age of supervisory directors to regression equations (1), (2), and
(3). In equation (1) the variables enter as interactions with OCF. The results
(unreported) show that none of these board characteristics influence smoothing
behavior or conservatism, while the results reported earlier remain largely
unchanged. That is, coefficients on the main variables of interest,
CONCENTRATION and PROTECTION remain significantly negative, except for
the earnings smoothing test that includes STRUCTURE and ANTI_TAKEOVER
separately in equation (1), where the coefficient on ANTI_TAKEOVER is negative
but no longer statistically significant (p=0.11, one-tailed). When I include the board
monitoring variables in equation (3), only the average age of board members is
significantly negatively related to the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst
forecast. The signs and significance of the main variables of interest remain
unchanged.
2. U.S. exchange listing: By listing on a U.S. stock exchange, foreign firms subject
themselves to SEC regulation and enforcement. U.S. accounting standards are
considered to be targeted at the interests of minority shareholders and the
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enforcement environment in the U.S. is considered to be very strict. To test
whether my results are sensitive to including U.S. exchange listing, I add an
indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is listed on a U.S. stock exchange (12.9
percent of my observations) and 0 otherwise to regression equations (1), (2), and
(3). In regression equation (1) the variable is included as an interaction term with
OCF. The results (unreported) show that U.S. listing is not significantly related to
either smoothing behavior, conservatism, or the likelihood of meeting or beating
analyst expectations. My main results are robust to the inclusion of this control
variable and remain qualitatively similar.
3. Alternative definitions of accruals: As explained earlier, I define working capital
accruals as the change in working capital, minus the change in provisions. As a
first test, I leave the change in provisions out of my accruals measure. The results
from estimating equation (1) are robust to this alternative definition. As a second
robustness check, I follow prior research on earnings management and use total
accruals as my accruals measure, defined as the change in non-cash working
capital minus depreciation expense. I then use the Modified Jones model to
decompose total accruals into a discretionary and a non-discretionary part, using
?SALES, the end-of-year level of property, plant, and equipment, and next year’s
SALESGROWTH (following Dechow et al. 2003) as drivers of non-discretionary
accruals. In the final step, I substitute my measure of accruals in equation (1) with
the estimated discretionary component of total accruals. The results (unreported)
show that my proxies for the stakeholder orientation of a firm remain significantly
negatively associated with the correlation between accruals and cash flows.
4. Goodwill write-offs: During the sample period, Dutch firms frequently wrote off
purchased goodwill against equity immediately on acquisition, instead of
amortizing it through the income statement. Because this dirty surplus flow reduces
book value relative to market value (the dependent variable in equation (2)), but is
not a determinant of unconditional earnings conservatism, I control for goodwill
write-offs in the current year and the two previous years (scaled by market value at
the end of the corresponding fiscal year) in equation (2). The coefficients on these
control variables are significantly negative as predicted, but the coefficients on my
variables of interest (CONCENTRATION, PROTECTION, ANTI_TAKEOVER, and
STRUCTURE) remain significantly negative.
3.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this study, I examine the influence of Dutch firms’ corporate governance structures
on properties of their accounting. I argue that firms that are shielded from the
influence of minority shareholders and from the threat of takeover, through high
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ownership concentration, the use of takeover defense mechanisms, or being subject to
the structure regime, adopt a stakeholder-oriented financial reporting system. I
hypothesize that in stakeholder-orientated firms financial reporting plays a
substantially different role than in shareholder-oriented firms, for which providing
timely information to capital market participants is the key objective of financial
reporting. Stakeholder-oriented financial reporting is mainly driven by payout
determination. That is, maintaining a strong financial position and avoiding excessive
payouts to any of the firm’s stakeholders is an important objective of stakeholder-
oriented financial reporting. I predict and find that firms with a stakeholder orientation
more actively smooth earnings, report more conservatively, and are less inclined to
exhibit myopic reporting behavior, as measured by meeting or beating analyst earnings
forecasts, than firms with a shareholder orientation.
The study in this chapter contributes to the literature in three interrelated ways.
First, I examine financial reporting choices in a setting that has some unique
characteristics. The Netherlands has shareholder-oriented accounting regulation, but
provides firms sufficient opportunities to adopt a stakeholder orientation. As a result,
financial reporting objectives of individual firms do not necessarily coincide with the
objectives of the regulator, which allows us to examine how these deviations affect
financial reporting. Second, in contrast with studies examining the effect of
governance orientation on financial reporting at the country level (e.g., Ball et al.
2000; Ball et al. 2003; Leuz et al. 2003), I examine the effect of governance
orientation on financial reporting at the firm level. By keeping regulation and other
institutional influences constant, I am able to provide direct evidence that firm-specific
financial reporting incentives are an important determinant of financial reporting
properties. Finally, my results indicate that Dutch stakeholder-oriented firms are less
likely to report in accordance with the shareholder-oriented objectives of the
accounting regulator, which suggests that firm-level reporting incentives dominate
regulatory incentives if enforcement is relatively weak.
An important implication of my results is that an attempt to move in the
direction of shareholder-oriented financial reporting solely through reforms in
accounting regulation is unlikely to be successful. For example, it is questionable
whether the implementation of IAS in the European Union will lead to more
shareholder-oriented reporting, because firm-level reporting incentives, which are a
function of a firm’s relationships with shareholders and other stakeholders, will not
change simultaneously. In addition, other aspects of the institutional environment,
such as enforcement, are still relatively weak and are only beginning to be reformed in
most EU Members States.
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Notes
1  Because shareholders of Dutch firms have not been allowed to vote by proxy, the large absenteeism
of shareholders at the Annual Meetings implies that minority shareholders can potentially have a
large influence on firm decisions.
2  The description of the authorities of the Supervisory Boards of firms subject to the structure regime
in this chapter applies to the situation during the period studied. Recently, Dutch corporate
governance has been reformed. In general the changes strengthen the position of the shareholders at
the expense of the Supervisory Board. See chapter 5 for a more detailed description of the changes.
3  The takeover defense mechanisms I study (priority shares, voting caps, depository receipts, and
preferred defense shares) are the most widely adopted mechanisms by Dutch firms (Kabir et al.
1997). Mechanisms such as poison pills or golden parachutes are uncommon in the Netherlands.
4  Hribar and Collins (2002) indicate that an artificial negative correlation between accruals and cash
flows could be created if (i) cash flows are defined as earnings minus accruals and (ii) if mergers
and acquisitions, discontinued operations, or exchange rate changes affect balance sheet items. A
potential solution to this problem is to use accruals and cash flows from the firms’ cash flow
statements. However, because I do not have such data available, I use an alternative solution by
scaling working capital in year t (t-1) by total assets from the same year t (t-1) and calculating
working-capital accruals as changes in scaled working capital. This contrasts with the commonly
used approach of defining accruals as changes in working capital in year t, scaled by total assets
from year t-1. Because working capital and total assets from one particular year are similarly
affected by events such as mergers and acquisitions, scaling working capital by total assets from
the same year should reduce the distorting effect of the problems described by Hribar and Collins.
5  Because I exclude financial firms, my sample does not include firms from the ‘Financial
institutions’ and ‘Insurance and real estate’ industries. The industry groupings ‘Pharmaceuticals’,
‘Utilities’, and ‘Other’ are not represented in my sample. Due to the small size of the ‘Extractive
industries’ group, I combined it with the ‘Chemicals’ industry.
6  The results of my logistic regression analysis remain qualitatively unchanged if I replace EPS and
?EPS with a dummy variable equal to one if a firm reports a loss and a dummy variable equal to
one if a firm reports an earnings decrease, respectively.
7  Additional support for this argument is provided by the fact that broadening the interval increases
the sample size and thus statistical power, which, all else equal, should lead to increased
significance instead of decreased significance.
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Chapter 4
The Effect of Institutional Factors on Accounting
Properties for Firms with Different Ownership
Structures
4.1 Introduction
Firms’ reporting objectives are influenced by two main classes of factors: firm-specific
influences, such as their ownership structures, corporate governance, and method of
financing, and the institutional environment of their country of domicile. A substantial
stream of accounting research has documented international differences in financial
reporting (e.g., Alford et al. 1993; Joos and Lang 1994) and has studied determinants
of such differences (e.g., Ali and Hwang 2000, Ball et al. 2000, Leuz et al. 2003).
Other accounting research has studied firm-specific determinants of financial reporting
choices, such as exchange listings (Ball and Shivakumar 2005), ownership structures
(Fan and Wong 2002), managerial ownership (Warfield et al. 1995), and financing
structures (Ahmed et al. 2002). Chapter 3 of this dissertation, where I examine the
effect of the reporting incentives generated by firms’ governance structures on
accounting properties, also fits into this line of research.
Ball et al. (2003) find that IFRS introduction in East Asian countries does not
seem to result in more shareholder-oriented reporting. They attribute this finding to the
influence that other institutional factors, besides accounting regulation, and firm-
specific reporting incentives have on firms’ reporting objectives and consequently on
their accounting choices. With the exception of Burgstahler et al. (2006) and Peek et
al. (2007), most prior studies do not examine whether the influence of institutions on
firms’ financial reporting choices differs depending on firm characteristics. Such
knowledge is relevant for firms’ shareholders and other stakeholder in interpreting
financial statement information, but also for regulators trying to assess the impact of
(changes to) the institutional environment on firms with different reporting incentives.
The study presented in this chapter investigates the influence of a country’s
institutional orientation on firms’ financial reporting objectives conditional on the
reporting incentives generated by firms’ ownership structures. Financial reporting can
have different objectives. As in chapter 3, I distinguish between stakeholder-oriented
objectives, where payout determination is the main objective, and shareholder-oriented
objectives, where the main function of financial reporting is timely information
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provision to shareholders. Because firms’ reporting objectives are not directly
observable, I examine two properties of accounting information – unconditional
conservatism and earnings smoothing – that should be a reflection of a firm’s reporting
orientation. Firms with stakeholder-oriented reporting objectives are expected to report
more conservatively and smooth earnings more actively than firms with shareholder-
oriented reporting objectives. I classify countries’ institutional environments along the
same lines, i.e. stakeholder- versus shareholder-oriented. A factor score of four
institutional factors is created to capture differences in the institutional orientation of
countries. I hypothesize that closely held firms’ financial reporting choices are to a
greater extent influenced by the institutional environment of their country of domicile
than widely held firms’ reporting choices. Reporting incentives of widely held firms
are mainly driven by capital market demand for shareholder-oriented reporting.
Because shareholders in these firms are at arm’s length and rely on public financial
reporting for information provision, they will demand informative financial reporting.
In stakeholder-oriented economies, widely held firms’ shareholder-oriented reporting
incentives are not congruent with the country’s institutional orientation. I nevertheless
expect that these firms will report shareholder-oriented, because (i) failure to reduce
information asymmetries can lead to a higher cost of equity capital (Botosan 1997) and
(ii) in stakeholder-oriented countries, firms can usually make certain accounting
choices within local GAAP or provide additional voluntary disclosures to make
reporting more informative.
Large shareholders in closely held firms typically have access to private
information and financial reporting can therefore serve different goals, like
determination of payouts to various stakeholders. I hypothesize that the effect of
institutions on closely held firms’ reporting is larger than on widely held firms’
reporting, because closely held firms domiciled in countries with shareholder-oriented
institutions face relatively high costs of non-compliance. Dispersed shareholders in
closely held firms, who do not have access to private information and thus demand
informative financial reporting, are better protected in shareholder-oriented
institutional environments. In addition to having higher minority investor rights
protection, accounting regulation in shareholder-oriented countries typically has a
higher degree of determination and is better enforced than in stakeholder-oriented
economies, which also increases the costs of non-compliance for closely held firms.
I use data from Western European firms to provide evidence on the role of the
institutional environment on financial reporting across firms with different levels of
ownership concentration. In accordance with my hypothesis that institutions have a
larger influence on closely held than on widely held firms’ reporting choices, I find
that the level of (unconditional) conservatism is not dependent on a country’s
institutional orientation for the most widely held group of firms, but that institutions
THE EFFECT OF INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS ON ACCOUNTING PROPERTIES
73
increasingly influence conservatism the more closely held a firm becomes. Contrary to
expectations, I find that the influence of institutions on firms’ earnings smoothing
behavior does not depend on ownership concentration, but that widely held and closely
held firms are equally affected by a country’s institutional orientation.
This study complements the study in chapter 3 – where I study the influence on
firm-specific reporting incentives on accounting choices while holding the institutional
environment constant – by studying the effect of institutions on reporting behavior,
conditional on firms’ ownership structures. Most international accounting studies
implicitly assume that institutions influence all firms’ accounting properties equally.
Earlier studies, e.g., Ali and Hwang (2000), Ball et al. (2000), Leuz et al. (2003), study
the effect of international differences in institutional environments on properties of
firms’ financial reporting without explicitly considering the moderating influence of
firm-specific reporting incentives. Firms’ reporting incentives are partly influenced by
the institutional orientation of a country (La Porta et al. 1999). Certain ownership
structures or methods of corporate governance are related to institutional factors such
as investor protection. However, these firm characteristics are only partly explained by
institutional influences. For example, Becht and Röell (1999) document substantial
variation in firms’ level of ownership concentration within countries. Knowing how
different types of firms respond to institutional reporting influences could be beneficial
to various market participants. It helps various stakeholders in determining if a firm’s
financial reporting can be easily compared internationally or is more likely reflective
of the institutional environment of its country of domicile. Regulators could assess
how the impact of (changes to) accounting standards or enforcement mechanisms
differs across firms.
Few prior studies have investigated the simultaneous impact of firm-specific
incentives and institutional factors on financial reporting. Burgstahler et al. (2006)
study the influence of an institutional variable, the quality of legal enforcement, and a
firm’s listing status, private versus public, on earnings management behavior and find
that both influence firms’ earnings management behavior. In a supplemental analysis,
they examine whether the influence of various institutional characteristics differs for
private and public firms and document that the effect of some institutional variables
differs depending on listing status. LaFond (2005) studies whether the effect of firms’
ownership structures dominates the effect of institutions on financial reporting and
finds that minority investor rights protection significantly influences (conditional)
conservatism but that the effect of investor rights becomes less influential by
controlling for the effect of firms’ ownership structures. Peek et al. (2007) study the
differential effect of institutional variables, creditor protection and investor protection,
on private versus public firms’ level of (conditional) conservatism. The study in this
chapter extends these studies in several ways. First, instead of relying on listing status
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to measure firms’ reporting incentives, I use a measure of ownership concentration,
following LaFond (2005). This allows me to measure firm-specific reporting
incentives as a continuous variable.1 Second, I focus on listed firms only, which makes
it possible to conduct market-based tests of conservatism. Third, I capture institutional
differences using a factor score of four variables, which provides a more refined
picture of a country’s institutional environment compared to including one institutional
variable at a time or including institutional variables separately. Fourth, this study adds
to LaFond (2005) by explicitly examining the moderating effect of ownership structure
on the influence of institutions. Also, I extend Burgstahler et al. (2006) and Peek et al.
(2007), who focus on earnings management and (conditional) conservatism,
respectively, by studying different properties of accounting.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I develop my
hypotheses. Next, I describe the data and sample selection. I will continue with the
results and conclude with a discussion and concluding remarks.
4.2 Theory and hypotheses
4.2.1 Objectives of financial reporting
Financial reporting does not have the same primary objective for all firms. Following
prior research, I make a distinction between stakeholder- and shareholder-oriented
financial reporting.2 Shareholder-oriented accounting tends to be focused at providing
timely and reliable information about the firm to equity investors in order to enable
them to evaluate performance to base, e.g., investment, management compensation, or
CEO dismissal decisions on. Stakeholder-oriented financial reporting takes a broader
perspective and tries to serve the interests of all stakeholders in the firm. To protect
stakeholders’ interests, its main objective is avoiding excessive payouts to any
stakeholder (e.g., bonus payments to management or dividend payments to equity
investors) in order to ensure the financial health and stability of the firm.
The difference in objectives of financial reporting translates into different
properties of accounting numbers in these two benchmark systems. When a firm’s
reporting objectives are stakeholder-oriented, I expect that accounting discretion is
used for payout determination, i.e., to avoid excessive payouts. Specifically, I expect
that firms avoid large fluctuations in net income, because these fluctuations in net
income increase the chance that firms make unwarranted payouts based on temporarily
high earnings numbers. I also expect that firms with stakeholder-oriented reporting
objectives make (unconditionally) conservative accounting estimates, i.e., defer
recognition of potential gains and accelerate recognition of potential losses and
consequently understate assets and overstate liabilities. Besides providing a
conservative estimate of net income, which serves as the basis for the determination of
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dividends, this also ensures that net assets, as reflected on the balance sheet, are valued
conservatively, i.e. assets are never overvalued and liabilities are never undervalued.
As discussed in chapter 3, these accounting choices (using discretion to smooth
earnings and make conservative accounting estimates) can interfere with providing
informative performance measures to shareholders.3 I therefore expect firms with
shareholder-oriented reporting objectives to engage in less earnings smoothing and
less (unconditionally) conservative reporting than firms with stakeholder-oriented
reporting objectives.
4.2.2 Countries’ institutional orientation and firms’ reporting objectives
A firm’s financial reporting objectives are partly influenced by the institutional
environment that a firm faces. Alford et al. (1993) and Joos and Lang (1994) find that
financial reporting properties differ internationally. Later studies (Ali and Hwang
2000, Ball et al. 2000, Hung 2001, Leuz et al. 2003) attribute these international
differences in accounting properties to differences in institutional structures across
countries. These studies have identified two main groups of countries with different
institutional influences on financial reporting, which are labeled market- versus bank-
oriented (Ali and Hwang 2000), common- versus code-law (Ball et al. 2000), or
outsider versus insider systems (Leuz et al. 2003). I consistently use the terms
shareholder- and stakeholder-oriented throughout this study to describe differences in
the objective of financial reporting, both at the country and at the firm level.4
Countries differ in the role that is attributed to financial reporting. This is
commonly traced back to differences in countries’ legal systems. The influence of
governments on business and accounting is different under both systems. In common
law countries, governments set and enforce private property rights, which results in
strong protection of minority investor rights and accounting standard setting by private
sector bodies that tend to promote the interests of (minority) shareholders. This stands
in contrast to countries with code law systems, where legal protection of investors is
weak, but the political influence of governments and other corporate stakeholders on
businesses is strong. This political influence on business extends to financial reporting.
Accounting standards are typically set by a public sector body and financial
reporting’s main goal is the determination of payouts to different stakeholder groups.
The importance of payout determination in stakeholder-oriented economies often leads
to a strong link between tax and financial reporting. Leuz and Wüstemann (2004)
indicate that regulators in stakeholder-oriented countries view earnings that serve as a
basis for dividend payouts as a good basis for tax determination as well and
consequently also as a basis for payouts to all stakeholders. The principle of payout
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determination in stakeholder-oriented countries leads to income numbers that try to
capture the funds available for distribution to various stakeholders.
In shareholder-oriented economies the focus is on information provision to
shareholders. This difference in the main objective of financial reporting also
translates into differences in accounting rules. Because in shareholder-oriented
economies financial reporting is targeted at providing investors with a measure of
(economic) performance, regulators in these countries will promote accrual
accounting. For example, immediate write-off of purchased goodwill (which is close
to cash-based accounting) is more likely to be required by regulators in stakeholder-
oriented countries to ensure that assets are never overstated. In countries with
shareholder-oriented institutions, goodwill is more likely to be capitalized and
impaired when necessary, reflecting an accounting loss only when an actual economic
loss occurs.
4.2.3 Reporting objectives of widely held firms across institutional environments
Firms with widely held ownership structures face capital market demand for
informative financial reporting. The dispersed shareholders in these firms typically do
not have the means or incentives to obtain information through private channels
(Shleifer and Vishny 1986). The arm’s length relation between shareholders and
managers results in greater reliance on (implicit or explicit) contracting (Ball et al.
2000). Greater use of contracting as opposed to direct monitoring is likely to translate
into a greater demand for informative public financial reporting. Furthermore,
investments of dispersed shareholders are relatively liquid and therefore they will
demand valuation-relevant information. Failure to reduce information asymmetries
through informative financial reporting could thus result in an increased cost of capital
(Botosan 1997).
The capital market demand for shareholder-oriented financial reporting is not
expected to differ across institutional environments. If the stakeholder-oriented
institutional environment in some countries would prohibit firms from reporting
shareholder-oriented, it could be expected that widely held firms in these countries
would report less informatively than their counterparts in shareholder-oriented
institutional environments. However, the institutional environment in stakeholder-
oriented economies is characterized by accounting rules with a relatively low degree of
determination (d’Arcy 2000) and relatively weak enforcement (Leuz et al. 2003). A
low degree of determination means that firms have a large choice of accounting
methods in drawing up their financial statements, which suggests that widely held
firms in countries with stakeholder-oriented institutions are able to report shareholder-
oriented by choosing certain options in accounting rules. It seems likely that
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institutions in stakeholder-oriented countries give firms a certain degree of flexibility
to allow them to adapt to the reporting demands of their main stakeholders. In widely
held firms, minority shareholders are one of the most important stakeholder groups
and financial reporting will be heavily influenced by their demands. Furthermore,
these firms can provide additional disclosures that make their financial reporting more
informative to shareholders. In the extreme, firms can choose to report according to
IAS/IFRS to overcome the stakeholder-oriented financial reporting tradition of their
country of domicile. For example German firms such as Adidas, Bayer, and Südzucker
have chosen to adopt IAS/IFRS long before the European Commission’s mandated
adoption date. The analysis in chapter 2 suggests that one of the reasons for firms to
switch to non-local GAAP is the low quality of the accounting standards of their
country of domicile. Weak enforcement implies that the costs for widely held firms of
not complying with the institutional reporting norm in stakeholder-oriented countries
are relatively low and likely are outweighed by the benefits of meeting shareholders’
demand for informative reporting.
4.2.4 Reporting objectives of closely held firms across institutional environments
In closely held firms, most financing is provided by large shareholders that are
typically insiders to the firm and have access to private information through direct
contact with management. For example, many large shareholders are represented on
firms’ (supervisory) boards. The need for financial reporting as a mechanism to
resolve information asymmetries between shareholders and managers is therefore less
than in widely held firms. Financial reporting can thus serve different purposes. The
illiquid nature of large shareholders’ investments causes them to take a long-term
interest in the firm, which means that large shareholders, like many other stakeholder
groups, become interested in the survival of the firm. Financial reporting will reflect
this stakeholder orientation and will therefore be used in determination of payouts to
stakeholders and to ensure the financial stability of the firm.
In stakeholder-oriented countries, the institutional environment is largely
targeted at payout determination and closely held firms’ incentives are therefore
congruent with the country’s orientation. However, institutions in shareholder-oriented
environments require firms to report shareholder-oriented and view financial reporting
as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetries between firms and minority
shareholders, irrespective of the ownership structure of the firm. Minority shareholders
of closely held firms will demand informative financial reporting irrespective of the
country’s institutional orientation. However, in shareholder-oriented countries
minority investor rights tend to be better protected than in stakeholder-oriented
countries (Leuz et al. 2003). Therefore, minority investors are likely to be more
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successful in demanding informative financial reporting in shareholder- than in
stakeholder-oriented countries. Furthermore, in some shareholder-oriented countries,
accounting regulation has a relatively high degree of determination (d’Arcy 2000),
which suggests that within-country variation in firms’ reporting practices is lower,
because all firms have to apply the same accounting rules that leave relatively little
discretion. In summary, closely held firms in countries with institutions that promote
shareholder-oriented reporting are likely to report more shareholder-oriented than their
counterparts in stakeholder-oriented countries, because I expect the cost of non-
compliance with the country’s reporting norms to be relatively high in shareholder-
oriented countries.
4.2.5 The effect of the institutional environment conditional on ownership structure
The above discussion implies that the effect of the institutional environment on firms’
financial reporting choices differs across firms. The strong capital market pressures to
reduce information asymmetries that widely held firms face are expected to result in
shareholder-oriented reporting choices, irrespective of the institutional orientation of a
firm’s country of domicile. The costs of reporting shareholder-oriented for widely held
firms in stakeholder-oriented countries are unlikely to be high because these firms can
report shareholder-oriented by using the flexibility that stakeholder-oriented
accounting rules typically offer or by providing additional disclosures. Consequently,
widely held firms’ reporting behavior is expected to be relatively homogeneous across
countries.
The difference in closely held firms’ reporting behavior across various
institutional environments is expected be much more diverse. Closely held firms in
shareholder-oriented countries face higher costs of not complying with the country’s
reporting norms than widely held firms in stakeholder-oriented countries, whose
reporting incentives are also inconsistent with the country’s institutional orientation.
The relatively higher degree of determination (d’Arcy 2000) and higher levels of
minority investor rights protection cause closely held firms in shareholder-oriented
institutional environments to report less stakeholder-oriented than their counterparts in
stakeholder-oriented environments. In summary, the influence of the institutional
environment on firms’ financial reporting decisions is hypothesized to be greater for
closely held firms than for widely held firms.
Hypothesis: The influence of a country’s institutional orientation on the properties of
firms’ financial reporting is positively related to firms’ concentration of
share ownership.
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4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Data and sample selection
I use data about European firms from 1991 to 2003 in the analyses. The sample is
restricted to the 13 European countries that Faccio and Lang (2002) provide ownership
data5 for (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) and The Netherlands.
For The Netherlands, I use the ownership data that is also used in chapter 3, i.e. from
the WMZ (Disclosure of Major Holdings in Listed Companies Act) register.6 Financial
statement data comes from the Worldscope database and stock market data is from
Datastream. The final sample consists of all firm-year observations for which
ownership data is available and sufficient information is available on both Worldscope
and Datastream to compute the variables used in the analyses below.
To capture the differences in institutional orientation across countries, I
construct a factor score (cf. Ali and Hwang 2000) of various institutional features that
are expected to reflect the difference in the orientation of financial reporting, i.e.
stakeholder- versus shareholder-oriented. One advantage of this approach is that it
avoids classifying European countries only along the line of legal origin (cf. Ball et al.
2000), which would contrast England (common law) with the rest of the sample
countries (code law). Another advantage is that I do not rely on just one measure to
classify countries (e.g. Leuz et al. 2003 use the quality of legal enforcement to classify
countries), but capture the institutional variation more accurately. I use four
institutional features to represent the orientation of a country. I measure the political
influence on accounting by the protection of minority investors’ rights and by an
indicator variable that captures governmental influence on accounting standard setting.
The protection of minority investors’ rights is measured by the anti-director rights
index from La Porta et al. (1998) and includes, for example, whether shareholders are
allowed to mail their proxy vote and whether cumulative voting is allowed. The
indicator variable takes the value one if a country has a private sector standard setting
body and zero if it has a public standard setting body. Weak protection of investor
rights and a private sector standard setter indicate low political influence on financial
reporting. I therefore expect that these two variables are positively related to the
shareholder orientation of a country’s institutions.
The other two variables I use to capture a country’s institutional orientation,
measure the objective of accounting regulation. Financial reporting regulation that has
payout determination as an important objective (i.e., a stakeholder-oriented reporting
objective), likely uses the same rules for tax and financial reporting and is less likely to
be accrual based. I use an indicator variable that equals one if tax and financial
reporting are closely aligned. I expect this variable to be negatively related to the
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shareholder orientation of a country’s accounting regulation. The extent to which a
country’s standard setter promotes the use of accrual accounting is measured by the
accrual index constructed by Hung (2001). This index captures, for example, whether
finance leases, R&D, and intangibles can be capitalized and whether the percentage of
completion method is allowed or required. I expect this variable to be positively
related to a country’s shareholder-orientation.
As shown in Table 4.1, factor analysis on these four variables at the country
level results in one factor with an eigen value greater than 1 (2.681). As expected, the
investor protection index (factor loading: 0.772), the existence of a private sector
standard setting body (0.771), and the accrual index (0.853) load positively and
alignment between tax and financial reporting (-0.874) loads negatively on this factor.
Therefore, I classify countries with a high factor score as more shareholder-oriented
Table 4.1
Institutional orientation of sample countries
Institutional
orientation
Country
Investor
protection
Source of
accounting
rules
Financial/tax
accounting
alignment
Accrual
index
Factor score Rank
Austria 2 0 1 0.41 -0.891 11
Belgium 0 0 1 0.68 -0.796 10
Finland 3 0 1 0.55 -0.421 9
France 3 0 1 0.64 -0.252 7
Germany 1 0 1 0.41 -1.098 14
Ireland 4 1 0 0.82 1.602 2
Italy 1 0 1 0.45 -1.022 12
The Netherlands 2 1 0 0.73 1.020 3
Norway 4 0 1 0.82 0.294 5
Portugal 3 0 1 0.59 -0.346 8
Spain 4 0 0 0.77 0.895 4
Sweden 3 1 1 0.59 0.268 6
Switzerland 2 0 1 0.32 -1.060 13
United Kingdom 5 1 0 0.82 1.809 1
Eigen value:
Factor loadings 0.772 0.771 -0.874 0.853 2.681
Investor protection is measured by the anti-director index taken from LaPorta et al. (1998), Source of
accounting rules is an indicator variable which equals one if a country has a private sector standards
setting body, Financial/tax accounting alignment is an indicator variable which equals one if a
country’s financial and tax accounting rules are closely aligned, and the Accrual index is taken from
Hung (2001) and represents the extent to which a country’s accounting rules promote the use of
accrual accounting. A factor score of these four institutional variables measures the institutional
orientation of a country. Countries with high factor scores are classified as shareholder-oriented and
countries with low factor scores as stakeholder-oriented.
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and countries with a low score as more stakeholder-oriented. Table 4.1 shows that the
institutional environments in the U.K., Ireland, and The Netherlands are classified as
the most shareholder-oriented, whereas Germany, Switzerland, and Italy have the most
stakeholder-oriented institutions in my sample. This classification corresponds to other
studies classifying countries according to the institutions that influence accounting
(e.g., Leuz et al. 2003)
A firm’s ownership structure is measured by constructing a Herfindahl index of
share ownership concentration using the shareholdings of the eight largest owners.
Table 4.2 shows the variation in average ownership concentration across countries.
The correlation between the factor score and the average CONCENTRATION per
country is -0.685 (p<0.01), which indicates that, on average, the concentration of share
Table 4.2
Ownership concentration across sample countries (n = 26,744)
Quartiles
Country
Avg. ownership
concentration
n 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Austria 0.274 522 55 31 172 264
10.5% 5.9% 33.0% 50.6%
Belgium 0.182 630 78 87 260 205
12.4% 13.8% 41.3% 32.5%
Finland 0.134 838 168 272 244 154
20.0% 32.5% 29.1% 18.4%
France 0.285 3764 493 272 1149 1850
13.1% 7.2% 30.5% 49.1%
Germany 0.314 3897 564 428 1143 1762
14.5% 11.0% 29.3% 45.2%
Ireland 0.051 374 234 28 95 17
62.6% 7.5% 25.4% 4.5%
Italy 0.202 1158 227 125 390 416
19.6% 10.8% 33.7% 35.9%
The Netherlands 0.147 1242 165 498 285 294
13.3% 40.1% 22.9% 23.7%
Norway 0.100 738 242 153 259 84
32.8% 20.7% 35.1% 11.4%
Portugal 0.205 429 121 7 105 196
28.2% 1.6% 24.5% 45.7%
Spain 0.179 996 352 109 269 266
35.3% 10.9% 27.0% 26.7%
Sweden 0.076 1205 318 466 323 98
26.4% 38.7% 26.8% 8.1%
Switzerland 0.148 1300 236 404 369 291
18.2% 31.1% 28.4% 22.4%
United 0.067 9651 3435 3805 1622 789
Kingdom 35.6% 39.4% 16.8% 8.2%
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ownership is lower in shareholder-oriented than in stakeholder-oriented countries.
Ownership structures are partially shaped by the institutional environment of the
country of domicile. For example, when protection of minority investors’ rights is
high, equity markets tend to be well-developed and share ownership will likely be
dispersed. Concentration of share ownership is a rational response to weak investor
protection, as dispersed shareholders are subject to expropriation attempts by insiders
to the firm when protection of minority investors’ rights is poor (La Porta et al. 1999).
Table 4.3
Descriptive statistics (n = 26,744)
Variable Mean
Standard
deviation Q1 Median Q3
Ownership variables
CONCENTRATION 0.164 0.223 0.007 0.062 0.251
WH 0.375 - - - -
Largest shareholder 0.294 0.262 0.075 0.230 0.499
Financial variables
ASSETS 1,806 7,459 57 191 801
SALES 1,592 6,111 65 208 819
?SALES 0.019 0.153 -0.057 0.010 0.087
ACCR -0.001 0.052 -0.027 0.000 0.026
OCF 0.033 0.083 -0.007 0.037 0.080
ROA 0.033 0.065 0.009 0.037 0.069
BTM 0.782 0.546 0.394 0.639 1.019
LEVERAGE 0.126 0.126 0.020 0.096 0.190
The variables are defined as follows:
CONCENTRATION = Herfindahl concentration index of control rights;
WH = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is a widely held;
ASSETS = End-of-year total assets (in millions of Euros);
SALES = Sales (in millions of Euros);
?SALES = Change in sales in year t, defined as sales in year t, scaled by end-of-year
total assets, minus sales in year t-1, scaled by beginning-of-year total
assets;
ACCR = Working capital accruals in year t, defined as non-cash working capital in
year t, scaled by end-of-year total assets, minus non-cash working capital
in year t-1, scaled by beginning-of-year total assets;
OCF = Operating cash flow in year t, defined as net income in year t, scaled by
end-of-year total assets, minus ACCRt;
ROA = Return on assets in year t, defined as the ratio of net income before
extraordinary items in year t to end-of-year total assets;
BTM = Book to market ratio in year t, defined as the ratio of end-of-year book
value of equity to end-of-year market value of equity;
LEVERAGE = The ratio of end-of-year long-term debt to end-of-year total assets.
I report descriptive statistics for ACCR, OCF, ROA, and ?SALES after removing the top and bottom
one percent of the corresponding distributions.
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Partitioning the full sample into quartiles based on ownership concentration
shows that not only the across-country variation is large. There is also substantial
within-country variation in ownership structures. In countries that I classify as having
the most shareholder-oriented institutions, Ireland and the U.K., a substantial number
of firms can be classified as closely held, whereas in countries that I classify as most
stakeholder-oriented, a sizable number of firms are widely held.
Table 4.3 shows descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest and
control variables that I include in the regression. The three ownership variables
reported show that there is substantial variation in the pattern of share ownership in the
full sample. Furthermore, the firms included in the sample show large differences in
relevant control variables such as size, profitability, book-to-market ratios, and
leverage.
4.3.2 Smoothing
Earnings smoothing manifests itself through a negative relation between accruals and
cash flows (Leuz et al. 2003). Although, as discussed in chapter 3, the negative
relation between accruals and cash flows is a property of accounting recognition and
matching rules, I interpret a more negative association as evidence of active earnings
smoothing. To test the influence of institutional factors and firms’ ownership
structures on earnings smoothing behavior, I estimate the following regression
equation:
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where:
ACCRt = Working capital accruals in year t, defined as non-cash
working capital in year t, scaled by end-of-year total assets,
minus non-cash working capital in year t-1, scaled by
beginning-of-year total assets;7
OCFt = Operating cash flow in year t, defined as net income in year
t, scaled by end-of-year total assets, minus ACCRt;
CONCENTRATIONt = Herfindahl concentration index of control rights in year t;
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CONCENTRATIONtQn is an indicator variable that equals 1
if the firm-year observation falls into the nth quartile of the
distribution of CONCENTRATION;
ORIENT = Factor score representing the institutional orientation of a
country, transformed to range between 0 and 1, where high
values indicate a shareholder orientation and low values
indicate a stakeholder orientation.
?SALESt = Change in sales in year t, defined as sales in year t, scaled
by end-of-year total assets, minus sales in year t-1, scaled
by beginning-of-year total assets;
SALESGROWTHt+1 = Percentage change in sales from year t to year t+1;
SIZEt = Natural logarithm of end-of-year total assets;
INDUSTRYt = Industry dummies based on the industry classification of
Barth et al. (1998);
YEARt = Year dummies.
Following chapter 3, I expect the degree of earnings smoothing to be positively
related to ownership concentration, i.e. the coefficients on the interaction of OCF and
the CONCENTRATION indicator variables are expected to be negative. The effect of a
country’s institutional orientation on accounting properties is hypothesized to be
greater for closely held than for widely held firms. If institutions have an effect on
widely held firms’ financial reporting choices, the coefficient on OCF × ORIENT,
which measures the effect of ORIENT for the most widely held firms (i.e., firm-year
observations in the first quartile of the distribution of CONCENTRATION), is expected
to be positive. The coefficients on the three-way interactions of OCF, ORIENT, and
the CONCENTRATION indicator variables are expected to be positive, because I
hypothesize the effect of institutions to be more pronounced for firms with more
concentrated ownership structures.
ORIENT is included to control for differences in accruals across institutional
environments. ?SALESt controls for the non-discretionary part of working capital
accruals. I include SALESGROWTHt+1 to control for investments in working capital to
facilitate future growth (Dechow et al. 2003). The interaction between OCF and SIZE
controls for possible size effects in the accruals-cash flow relation. Finally,
interactions of OCF with industry and year dummies control for differences in
smoothing behavior across industries or years. To correct for the influence of positive
correlation in OLS residuals across years on standard errors, I estimate equation (1)
using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (Newey and
West 1987).
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4.3.3 Conservatism
Consistent with chapter 3 and following Ahmed et al. (2002), I define (unconditional)
conservatism as a persistent difference between the market value and the book value of
equity. To study the impact of institutions and ownership structure on conservatism, I
therefore estimate the following regression equation:
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where:
BTMt = Book to market ratio in year t, defined as the ratio of end-of-
year book value of equity to end-of-year market value of
equity;
SALESGROWTHt = Percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t;
ROAt = Return on assets in year t, defined as the ratio of net income
before extraordinary items in year t to end-of-year total
assets;
LEVERAGEt = The ratio of end-of-year ratio of long-term debt to end-of-
year total assets;
DIVIDENDSt = Dividends declared out of year t net income, scaled by end-
of-year total assets;
STD_ROAt = The standard deviation of ROAt, ROAt-1, and ROAt-2 (if
available);
RETt = Stock return over the twelve month period ending at year t
fiscal year-end;
GWt = Goodwill write-off against equity in year t scaled by current
end-of-year market value;
and other variables are as defined before.
The coefficients on the CONCENTRATION indicator variables are expected to
be negative because, following chapter 3, closely held firms are expected to report
more stakeholder-oriented than widely held firms. The coefficients on the interaction
terms between ORIENT and the CONCENTRATION indicator variables are
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hypothesized to be positive, as the effect of ORIENT is expected to be greater for
closely held firms than for widely held firms.
Following Ahmed et al. 2002, I include the control variables SIZE,
SALESGROWTH ROA, LEVERAGE, DIVIDENDS, and STD_ROA because they
represent additional explanations for conservatism. I also control for differences
between book and market values caused by lagged recognition by including current
and past returns as proxies for past performance (Beaver and Ryan 2000). To control
for international differences in the treatment of acquisition goodwill (e.g., writing off
against equity immediately or capitalization and amortization) I include current and
past goodwill write-offs. This makes sure that international differences in
conservatism are not driven by differences in goodwill treatment. Again, I include
industry and year dummies to control for industry and year effects. Because OLS
residuals of equation (2) could be positively correlated across years, I calculate all t-
statistics using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors
(Newey and West 1987).
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Smoothing test
Table 4.4 shows the results of estimating equation (4.1). I do not find an effect of
ownership concentration on earnings smoothing behavior. This means that in a sample
pooled across countries, earnings smoothing does not significantly differ across firms
with different ownership structures. The significantly positive coefficient on OCF ×
ORIENT (p<0.01 one-sided) indicates that a country’s institutional orientation has a
significant effect on the most widely held firms’ reporting behavior. This suggests that
widely held firms in stakeholder-oriented countries smooth their earnings more
actively than their counterparts in shareholder-oriented countries. The coefficients on
the interactions between OCF, ORIENT, and the CONCENTRATION indicator
variables are all insignificant, indicating that the effect of ORIENT does not depend on
a firm’s ownership structure, i.e. widely held and closely held firms are equally
affected by institutions.
The fact that earnings smoothing behavior appears to be solely driven by a
country’s institutional orientation and is not significantly influenced by firms’
ownership structures could be explained by tax motives for earnings smoothing.
Coppens and Peek (2005) suggest that earnings management activities in countries
where the alignment between tax and financial accounting is high (one of the measures
in my factor score) are directed at managing tax burdens. Firms in these countries
prefer less volatile earnings and are likely to smooth earnings to a greater extent than
firms in countries where tax and financial accounting rules are not strongly aligned
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(Ball et al. 2000; Hermann and Inoue 1996). In stakeholder-oriented countries, the
benefits from smoothing earnings for tax management may outweigh the benefits of
reporting informatively, even for widely held firms.
The control variables ?SALES and next year’s SALESGROWTH are significant
and have the predicted signs (p<0.01, one-sided), i.e. working capital accruals are
positively related to increases in sales and to future sales growth, which suggests
investments in working capital to finance current and future growth. Firm size has a
significantly negative coefficient (p<0.01, two-sided), which indicates either that large
firms more actively smooth earning or that large firms have naturally more stable
earnings patterns, for example because their operations are more diversified on
average.
4.4.2 Conservatism test
The results of estimating equation (4.2) are displayed in Table 4.5. The coefficients on
the CONCENTRATION indicator variables are all significantly negative. Specifically,
firm-year observations in the first quartile of ownership concentration (the most
widely held firms) show less conservative reporting behavior than the second (p<0.10,
Table 4.4
OLS regression analysis of the influence of institutional orientation and ownership concentration on
the relationship between cash flows and working capital accruals
Independent variable Expected sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Intercept ? 0.011
(18.275)+++
OCFt – -0.440
(-15.734) ***
OCFt ´ CONCENTRATIONtQ2 – 0.016
(0.494)
OCFt ´ CONCENTRATIONtQ3 – -0.014
(-0.553)
OCFt ´ CONCENTRATIONtQ4 – -0.032
(-1.215)
OCFt ´ ORIENT ? 0.220
(8.476) ***
OCFt ´ ORIENT ´ CONCENTRATIONtQ2 + -0.030
(-0.810)
OCFt ´ ORIENT ´ CONCENTRATIONtQ3 + -0.0481
(-1.336)
OCFt ´ ORIENT ´ CONCENTRATIONtQ4 + -0.009
(-0.230)
(Continued on next page)
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one-sided), third (p<0.05, one-sided), and fourth quartiles (p<0.01, one-sided). The
difference between the two center quartiles is insignificant, but the most closely held
firms report significantly more conservative than firms in the third quartile (p<0.01,
one-sided). Overall, this suggests that the stakeholder orientation of a firm’s reporting
Table 4.4 (Continued)
Independent variable Expected sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Control variables
ORIENT ? -0.000
(-0.013)
?SALESt + 0.011
(5.211) ***
SALESGROWTHt+1 + 0.017
(9.494) ***
OCFt ´ SIZE't ? -0.015
(-5.400) +++
Number of observations 24,312
F-value 368.003***
Adjusted R2 33.9%
The variables are defined as follows:
ACCRt = Working capital accruals in year t, defined as non-cash working capital
minus provisions in year t, scaled by end-of-year total assets, minus non-
cash working capital minus provisions in year t-1, scaled by beginning-of-
year total assets;
OCFt = Operating cash flow in year t, defined as net income in year t, scaled by
end-of-year total assets, minus ACCRt;
CONCENTRATIONt = Herfindahl concentration index of control rights in year t;
CONCENTRATIONtQn is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm-
year observation falls into the nth quartile of the distribution of
CONCENTRATION;
ORIENT = Factor score representing the institutional orientation of a country,
transformed to range between 0 and 1, where high values indicate a
shareholder orientation and low values indicate a stakeholder orientation;
?SALESt = Change in sales in year t, defined as sales in year t, scaled by end-of-year
total assets, minus sales in year t-1, scaled by beginning-of-year total
assets;
SALESGROWTHt+1 = Percentage change in sales from year t to year t+1;
SIZE't = Mean-centered natural logarithm of end-of-year total assets.
Coefficients on interactions between OCF and industry and year dummies are included in the
regression but not separately reported. The manufacturing industry and the most recent available year
are used as the base categories. I estimate the regression after removing the top and bottom one
percent of the distribution of ACCR and OCF. Reported t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent standard errors (Newey and West 1987).
***, **, and * (+++, ++, and +) denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent one-tailed (two-
tailed) alpha level, respectively.
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increases with its concentration of share ownership.
The coefficient on ORIENT is not significant which indicates that the most
widely held firms’ level of conservatism is not influenced by a country’s institutional
orientation. The significantly negative coefficients on ORIENT ×
CONCENTRATIONQ2 (p<0.10, one-sided) and ORIENT × CONCENTRATIONQ3
(p<0.01, one-sided) show that the influence of institutions on conservatism of firms in
the second and third quartiles of the distribution of ownership concentration is more
pronounced than for the most widely held firms in my sample. Also, the influence of
institutions on the most closely held firms in my sample (the fourth quartile of
CONCENTRATION) is significantly greater than the influence on firms in the first,
second, and third (all p<0.01, one-sided) quartiles of ownership concentration.8 In
summary, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of a country’s
institutional orientation on financial reporting becomes more influential when a firm’s
ownership concentration increases.
SIZE has a significantly negative coefficient (p<0.01, two-sided), which
indicates that larger firms report more conditionally conservative, possibly because of
higher political costs. Furthermore, I find that SALESGROWTH and ROA are
significantly positively (p<0.01 and p<0.05, one-sided, respectively) associated with
conservatism, which could be explained by the relatively higher cost for low
Table 4.5
OLS regression analysis of the influence of institutional orientation and ownership concentration on a
market-based measure of accounting conservatism
Independent variable Expected sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Intercept + 1.522
(30.723)***
CONCENTRATIONtQ2 – -0.039
(-1.615) *
CONCENTRATIONtQ3 – -0.049
(-2.101) **
CONCENTRATIONtQ4 – -0.129
(-5.642) ***
ORIENT ? 0.019
(0.807)
ORIENT ´ CONCENTRATIONtQ2 + 0.045
(1.463)*
ORIENT ´ CONCENTRATIONtQ3 + 0.132
(4.063) ***
ORIENT ´ CONCENTRATIONtQ4 + 0.273
(7.546) ***
(Continued on next page)
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Table 4.5 (Continued)
Independent variable Expected sign
Coefficient
(t-statistic)
Control variables
SIZEt ? -0.032
(-11.514) ***
SALESGROWTHt – -0.165
(-7.227) ***
ROAt – -0.185
(-2.315) **
LEVERAGEt – -0.093
(-1.147)**
DIVIDENDSt – -6.721
(-26.284) ***
STD_ROAt – -1.488
(-12.886) ***
Number of observations 20,141
F-value 1548.799***
Adjusted R2 26.1%
The variables are defined as follows:
BTMt = Book to market ratio in year t, defined as the ratio of end-of-year book
value of equity to end-of-year market value of equity;
CONCENTRATIONt = Herfindahl concentration index of control rights in year t;
CONCENTRATIONtQn is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm-
year observation falls into the nth quartile of the distribution of
CONCENTRATION;
ORIENT = Factor score representing the institutional orientation of a country,
transformed to range between 0 and 1, where high values indicate a
shareholder orientation and low values indicate a stakeholder orientation;
SIZEt = Natural logarithm of end-of-year total assets;
SALESGROWTHt = Percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t;
ROAt = Return on assets in year t, defined as the ratio of net income before
extraordinary items in year t to end-of-year total assets;
LEVERAGEt = The ratio of end-of-year liabilities to end-of-year total assets;
DIVIDENDSt = Dividends declared out of year t net income, scaled by end-of-year total
assets;
STD_ROAt = The standard deviation of ROAt, ROAt-1, and ROAt-2 (if available);
RETt = Stock return over the twelve month period ending at year t fiscal year-end.
Coefficients on industry dummies, year dummies, RETt, RETt-1, RETt-2, and RETt-3, and GWt, GWt-1,
GWt-2, and GWt-3 are included in the regression but not separately reported. The manufacturing
industry and the most recent available year are used as the base categories. I estimate the regression
after removing the top and bottom one percent of the distribution of BTM. Reported t-statistics are
based on heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors (Newey and West 1987).
***, **, and * (+++, ++, and +) denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent one-tailed (two-
tailed) alpha level, respectively.
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profitability firms to understate net income. LEVERAGE, DIVIDENDS, and STD_ROA
are included to control for bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy, and,
as hypothesized by Ahmed et al. (2000), are significantly negative (p<0.05, p<0.01,
and p<0.01, one-sided, respectively). The coefficients on current and lagged returns
(untabulated), which are included to control for lagged recognition of economic
income in accounting income are all significantly negative (p<0.01), as predicted.
Also, the coefficients on current and lagged goodwill write-offs (untabulated), which
control for differences in book and market values caused by immediate write-offs of
goodwill,  are all significantly negative (p<0.01).
4.4.3 Sensitivity analyses
1. Alternative measure of ownership structure: To test the sensitivity of my results to
the definition of ownership structure, I replace the CONCENTRATION indicator
variables by the continuous variable CONCENTRATION in equations (4.1) and
(4.2). The results (not tabulated) remain qualitatively similar.
2. Alternative definition of accruals: To test whether the definition of accruals drives
the results, I estimate equation (4.1) while substituting working capital accruals by
total accruals (i.e., including depreciation).9 The results for my smoothing test (not
tabulated) remain qualitatively similar. However, the coefficient on ORIENT
becomes negative and statistically significant, whereas I do not find a significant
effect in my main analysis (see Table 4.4). This could suggest that depreciation
expense (the only difference between the two accrual measures) is driven by a
country’s institutional orientation, i.e. that firms from countries with more
shareholder-oriented institutions report greater depreciation expenses.
4.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this chapter I study the influence of country-specific institutional factors on firms’
financial reporting choices at different levels of ownership concentration. I find some
evidence that the influence of institutions on financial reporting is more pronounced
for closely held firms than for widely held firms. Specifically, I find that the extent to
which widely held firms engage in (unconditionally) conservative reporting does not
differ across institutional environments, whereas closely held firms in shareholder-
oriented countries display significantly less conservative reporting behavior than their
counterparts in stakeholder-oriented countries. Furthermore, I find that differences in
earnings smoothing across countries are related to a country’s institutional orientation.
However, contrary to expectations, I do not find a difference in the effect of
institutions for firms with different levels of ownership concentration. A possible
explanation for this finding is that both closely held and widely held firms in
CHAPTER 4
92
stakeholder-oriented institutional environments, where financial and tax accounting
tend to be highly aligned, smooth earnings in order to manage their tax burdens.
The analyses in this chapter refine previous international accounting research by
documenting that the influence of institutions on some properties of accounting
information may differ across firms. Specifically, the finding that in stakeholder-
oriented institutional settings, the variation in (unconditional) conservatism across
firms is greater than in shareholder-oriented settings, suggest that existing studies of
international differences in accounting are better predicting financial reporting
behavior in the latter type of environments.
Mandated IFRS introduction for listed EU firms from 2005 on can be seen as an
attempt by the European Commission to make reporting in the EU more shareholder-
oriented. The findings in this chapter suggest that changes that make the institutional
environment more shareholder-oriented reduce the influence of ownership
concentration on financial reporting, which makes the reporting objectives of firms
more homogeneous. In chapter 3, I find that in The Netherlands, a country with
shareholder-oriented accounting regulation that is close to IFRS, firms’ ownership
structures significantly influence financial reporting. Taken together, these findings
suggests that mere standardization of accounting regulation is not likely to result in
more homogeneity in financial reporting and that other institutional changes are
necessary to make financial reporting practices more homogeneous and more
shareholder-oriented.
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Notes
1  I split up firm-years into quartiles based on ownership concentration.
2  Prior international accounting research has dichotomized countries’ accounting systems using
differing terminology. For example, Ali and Hwang (2000) distinguish between bank- and market-
oriented countries, whereas Ball et al. (2000) classify countries according to their legal origins into
code- and common law countries. Leuz et al. (2003) use the ‘insider’ versus ‘outsider’
classification, but point out that their classification shows a large degree of overlap with other
classifications.
3  Tucker and Zarowin (2006) argue that earnings smoothing is informative in the sense that it
improves the predictability of firms’ earnings.
4  Leuz et al. (2003) compare countries’ institutional environments on different characteristics and
show, using a cluster analysis, that ‘outsider’ institutional environments differ from ‘insider’
institutional environments by, among others, having a higher stock market capitalization, more
listed firms, a higher number of IPOs, lower average ownership concentration, a higher anti-
director rights index, and a higher disclosure index. My classification is likely to show considerable
overlap with other classifications of countries’ institutional environments.
5  Ownership data from Faccio and Lang (2002) is available from the web site of the Journal of
Financial Economics (http://jfe.rochester.edu/data.htm)
6  Unlike in chapter 3, where separate measures for the use of takeover defense mechanisms,
including the use of depository receipts, are considered, I include depository receipt holdings
(shares are held by administrative offices) in my ownership measures in this chapter.
7  Hribar and Collins (2002) indicate that an artificial negative correlation between accruals and cash
flows could be created if (i) cash flows are defined as earnings minus accruals and (ii) if mergers
and acquisitions, discontinued operations, or exchange rate changes affect balance sheet items. A
potential solution to this problem is to use accruals and cash flows from the firms’ cash flow
statements. However, because I do not have such data available, I use an alternative solution by
scaling working capital in year t (t-1) by total assets from the same year t (t-1) and calculating
working-capital accruals as changes in scaled working capital. This contrasts with the commonly
used approach of defining accruals as changes in working capital in year t, scaled by total assets
from year t-1. Because working capital and total assets from one particular year are similarly
affected by events such as mergers and acquisitions, scaling working capital by total assets from
the same year should reduce the distorting effect of the problems described by Hribar and Collins.
8  The effect of a country’s institutional orientation differs significantly between quartiles 1 and 2
(p<0.05, one-sided), 2 and 3 (p<0.01, one-sided), and 3 and 4 (p<0.01, one-sided).
9  I do not use an abnormal accruals measurement model, as in Chapter 3, to decompose accruals into
a normal (non-discretionary) and abnormal (discretionary) part, because Meuwissen et al. (2006)
show that the performance of these models shows considerable cross-country variation.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Conclusion
5.1 Introduction
This dissertation examines determinants of firms’ financial reporting choices. In
chapter 2 the determinants and consequences of non-local GAAP adoption by EU
firms are studied. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the effects of institutional and firm-
specific factors on properties of accounting information. In chapter 3 I study the
effects of firm-specific reporting incentives generated by firms’ governance structures
in detail and in chapter 4 I consider the effects of both country-specific and firm-
specific factors on reporting as well as their interactive effect. This final chapter starts
with a summary of the empirical findings of the three studies contained in this
dissertation, followed by conclusions and implications. Finally, I discuss some
limitations and provide suggestions for future research.
5.2 Summary
The study in chapter 2 investigates the determinants and consequences of voluntary
adoption of non-local accounting principles (non-local GAAP) by firms listed and
domiciled in the European Union. Knowing what drives firms to voluntarily use non-
local standards helps to understand the costs and benefits of non-local GAAP
adoption. Furthermore, analyzing the consequences of adoption sheds light on the
existence or absence of measurable benefits of adoption. In the study, I consider the
two predominant internationally accepted sets of accounting standards, IAS/IFRS and
U.S. GAAP. I use various data sources to identify EU firms that use non-local GAAP
of which I subsequently inspect the 1999 annual reports to confirm their usage of
IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP. Firms’ 1999 annual reports are chosen because accounting
standard choices in more recent years may be affected by the announcement of the
proposal by the European Commission in February 2001 to mandate IAS usage from
2005 on. The maintained hypothesis is that firms that voluntarily adopt IAS or U.S.
GAAP expect to experience net benefits from adoption. The finding that 133
non-financial firms in the EU voluntarily use non-local GAAP in 1999 suggests that
the vast majority of listed EU firms do not expect to benefit from non-local GAAP
adoption. I find that firms voluntarily using non-local GAAP are more likely to be
listed on a U.S. exchange, the EASDAQ exchange in Brussels, and have more
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geographically dispersed operations. Furthermore, they are more likely to be domiciled
in a country with lower quality financial reporting and where IAS is explicitly allowed
as an alternative to local GAAP.
In the second part of chapter 2, I study whether non-local GAAP adopters have
lower levels of information asymmetry, a much cited benefit of using more transparent
financial reporting, than non-adopters. I consider several proxies for information
asymmetry: analyst following, cost of equity capital, and uncertainty among analysts
and investors (measured by analyst forecast dispersion and stock return volatility). I
document a positive effect of non-local GAAP adoption on analyst following, but fail
to find evidence of a lower cost of capital or lower stock return volatility for non-local
GAAP adopters. Contrary to expectations, analyst forecast dispersion appears to be
higher for firms using IAS or U.S. GAAP than for firms using local GAAP. However,
by comparing ‘early’ and ‘late’ adopters, I find that only late adopters experience
higher forecast dispersion. The forecast dispersion of early adopters and non-adopters
is not significantly different. This suggests that benefits of adoption take some time to
fully materialize.
In chapter 3, the influence of firms’ corporate governance structures on
financial reporting is examined. The setting of the study, The Netherlands, is
characterized by an institutional environment with shareholder-oriented accounting
regulation, which is relatively weakly enforced. These characteristics leave firms
considerable reporting discretion. Furthermore, the Dutch corporate governance
system has some unique characteristics. First, firms display a large diversity in
ownership structures, with some firms being widely held, whereas others are majority
owned by management or a single large shareholder. Second, some firms’ Supervisory
Boards fall under the so-called structure regime, which grants supervisory directors
substantial power over managers’ appointment and dismissal and financial reporting.
Finally, Dutch corporate governance is characterized by the extensive use of various
takeover defense mechanisms. This variation in governance structures creates strong
variation in (firm-specific) reporting incentives. Coupled with the high degree of
reporting discretion that the institutional environment offers, this provides a unique
research setting to study the influence of governance structures on properties of
financial reporting, while holding institutional factors constant.
I characterize firms’ reporting objectives as stakeholder- or shareholder-
oriented. The stakeholder (shareholder) orientation of a firm’s financial reporting is
expected to be increasing (decreasing) in the degree of ownership concentration, being
subject to the structure regime, and the use of takeover defense mechanisms. Firms
with shareholder-oriented governance structures face demand for informative financial
reporting from shareholders who are at arm’s length from the firm. In firms with
stakeholder-oriented governance structures, shareholders typically have access to
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private information and are therefore less dependent on public financial reporting.
Furthermore, the market for corporate control tends to be weaker for stakeholder-
oriented firms. This allows firm management to take the interests of other stakeholders
into account and focus financial reporting choices on payout determination and
maintain financial stability by avoiding excessive payouts to any group of stakeholders
(including shareholders’ dividend payments). I hypothesize that firms that I label as
stakeholder-oriented smooth earnings more actively and report more (unconditionally)
conservative than firms that I label as shareholder-oriented. Smoothed earnings figures
and conservative accounting choices ensure financial stability by controlling payouts
and ensuring sufficient internal financing. Furthermore, stakeholder-oriented firms are
expected to engage less in myopic reporting, measured as meeting or just beating
analyst earnings forecasts than shareholder-oriented firms, because of the lower capital
market pressures. I find evidence consistent with my hypotheses.
Chapter 4 describes a study about the impact of the effect of a country’s
institutional orientation on firms’ reporting objectives conditional on firms’ ownership
structures using a sample of firms from Western European countries. This study
complements the study in chapter 3, where I study the influence of firms’ incentives
while holding the institutional environment constant, by investigating the influence of
institutions, while controlling for firms’ ownership structures. I measure a country’s
reporting orientation, stakeholder- or shareholder-oriented, by constructing a factor
score of various institutional influences on accounting. Firm-specific reporting
incentives are measured by share ownership concentration. I hypothesize that
institutional influences on reporting are stronger for closely held than for widely held
firms. As argued in chapter 3, widely held firms have incentives to report shareholder-
oriented. In stakeholder-oriented institutional environments, where these reporting
incentives are incongruent with the institutional reporting orientation, widely held
firms are expected to be able to report shareholder-oriented by choosing certain
accounting options or by providing additional disclosures to better inform dispersed
shareholders. On the other hand, the costs for closely held firms in shareholder-
oriented countries of not complying with the country’s institutional orientation tend to
be relatively high. The strong protection of minority investors’ rights and typically
strict enforcement of accounting standards are expected to lead to shareholder-oriented
reporting also by closely held firms in these countries.
Using the same methodology as in chapter 3, I find that firms’ ownership
structures moderate the effect of institutions on firms’ level of (unconditional)
conservatism. Furthermore, I find that institutions influence earnings smoothing
behavior.1 However, I do not find the hypothesized moderating effect of ownership
structure, i.e., closely held and widely held firms’ earnings smoothing behavior is
equally affected by a country’s institutional orientation. In stakeholder-oriented
CHAPTER 5
98
institutional environments, the alignment between financial and tax accounting rules,
one of the measures included in the institutional orientation factor score, is relatively
high. Firms may therefore smooth their earnings to manage taxes in these countries.
Finding no difference in smoothing behavior between widely held and closely held
firms may indicate that, even for widely held firms, the benefits of income smoothing
for tax purposes outweigh the costs of not reporting informatively in stakeholder-
oriented institutional environments.
5.3 Limitations and suggestions for future research
To measure the consequences of adoption of non-local GAAP in chapter 2, I use
various proxies for information asymmetry. The mixed evidence regarding adoption
consequences could be related to the inability of these measures to accurately measure
the level of information asymmetry between firms and their shareholders.
Furthermore, relatively little data was available in the post-adoption period. Therefore,
I have not been able to thoroughly test the explanation I offer that benefits from
adoption take some time to fully materialize, i.e., because investors and analysts need
time to fully comprehend the changes brought about by the switch to non-local GAAP.
Also, the effects of voluntary non-local GAAP adoption may very well be different
from the effect of, for example, the mandated introduction of IAS/IFRS in the EU.
Future research could try to better measure the consequences of adoption by using
longer time series. Also, the effects of the mandatory EU-wide introduction of
IAS/IFRS could be analyzed, keeping in mind that the short-term effects may be
different from the long-term consequences.
The studies in chapters 3 and 4 use ownership concentration (chapters 3 and 4),
being subject to the structure regime, and the use of takeover defense mechanisms
(chapter 3) as firm-specific determinants of financial reporting objectives. Although I
argue that these are important determinants, there are several other classes of factors
that influence firms’ reporting objectives. The measures I study mainly reflect the
absence or presence of shareholders’ demand for shareholder-oriented reporting. Other
groups of stakeholders, like providers of debt financing, may have different reporting
demands. Future research could study the effect of specific reporting demands from
other stakeholders on properties of firms’ accounting.
The empirical proxies for firms’ reporting objectives I study in chapters 3 and 4,
the accounting properties unconditional conservatism and earnings smoothing, are
subject to measurement error. The book to market ratio which I use as an inverse
proxy for conservative reporting behavior is influenced by factors not explained by
accounting choices. Although I control for some of these factors in a manner
consistent with prior literature, I cannot exclude the possibility of correlated omitted
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variables. However, I am not aware of any variable that is correlated with the variables
measuring firm-specific and country-specific reporting incentives which is also related
to the book to market ratio. Furthermore, because of the unavailability of cash flow
statement data for many firms, working capital accruals and operating cash flows have
to be calculated using balance sheet data. Calculating accruals using the balance sheet
approach is an accepted method in the literature, especially when using international
data sets. Future research could assess the robustness of the results by refining the data
used or by examining further proxies for firms’ reporting objectives.
5.4 Conclusions and implications
The study on voluntary non-local GAAP adoption in the EU presented in chapter 2
indicates that only 6.4% of my sample firms use IAS/IFRS or U.S. GAAP by 1999,2
which suggest that the net benefits of adoption are negative for the majority of firms. I
find that adoption of non-local GAAP is explained by both firm-specific and country-
specific factors. Specifically, adopters are more likely to be listed on the EASDAQ
exchange or in the U.S., have more geographically dispersed operations, and are
larger. Furthermore, they are more likely to be domiciled in countries where local
accounting standards are of relatively low quality and in countries where IAS/IFRS is
explicitly allowed as an alternative to local GAAP. Firms with these characteristics are
therefore more likely to benefit from adoption and considering the obligation for listed
EU firms to use IAS/IFRS from 2005, these are the types of firms that the European
Commission is benefiting with the new accounting regulation. Considering that firms
that do not voluntarily switch to IAS/IFRS do not expect to experience net benefits
from adoption, these firms could have incentives to not fully comply with IAS/IFRS.
As such, identification of determinants of non-local GAAP adoption could help
enforcement institutions direct their efforts in enforcing the correct application of
IAS/IFRS from 2005 on.
Whether mandated adoption of IAS/IFRS will lead to more transparent
financial reporting across Europe ultimately remains an open question. From the
analysis of consequences of voluntary non-local GAAP adoption in chapter 2 mixed
results emerge. Firms using non-local standards (especially ‘early’ adopters) are
followed more heavily by financial analysts. I fail to find evidence of differences in
cost of equity capital or stock return volatility. ‘Late’ adopters even have higher
analyst forecast dispersion. However, ‘early’ adopters are not different from non-
adopters with respect to forecast dispersion. This analysis of the consequences of
voluntary adoption could suggest that adoption benefits take some time to materialize.
Daske (2006) finds that benefits from non-local GAAP adoption, in the form of a
lower cost of equity capital, do not seem to be apparent for voluntary adopters.
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Furthermore, results by Armstrong et al. (2007) suggest that the major source of
benefits from mandatory IFRS adoption is convergence of financial reporting across
firms, besides increased information quality. This would imply that benefits from the
introduction of IFRS for financial reporting in the EU may very well be substantial,
but that they do not come from improvements in a firms’ information environment, but
are mainly due to harmonization of financial reporting practice across firms.
The analyses in chapter 3 cast doubt on the achievability of the European
Commission’s aim of promoting the transparency and comparability of financial
reporting by mandating public EU firms to use IAS/IFRS. The results indicate that the
firm-specific reporting incentives generated by Dutch firms’ governance structures
significantly influence their financial reporting behavior. IAS/IFRS standards are
similar to the Dutch ‘Guidelines for Annual Financial Statements’ issued by the
‘Council for Annual Reporting’ (Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving), which are followed
by all Dutch publicly listed firms. Because of this similarity in accounting regulation,
it is questionable whether mandating firms with stakeholder-oriented governance
structures to use IAS/IFRS will significantly change these firms’ financial reporting.
Chapter 4 extends chapter 3 by studying the influence of institutions at different
levels of ownership concentration. The finding that a country’s institutional orientation
has a greater influence on the level of (unconditional) conservatism for closely held
than for widely held firms, suggests that some properties of accounting information are
affected differently by institutions across firms with different reporting incentives.
This finding is important for regulators in assessing the impact of (changes in) the
institutional environment, for example, enforcement or accounting regulation, across
firms. The combined results from chapters 3 and 4 suggest that IFRS adoption will be
successful in reducing differences in accounting across firms with different reporting
incentives if not only accounting regulation is changed, but also other aspects of the
institutional environment are changed simultaneously.
Important developments that can significantly influence firms’ financial
reporting are taking place, both on the EU level and in The Netherlands. The
description of Dutch corporate governance in chapter 3 is accurate for the sample
period studied. However, some major changes have taken place in recent years. First,
important responsibilities of the Supervisory Boards of structure firms, such as the
right to amend the financial statements, the approval of key firm decisions, the
appointment and dismissal of supervisory directors, and the determination of
supervisory directors’ remuneration, have been transferred to shareholders. Second,
holders of depository receipts are able to exercise their voting rights. However, the
holder of the voting rights (typically an administrative office controlled by the firm)
can refuse holders of depository receipts to exercise voting rights in the case of a
public offer for the firms’ shares or depository receipts. Third, the implementation of
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the EU Takeover Directive will reduce the possibility to effectively use takeover
defense mechanisms. The ‘mandatory offer rule’ stipulates that a shareholder with
predominant control (defined in the Dutch setting as at least 30 percent of voting
rights) is required to make a public offer for the remaining shares. The Netherlands has
decided to opt out of articles 9 and 11 (the ‘frustrating action’ and ‘breakthrough’
provisions) of the Takeover Directive, which would forbid offeree firms to take
defensive action and which would allow a shareholder that has acquired at least 75
percent of a firm’s shares through a public offer to be able to break through a firm’s
takeover defense mechanisms. However, firms can voluntarily adopt these provisions
in their Articles of Association. Finally, firms now have to report on their compliance
with a number of principles and best practice pronouncements of the Dutch corporate
governance code (‘Code Tabaksblat’) in their annual reports. The Code deals with
issues such as the independence of the members of the Supervisory Board, the
maximum number of directorships managing and supervisory directors can hold, term
limits of directors, and the disclosure of remuneration policies and conflicts of interest
of directors.
One of the objectives of stakeholder-oriented reporting is securing sufficient
internal financing through earnings smoothing and conservative reporting behavior.
However, in the absence of effective takeover defense mechanisms, the substantial
cash holdings make these firms attractive takeover targets. The stronger corporate
control market that the reform of the Dutch corporate governance system creates leads
to considerably more influence from shareholders on management. Politicians, trade
unions, and employers’ organizations have criticized the consequences of the
corporate governance reform. Venture capitalists take a growing interest in Dutch
public firms as they are constantly seeking to take over and restructure
underperforming firms. In the recent past this has lead to, among others, the
privatizations of retail firm VendexKBB and media firm VNU. Critics argue that a
disproportionate emphasis is placed on shareholders’ interests at the expense of other
stakeholders. Shareholders interests are not necessarily congruent with the interests of
other stakeholders, as minority shareholders are mainly interested in short-term value
creation and not necessarily in the long-term survival of the firm. Furthermore, critics
fear that Dutch firms increasingly become owned by foreign investors, which could
lead to a loss of employment in The Netherlands. Also the risk that venture capitalists
impose on firms is a point of critique, because most privatizations are financed heavily
by debt capital.
On the contrary, it can be argued that active shareholders fulfill an important
role in monitoring management. A strong market for corporate control forces
managers to make decisions that maximize firm value. Likewise, debt capital helps
reduce the agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen 1986), because, unlike dividends, the
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non-discretionary nature of interest payments makes debt an effective bonding
mechanism. In general, I consider the move towards shareholder-oriented governance
structures to be positive. Capital markets have an important role in the efficient
channeling of funds, both nationally and internationally. And although governments
should try to protect the interests of all parties in society, this role should not be
executed by protecting Dutch firms from takeovers. Public firms’ financial reporting
should serve an important role in reducing agency conflicts between minority
shareholders and management by facilitating contracting and providing useful
information for valuing investments.
On a European level, several important regulatory changes are taking place that
will influence and further harmonize financial reporting across the EU. The
Transparency Directive harmonizes various disclosure requirements and, among
others, requires listed EU firms to publish annual reports within four months after
fiscal yearend and to draw up interim financial statements. Furthermore, this Directive
regulates disclosures of major shareholdings in listed firms. The Prospectus Directive
makes it possible for firms to use a single prospectus on capital markets throughout the
EU, which reduces the costs of listing in multiple EU Member States.
The EU’s Market Abuse Directive sets uniform rules against insider trading and
market manipulation across the EU. The market for corporate control in many EU
countries will be strengthened by the abovementioned Takeover Directive, which
increases the influence of (minority) shareholders. One of the most important
developments however, is the revision of the Eighth Company Law Directive on
auditing. The Directive, adopted in April 2006, among others, requires firms to set up
an independent audit committee and to publicly disclose audit fees. Furthermore, the
Directive requires independence of the auditor and the audited firm, stipulates that
audits should be conducted in accordance with International Standards on Auditing
(ISA), and regulates the oversight and registration of auditors and audit firms. The
Directive thus will further harmonize audit practices in the EU, which can have
significant impact on firms’ financial reporting choices.
The developments that are taking place are important steps in the direction of
making the institutional environment across EU countries more shareholder-oriented.
As argued before, institutional reforms are important to make the introduction of
IAS/IFRS standards successful. However, progress is rather slow and significant
differences remain in important areas. The lengthy endorsement process of the fair
value option in IAS 39 by the Accounting Regulatory Committee of the European
Commission is illustrative of the difficulties of standardizing financial reporting across
all EU member states. Also, Member States are allowed to opt out of articles 9 and 11
of the Takeover Directive. Article 9 forbids firms to take defensive action in the case
of a bid without shareholder approval and article 11 allows bidders to breakthrough
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target firms’ anti-takeover mechanisms. Many EU countries are not implementing one
or both of these articles in national law, which means that the Directive only sets
minimum standards but does not fully harmonize the corporate control market.
One of the most important influences on financial reporting that has only
recently been addressed on an international level is the enforcement of accounting
regulation. The Transparency Directive stipulates that individual Member States are
responsible for the enforcement of the correct application of IFRS and sets minimum
requirements for national enforcement bodies. Furthermore, the Committee of
European Securities Regulators (CESR) issues standards and guidelines to coordinate
enforcement practices. However, because the Transparency Directive only is effective
from the beginning of 2007, it remains unclear whether measures taken so far will
harmonize enforcement of IFRS across the EU in practice.
The institutional changes that are underway have the potential to make
reporting in the EU more shareholder-oriented and more comparable across firms. In
the short run, I expect that there will be great diversity in the effectiveness of the
implementation of IAS/IFRS. As suggested in the analysis of consequences of non-
local GAAP adoption in chapter 2, investors and other stakeholders will likely need
time to learn how to interpret information reported under IFRS and firms will need
time to correctly implement the new set of accounting standards. Also, many reforms
mentioned above still need to be effectuated and further institutional changes are
necessary in many countries. One aspect that I consider essential in achieving
comparability of financial reporting information across countries is equally strict
enforcement of accounting standards across countries. However, uniform enforcement
across countries is still in its infancy and will likely take some years to become fully
harmonized. Changes in firm-specific incentive factors, like firms’ ownership
structures and financing methods, which are partly a result of institutional changes, can
be expected to take even longer. When reforms continue along the current path of
making both institutions and corporate governance more shareholder-oriented,
financial reporting practices in the EU can be expected to converge and gradually
become more shareholder-oriented in the near future.
CHAPTER 5
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Notes
1  In chapter 4, I do not study the tendency to meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts, one of the
accounting properties I investigate in chapter 3, because I do not have the required data available
for the all countries included in the sample.
2  The actual adoption percentage in the EU is lower, because firms from the United Kingdom and
Ireland are excluded from the analyses, where no firms adopted non-local GAAP in 1999, and
because relatively more non-adopter than adopter observations are lost because of data availability
constraints.
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Summary in Dutch (Nederlandse samenvatting)
Determinanten van verslaggevingskeuzes: de rol
van institutionele en bedrijfsspecifieke factoren
Dit proefschrift bestudeert de determinanten van verslaggevingskeuzes van
ondernemingen aan de hand van drie empirische studies. Verslaggevingskeuzes
worden gemaakt op verschillende niveaus. Ten eerste kunnen bedrijven in bepaalde
gevallen kiezen welke set verslaggevingsstandaarden ze gebruiken. Voor het gebruik
van International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) verplicht werd voor
beursgenoteerde ondernemingen in de Europese Unie, bijvoorbeeld, was het in een
aantal landen al toegestaan om U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
of IFRS, in plaats van lokale verslaggevingsstandaarden, toe te passen voor het
opstellen van de geconsolideerde jaarrekening. Ten tweede dienen ondernemingen
binnen een set verslaggevingsstandaarden schattingen en keuzes voor bepaalde
waarderingsmethoden te maken. Zo maken ondernemingen schattingen ten aanzien
van de hoogte van garantievoorzieningen en staat IFRS toe vaste activa te waarderen
tegen historische kostprijs of vervangingswaarde.
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik de determinanten en de gevolgen van vrijwillige
adoptie van IFRS of U.S. GAAP door beursgenoteerde ondernemingen in de Europese
Unie (EU). Verwacht wordt dat bedrijven kiezen voor deze verslaggevingsstandaarden
in plaats van lokale standaarden indien de voordelen van adoptie opwegen tegen de
kosten. Het blijkt dat in 1999 slechts 133 ondernemingen vrijwillig IFRS of U.S.
GAAP gebruiken. Dit suggereert dat het slechts voor weinig ondernemingen voordelig
is om deze standaarden toe te passen. Bedrijven die deze standaarden gebruiken zijn
vaker genoteerd aan de EASDAQ aandelenbeurs of aan een aandelenbeurs in de
Verenigde Staten. Verder zijn de activiteiten van deze ondernemingen geografisch
meer gespreid en komen ze vaker uit landen waar lokale verslaggevingsregels van
lagere kwaliteit zijn en waar IFRS expliciet als alternatief voor lokale standaarden is
toegestaan.
Bedrijven die IFRS of U.S. GAAP vrijwillig gebruiken blijken, tegen mijn
verwachtingen in, geen lagere kapitaalkosten te hebben. Wel worden deze bedrijven
door meer financiële analisten gevolgd. De spreiding van winstvoorspellingen van
analisten voor deze bedrijven blijkt echter groter te zijn, wat kan duiden op grotere
informatieasymmetrie tussen ondernemingen en investeerders. Nadere analyse leert
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echter dat dit effect alleen optreedt voor de ‘late’ adopters, bedrijven die in 1998 of
1999 IFRS of U.S. GAAP hebben ingevoerd, en niet voor de ‘early’ adopters.
In hoofdstuk 3 bestudeer ik de invloed van de corporate governance structuur
van ondernemingen op hun verslaggevingskeuzes. De setting van de studie,
Nederland, is gekozen vanwege de grote mate van flexibiliteit die ondernemingen
hebben in hun financiële verslaggeving en de substantiële verschillen in corporate
governance tussen ondernemingen. Nederlandse verslaggevingsregels zijn, evenals
IFRS, primair gericht op informatievoorziening aan aandeelhouders. Echter,
gedurende de onderzochte periode (1991-2000), is het gebruik van de Richtlijnen voor
de Jaarverslaggeving (Guidelines for Annual Reporting) vrijwillig en is het toezicht
op de verslaggeving van ondernemingen relatief zwak. Nederlandse corporate
governance in deze periode wordt gekenmerkt door het veelvuldige gebruik van
beschermingsconstructies door ondernemingen, het bestaan van het structuurregime en
de grote variantie in de concentratie van aandelenbezit tussen ondernemingen.
Ik verwacht dat ondernemingen met gespreid aandelenbezit, ondernemingen die
niet onder het structuurregime vallen en ondernemingen zonder
beschermingsconstructies (shareholder-georiënteerde corporate governance),
verslaggevingskeuzes maken in het belang van de informatieverstrekking aan
aandeelhouders. In ondernemingen met geconcentreerd aandelenbezit, ondernemingen
die onder het structuurregime vallen en ondernemingen met beschermingsconstructies
(stakeholder-georiënteerde corporate governance), verwacht ik dat verslaggeving een
belangrijke rol speelt in het bepalen van de winstbestemming. Specifiek verwacht ik
dat managers van bedrijven met stakeholder-georiënteerde governance structuren
conservatieve verslaggevingskeuzes maken en winsten proberen te egaliseren om
zodoende te hoge uitkeringen aan de verschillende stakeholders van de onderneming te
voorkomen en voor voldoende interne financiering te zorgen. Managers van bedrijven
met shareholder-georiënteerde governance structuren zullen daarentegen aan de vraag
van aandeelhouders voor informatieve verslaggeving willen voldoen, en dus niet
noodzakelijk conservatieve en winstegaliserende verslaggevingskeuzes maken.
Stakeholder-georiënteerde governance structuren zorgen er echter ook voor dat
managers minder onder druk staan van de kapitaalmarkt, omdat de relatief zwakke
macht van aandeelhouders in deze ondernemingen ervoor zorgt dat de kans op een
overname uiterst klein is. Voor ondernemingen met shareholder-georiënteerde
governance structuren is de druk van de overnamemarkt groter en de nadruk op het
behalen van korte-termijn winsten relatief hoog. Specifiek verwacht ik dat managers
van bedrijven met shareholder-georiënteerde governance structuren flexibiliteit in
verslaggeving meer zullen gebruiken om zo winstvoorspellingen van analisten
proberen te overschrijden dan managers van bedrijven met stakeholder-georiënteerde
governance structuren.
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De resultaten van de studie zijn in lijn met deze verwachtingen en laten zien
ondernemingen met een stakeholder-georiënteerde governance structuur
conservatiever rapporteren, winsten meer egaliseren en minder vaak
analistenvoorspellingen proberen te behalen dan bedrijven met een shareholder-
georiënteerde governance structuur.
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik de invloed van institutionele (landspecifieke)
factoren op verslaggevingskeuzes van ondernemingen met verschillende
aandeelhoudersstructuren in West-Europa. Ik verwacht dat de institutionele oriëntatie
van een land een grotere invloed heeft op ondernemingen met geconcentreerd
aandelenbezit dan op ondernemingen met verspreid aandelenbezit. Ik classificeer de
institutionele oriëntatie van een land ten aanzien van financiële verslaggeving als
stakeholder- of shareholder-georiënteerd. De institutionele omgeving in shareholder-
georiënteerde landen is gericht op de rol van verslaggeving in de
informatievoorziening aan aandeelhouders, terwijl de nadruk in stakeholder-
georiënteerde landen ligt op de rol van verslaggeving in het bepalen van de
winstbestemming. Evenals in hoofdstuk 3, classificeer ik bedrijven met
geconcentreerd aandelenbezit als stakeholder-georiënteerd en bedrijven met verspreid
aandelenbezit als shareholder-georiënteerd. Wanneer de ondernemingsspecifieke
verslaggevingsoriëntatie niet in lijn is met de institutionele verslaggevingsoriëntatie,
ontstaat er een kosten-batenafweging voor ondernemingen. De kosten voor bedrijven
met geconcentreerd aandelenbezit om stakeholder-georiënteerd te rapporteren in
landen met shareholder-georiënteerde instituties zijn relatief hoog, omdat de rechten
van individuele aandeelhouders in deze landen goed beschermd zijn en het toezicht op
verslaggeving strikt is. Echter, bedrijven met verspreid aandelenbezit kunnen in
stakeholder-georiënteerde landen vaak shareholder-georiënteerd rapporteren, omdat
de flexibiliteit in verslaggeving en het beperkte toezicht in deze landen het
ondernemingen veelal toestaat om bepaalde informatieve verslaggevingskeuzes te
maken. Ik verwacht dan ook dat de insitutionele oriëntatie van een land een grotere
invloed heeft op ondernemingen met geconcentreerd aandelenbezit dan op
ondernemingen met verspreid aandelenbezit.
Ik onderzoek de verslaggevingskeuzes van ondernemingen aan de hand van
twee van de kenmerken die ook in hoofdstuk 3 worden onderzocht: de mate waarin
een onderneming conservatief rapporteert en de mate van winstegalisatie. De
resultaten geven aan dat institutionele factoren de verslaggevingskeuzes van
ondernemingen beïnvloeden. Verder vind ik, in lijn met mijn verwachtingen, dat het
effect van instituties op de mate waarin ondernemingen conservatief rapporteren,
groter is voor ondernemingen met geconcentreerd aandelenbezit dan voor
ondernemingen met gespreid aandelenbezit. Ik vind dit effect echter niet voor de mate
waarin winsten geëgaliseerd worden.
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Samengevat laten de resultaten van de drie studies laten zien dat behalve
regelgeving, ook andere institutionele en bedrijfsspecifieke factoren een invloed
hebben op de financiële verslaggeving van ondernemingen. Een belangrijke implicatie
is dat de verplichte invoering van IFRS in de EU niet automatisch zal leiden tot
informatievere, shareholder-georiënteerde verslaggeving voor alle ondernemingen,
omdat, naast regelgeving, andere institutionele en bedrijfsspecifieke factoren niet
gelijktijdig veranderen. Naast standaardisatie van verslaggevingsregels, worden echter
ook andere institutionele verschillen tussen landen, bijvoorbeeld op het gebied van
richtlijnen voor overnames, accountantscontrole en handel met voorkennis,
gereduceerd. Het doorvoeren van deze veranderingen vergt echter tijd. Ook resteren er
nog belangrijke verschillen tussen landen, ondermeer op het terrein van het toezicht op
verslaggeving. Daarnaast zullen bedrijfsspecifieke verschillen die een invloed hebben
op verslaggeving, zoals verschillen in financieringsvormen van ondernemingen,
slechts geleidelijk verdwijnen. Op de lange termijn zullen deze veranderingen er echter
voor zorgen dat financiële verslaggeving in de EU beter vergelijkbaar en meer op de
vraag van aandeelhouders gericht wordt.
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